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ABSTRACT 
The critique of the Legal Aid scheme is on two levels. 
Firstly 'technical' problems are discussed. It is in the 
nature of these problems that they can be resolved within 
the present structural arrangement of the scheme. The 
administrative procedures, use and coverage of the scheme 
are examined, taking into account the view point of the 
consumer. Privately paying and legal aid clients are com-
pared in terms of the quality of the service they receive, 
solicitors' attitudes to them, and the differing nature of 
the problems of poor people. 
The argument then concentrates on the 'structural' 
defects of the scheme, avoiding the minutiae of its 
workings. The proprietry of a scheme created to provide 
legal services to poor people through solicitors in private 
practice is questioned. The legally orientated theory 
underlying the Legal Aid scheme is contrasted to social 
and consumer based theories, and to the practical model 
of the American Neighbourhood Law Firm. Empirical research 
is used to highlight the deficiency in the distribution of 
private practice solicitors to meet the needs of the poor; 
and the compensatory role of advice agencies in providing 
the relevant legal services to them. 
The Legal Aid Act 1988 is subjected to a close analysis 
with particular emphasis on the Lord Chancellor's powers, 
and the creation of the Legal Aid Board. The role and 
agenda of the Board, and future of the Legal Aid scheme are 
considered by outlining and examining the proposals con-
tained in the preceding White Paper. Conclusions are drawn 
as to the possible results of the Act, and its value in 
relation to the _previous critique of the Legal Aid scheme. 
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PART 1 
Legal Aid A Question of Suitability 
l 
(A) Introduction 
When introducing the Bill which was to become the 
Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949, the then Attorney General 
Sir Hartley Shawcross said the legal aid system would 
"open the doors of the courts freely to all 
persons who may wish to avail themselves of 
British justice without regard to their 
wealth or ability to pay." (1) 
The Act was significant in the assistance which it 
intended to provide for the poor. The underprivileged 
would no longer have to rely on solicitors' charity to 
enable them to obtain legal representation. A positive 
right to free legal representation had been created for 
the poorest in society, and to those of moderate means a 
right to assistance towards the cost of litigation had 
been created. In his retrospective analysis of the legal 
aid system Wegg-Prosser wrote with reverence on the entrench-
ment of the principle of equality before the law into the 
British system of justice. He recognised the importance of 
placing the poor person on a par with the rich one at the 
expense of the state. (2 ) 
These remain fine principles, but, as the Hughes 
Royal Commission noted, 
"There is no compelling reason why State 
support should take only the form of payment 
to private practitioners." (3) 
It is important to be aware that however benevolent the 
aims of the legal aid system were represented to be, that 
system was chosen because it was most beneficial to the 
l) \\Tegg-Prosser, C.F., "Justice Denied II", (1969) 113 Solic.J.825. 
2) Wegg-Prosser, C.F., "Justice Denied I-IV", (1969)113 Solic.J.803 
3) Royal Commission on Legal Services in Scotland,Vol.l.(l980) Cmnd.7846. 
para. 8.14. 
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most powerful pressure group. In this case the Law Society, 
the voice of the legal profession, was able to coerce the 
government into implementing a system tailored to the 
legal profession's structure and practices( 4 ). While 
this was not wholly detrimental to the interests of those 
who were unable to enforce their legal rights because of 
a lack of representation, it did mean that their require-
ments were not paramount in deciding how best they should 
be assisted. 
It is proposed to examine the legal aid system, to 
establish whether it is a suitable method by which to 
provide legal advice, assistance, and representation, to 
enable the poorer members of society to lawfully enforce 
their rights and fulfil their legal obligationsin the 
same way as those individuals and organisations with the 
advantage of comparative wealth. 
The legal aid scheme will be critically examined at 
two levels. First, in relation to what may be called the 
'technical' problems of the scheme and, second, in relation 
to what may be termed the 'structural' problems. The 
'technical' problems are those problems which could be 
rectified within the present structural arrangements. The 
subsequent examination of 'structural' problems avoids 
the minutia of the legal aid scheme and concentrates on 
asking whether providing the service through private 
4) Abel, R., "Laws Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced 
Capitalism", (1985) 32 U.C.L.A. Law Review 474; and 
Alcock, P.C. I "Legal Aid ; vlhose Problem?" I (1976) 
3 B.J.L.S. 151. 
3 
practitioners is the most suitable method to enable the 
poor to receive the representation necessary to achieve 
equality before the law. Some issues will require 
examination under both headings but duplication will be 
kept to a minimum. 
(B) The Technical Problems of Legal Aid 
(1) Is Legal Aid too bureaucratic? 
" ... [IJt's all a question of paying solicitors' 
costs, that's really all we're doing." (5) 
Whatever the view of the professional administrator, 
legal aid could not be regarded as a simple system in 
the eyes of the layman. When people are in need of assis-
tance they are likely to be uncertain in two ways. Firstly 
a lack of knowledge of the structures and institutions 
both in society as a whole and specifically in the law 
prevents people from choosing the course of action which 
is right for them. People are reliant on what they are 
told by the solicitor, it is a fallacy to suggest that 
they 'instruct' the solicitor since it is the solicitor, 
whether wilfully or not, who control the clients'choices. 
Secondly, when people deal with lawyers they are often 
concerned with the cost, but unawa~ of their entitlement 
to assistance in meeting those costs. 
(a) What is legal aid? 
Let us briefly look at the form of legal aid and the 
process of the administration(6 ). 
5) Shaun Kirby, Secretary of Law Society Legal Aid (Area 8) Office 
during interview with author. 
6) Information from The Solicitors' and Barristers' Directory and 
Diary, Vol.2. (1985) ,14. 
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There are five types of legal aid, which are commonly used 
each with a separate use and a different procedure:-
(i) L~gal advice and assistance, "Green Form". This 
covers preliminary advice and assistance from a solicitor. 
It is the solicitor's responsibility to assess the client's 
financial eligibility. So that an immediate decision can 
be taken, the financial test is relatively straight-
forward. The solicitor must assess clients' means, advise 
them of whether it will be necessary for them to pay any 
contribution, and if so then to collect that contribution 
from them. Solicitors are given this relatively large 
freedom because of the strictly limited financial expen-
diture they may incur under the green form scheme, i.e. 
£50 (£90 if drafting a divorce petition) before applica-
tion for an extension is required. 
(ii) Assistance by way of representatio~'A.B.W.O.R. '. 
This is very similar to green form but can only be used to 
represent clients in limited circumstances, for example 
domestic proceedings in the Magistrates' Court. The 
procedure is to fill out a green form since the financial 
eligibility limits are noted thereon. However the solicitors 
may not automatically proceed to give A.B.W.O.R, but must 
first obtain the approval of the legal aid Area Director. 
Therefore once the financial criteria have been satisfied 
the procedure is to complete a further application form 
for A.B.W.O.R., sending only that form to the Area Direc-
tor at the area legal aid office where it will be considered. 
The solicitor can only proceed when an approval form has 
been received. Thereafter they are not subject to the 
green form costs limits. 
5 
(iii) Civil Legal Aid. Where costs can become more con-
siderable the solicitor loses the right to take decisions 
as to client eligibility and any discretion in collecting 
contributions. For civil legal aid the clients cannot 
make their own application, the Solicitors' Directory 
states clearly that the solicitor should 'always' com-
plete the form to avoid inadequate responses which might 
lead to a refusal of aid. The complexity of the applica-
tion necessitates providing both written (the 'legal Aid-
Applicants Leaflet'} and oral explanations to the client. 
The solicitor cannot undertake work until permission is 
received from the legal aid office. In theory this will 
take approximately six weeks from the date of submission 
but in practice may be longer. This time gap is because 
processing the application is split into two stages, a 
'merits' test where the merits of the case are assessed by 
the legal aid office; and a 'means' test where an assessment 
of the client's means is carried out by the independent 
legal aid assessment offices of the Department of Social 
Security. Emergency applications can be made if the case 
is urgent, and a decision can be given immediately, even 
over the telephone if necessary. 
(iv) Criminal Legal Aid. Application is made to the rele-
vant criminal court upon forms supplied by that court. 
Here again there are two hurdles for the applicant simi-
larly to civil legal aid there is the means test of finan-
cial eligibility, but here the other test is not of merit 
but of the 'interests of justice' for which there are 
certain guidelines known as the Widgery Criterial?}. Where there 
7) The Widgery Committee on Legal Aid and Criminal Proceedings (Cmnd 2934) . 
6 
is doubt as to whether legal aid should be granted, the 
Directorysuggests this should be resolved in the appli-
cants favour, a further criterion unavailable elsewhere. 
Appeal against refusal of aid is not to a different court 
but rather to a criminal legal aid committee who re-consider 
the application on exactly the same grounds as the court. 
(v} The Duty Solicitor Scheme. (S) There are two schemes, 
the magistrates court scheme and the twenty-four hour 
scheme. These are the simplest schemes from the client's 
viewpoint, since they are entitled to £50 (unextendable) 
worth of advice where attending voluntarily, or for a non-
arrestable offence, or £90 (extendable retrospectively by 
Area Office} worth of advice for an arrestable offence, 
without either a means test or payment of any contribution. 
Unfortunately the costing has proved unduly complex for 
the solicitors involved, which has necessitated a consid-
erable number of forms having to be returned and there-
fore increasing administrative burdens on both the area 
officers and the solicitors themselves. 
(b) How do the legal aid schemes work in practice? 
It would not matter if the system of application and 
provision of legal aid was complex and multifarious if 
it ran smoothly and was in the interest of the client. 
As the Benson Commission( 9 ) noted, the difference between 
the simplicity of the green form scheme's administration 
and the complexity of civil legal aid's administration is, 
8) Information from Law. Society Gazette 1289 (30 April,l986) 
9) Royal Commission on Legal Services in England and Wales, (1979} 
Cnmd. 7648 paras. 13.12-13.14. 
7 
it is argued, justified because of the necessity of acc-
urate assessment. Eligibility and contribution rates are 
such that a minor variation in assessment may have a 
disproportionate impact on the ability of the applicants 
to proceed with their cases. Therefore, although the 
total cost recovered from clients' contributions is rela-
tively small compared to expenditure required to pay the 
D.S.S. to assess the means of those clients, to the level 
of accuracy required by the legal aid office, it is felt 
to be justifiable bureaucracy to ensure accuracy of assess-
ment. 
It would be difficult to argue with this principle, 
it does seem legitimate to have a considerable bureaucracy 
if it is the best means of protecting the clients' interest. 
But does the legal aid bureaucracy do as it claims? Is it 
the clients' interest which is protected by the variety of 
forms of legal aid and their administration or are the 
procedures involved suiting either the profession or even 
the Treasury more than the clients? 
How do the clients perceive legal aid before they 
come into contact with it? Clients have notorious lack 
of knowledge of their entitlement to legal aid. The work 
of the Hughes Commission(lO) was important in showing this. 
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that when clients 
enter a solicitor's office they have little or no concep-
tion of whether or not they will be entitled to free 
legal advice, or whether they will have to pay in whole 
or in part for any of the time given. We ~ust also bear 
10) op.cit., note (3) para.l22. 
8 
in mind that the clients are probably uncomfortable in the 
situation in which they find themselves. They have probably 
overcome psychological fears and barriers of distance to 
attend at the office(ll), they may well have a problem of 
considerable concern, one which it has been impossible to 
solve by reference to family and friends. Going to the 
solicitor is not the first port of call, it is a last 
refuge for a problem which that client may regard as 
unsurmountable. 
What then can the solicitors do to allay their 
clients' fears? If the solicitors establish that legal 
aid will be necessary then they must decide which type is 
most suitable in this case. If green form is adequate 
then they can immediately carry out the means test and 
inform the client of their eligibility for advice and 
assistance, and what contribution if any they must pay. 
This scheme is good to the extent that it is quick and 
simple, and it allows the solicitor to give the necessary 
advice immediately. Unfortunately complications set in 
if it becomes necessary to request an extension of the 
green form. Solicitors can not do this at their own 
discretion and must send an application for an extension 
to the Area Director who will consider it. The bur-
eaucracy which is supposed to assist the client makes it 
necessary for them to wait two or even three months for a 
d . . (12) eClSlOn • This is not satisfactory for the clients, 
11) Ibid. 1 Appendix 4 1 para .lOB. 
12) Ben Hoare (Private practitioner in Sunderland concentrating 
on legal aid work) during interview with author. 
9 
and may cause a conflict of interest for the solicitors 
who must either wait for a decision and often feel that 
they have failed in their duty to their clients, or do the 
work necessary without securing payment and hope that their 
application will be granted. (lJ) 
If the solicitor, having dealt with the client 
initially under the green form scheme then finds it 
necessary to apply for civil legal aid, then, as Benson(l 4 ) 
noted, it is necessary to put the client through a second 
means test. In 1986/87 this occurred in approximately 20% 
of green form cases(l 4a). Therefore however short the 
case or however low the contribution it was necessary to 
duplicate the work already done in completion of the green 
form, to apply for civil legal aid. 
When application is made for civil legal aid further 
problems are raised. It is difficult for clients to correctly 
completeorunderstand the application form, and as stated 
above,the Directory specifically advises the solicitor 
to give both oral and written explanations to their 
clients. This simply serves to exacerbate the problems 
of the often already confused clients. There is also an 
inevitable time delay while the Law Society area office 
processes the claim. Here the delays are longer than for 
green form, taking three to four months. Often the 
13) Ibid. 
14) op.cit., note (9) 
l4a) Legal Aid, 37th.Annual Report of the Law Society (1986/87) , 
(1988) H.M.S.O. para.74. It has been as high as 25% in 1985-86 
10 
clients' cases cannot wait that long. For example if 
there is a personal injury case arising from an accident, 
the solicitor may have to commence proceedings in the hope 
that they will succeed and obtain their costs from the 
insurers(lS). Therefore the system can lead to uncertainty 
for both the clients and their solicitors. 
Criminal legal aid has been criticised for the co~­
plexity of the application form and more particularly the 
means test attached to it(l6 ). We have noted above that the 
solicitors themselves have had some difficulty in com-
pleting the new forms used for the duty solicitor scheme. 
These are all signs of an excessively bureaucratic system,which 
rather than assisting the clients worsens their situation 
by delays in confirming grants of their legal aid certifi-
cates or extensions; and a complexity of applications 
and procedures which prevent the clients from comprehending 
their own best interest. 
The administrative arrangements of the scheme do 
not appear to be in the interests of the client, and we 
have already seen some evidence that they create diffi-
culties for the solicitor. It is now proposed to explore 
this latter concept further. Remuneration for solicitors 
has always been a bone of contention. It has now beco~e 
a matter of acute concern, with complaints not only about 
the level of remuneration, but also about the speed of 
payment of legal aid bills. Taking the former first, 
15) Op.cit., Note (12). 
16) Op.cit., Note (1) p.849. 
ll 
legal aid work has always been paid at a lower rate than 
private client work, with certain anomalies such as only 
being able to recover 90% of High Court bills(lGa). The 
situation is such that solicitors are having to subsidize 
their legal aid work from conveyancing profits(l?). 
David Edwards, the former Law Society's Secretary for 
Legal Aid, has called the setting of fees: 
"far too amateur and far too much a matter of 
paying the minimum that can be paid without 
actually stopping the courts from working." (18) 
The delays in payment of bills have been described as 
"truly horrendous" and still increasing from twenty-five 
to twenty-eight days in April 1987 to a projected seventy-
seven to ninety days in April l988(l 9 ). This failure in 
the working of the administrative bureaucracy has had far 
reaching effects for both old and new legal aid practices. 
Welch, Aires and Co., a relatively new practice in New-
castle have relied heavily on the good will of their bank 
manager since legal aid bills have taken so long to come 
through that they are currently running about six months 
behind. Founder partner Jill Welch has said that they 
certainly could not afford to increase the size of the 
practice, and they were frequently unable to budget ade-
quately for the payment of wages and other general expenses~ 20 ) 
l6a) This particular anamoly is to be removed by the Legal Aid Act 1988. 
17) Grimes, R.H., and Martin, R.I., "Legal Aid ... Some lessons to be 
learnt", (1981), Journal of Social Welfare Law 283. 
18) Barley, P., Interview with David Edwards, (1984) 81 Law Society 
Gazette 1509. 
19) Anon, Editorial, "Delays in Legal Aid", (1987) l3l,Solic.J.203. 
20) Jill Welch, interview with the author. 
12 
This can be compared to the problems of Hodge, Jones and 
Allen a reasonably large legal aid firm established for 
over ten years and of some repute. Henry Hodge des-
cribed their difficulties with cash flows, 
"The story is depressingly repetitive : a lot 
of work in progress, big bills in the pipeline 
but delays in payment for legal aid cases 
leading to temporary difficulty." (21) 
This and the wish to help clients has led some 
solicitors to use emergency applications for legal aid to 
speed up the process generally rather than for their 
defined purpose. This has meant that the Law Society have 
progressed even more slowly with standard applications, 
and in soiT.e cases area offices have had to refuse to 
answer solicitors• enquiries unless the case is a bona 
fide emergency. 
(c) Can the bureaucracy be justified? 
What does this tell us about the administration of 
the legal aid fund; is it too bureaucratic, and if so, is 
there any explanation for it? From what we have seen of 
the major delays in processing and paying of bills, the 
varying levels of remuneration and the complexity of the 
systems in operation it must be accepted that the legal 
aid system is excessively bureaucratic. This manifests 
itself in a failure to stay abreast of the work which it 
must do. 
Why then is such a bureaucratic system used? The 
bureaucracy seems to hit the clients and the practitioners 
21) Hodge, H., "A Legal Aid Practice- Ten Years On", (September,l987), 
Legal Action 6. 
13 
hardest, they must work within the confines of a complex 
slow moving system. The bureaucracy can not be claimed to 
be in their interest. The solution to the problem is 
inherent to both the problems of the system itself and 
its administration, basically put, it is money. Both 
Alcock and Abel( 22 ) noted that when the legal aid scheme 
was created it was essentially the result of a power 
struggle. Although the Law Society succeeded to the extent 
that a scheme was developed, the government did keep some 
control over the financing of that scheme. This control 
itself came under criticism for being over generous. This 
point was emphasised by Raymond Potter, when speaking to 
solicitors on behalf of the Lord Chancellor, 
"If there is anyone here who seriously believes 
that the answer to the question "What does 
the future hold for the legal aid scheme?" can 
be answered simply "More Government Money" 
then he is living in a dream world." (23) 
It is not by chance that solicitors can only make decisions 
to give advice and assistance on issues up to £50( 24 ). If 
the government was going to sign a blank cheque for the 
total legal aid budget it intended to keep as firm a grasp 
as possible on the criteria by which legal aid was to be 
given. The bureaucracy was not created to protect the 
client but rather to protect the funders. The Treasury did 
not want solicitors being over generous to applicants, and 
if the government wanted the particularly rigid eligibility 
22) Ibid., note (4) 
23) In Morton, J., "Legal Aid on the Slippery Slope", (1987) 131 
Solie. J. 1307. 
24) or £90 when drafting a divorce petition. 
14 
rules to be properly applied it could not trust their 
administration to the very people who would benefit 
financially from the grant of a legal aid certificate. 
Finance also gives us the key to the problem of why 
the administration of the system is in such a mess. 
Although the legal aid budget is open ended, the adminis-
trative budget is fixed, and at a level such that it has 
been impossible for the Law Society to keep pace with the 
demand for their services. Therefore in this first case 
the facts support the suggestion that the legal aid scheme 
is too bureaucratic, and this is not in the interests of the 
client, or the people providing the service to them. 
15 
(2) Is legal aid a second-rate service? 
It is important to note that service in this context 
has two possible meanings. Firstly it can relate to the 
service provided by the profession. The question is 
therefore whether the quality of service provided by 
private practitioners to legal aid clients differs, 
whether consciously or not, to that which they provide 
for their privately paying clients. Secondly service in 
this context could be taken to refer to the broader nature 
of the legal aid scheme itself. In this case the emphasis 
of the question is whether the legal aid scheme inherently 
works in such a way that the service provided is not 
suitable to the requirements of the people whom it is 
meant to serve. It is irrportant to bear these distinc-
tions in mind since the former is essentially a technical 
problem remediable by changes in the working practices of 
solicitors, but the latter is a structural problem soluble 
only by fundamental change in the system itself. 
(a) Can legal aid clients receive the same services 
as privately paying clients? 
The Society of labour lawyers made a clear statement 
on their view of the role of modern society's use of the 
law, they said it has a duty 
"to ensure that its members are enabled to conduct 
their lives within the law, receive justice when 
the law is enforced against them, and take 
advantage of the benefits which the law confers 
upon them." (25) 
Let us look at how far legal aid provides for this. Does 
legal aid enable people to conduct their lives within the 
law? Legal aid is largely a responsive system, it comes 
(25) "Justice for All", (1968), Fabian Research Series No.273,p.3. 
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into use when a person is already in need of legal assis-
tance, in fact it is one of the major complaints levelled 
at legal aid, to be discussed later, that it does not 
help overcome ignorance of rights or how to enforce them. 
Even the Law Society has admitted that, 
" ... so far as litigation was concerned the legal 
aid scheme has been highly successful, but many 
people were unaware of their rights and had an 
inadequate knowledge of the legal facilities 
open to them." (26 ) 
It was for these reasons that green form, advice and assis-
tance was introduced. Figures show( 27 ) that since its 
introduction green form has been, and continues to be, 
used primarily in traditional areas of advice and assis-
tance. Again people have already come into contact with 
the law, they do not know how to pre-empt possible prob-
lems, rather they are trying to find solutions to more 
easily remediable difficulties. On the other hand, the 
paying clients can and do often use solicitors to pre-
empt steps which may bring them into unfavourable contact 
with the law. For example companies use contracts in many 
situations, such as purchasing goods or employing staff. 
It is more than likely that the contract used will have 
been approved or dra~m up by a solicitor in such a way as 
to ensure the contract is within the law, and to maximise 
the advantages to be derived from the law. The average 
person has neither the resources nor the cognizance to take 
26) Op.cit., note (2) p.866. 
27) Text to notes (44) - (47). 
17 
such a step. It would therefore appear that the avail-
ability of greater resources makes it easier to conduct 
your life within the bounds of the law. 
Does legal aid allow citizens to receive justice 
when the law is enforced against them? As was noted 
above, legal aid is a responsive system and is therefore 
geared towards helping people when the law is being en-
forced against them. Theoretically legal aid gives all 
the advantages of paying privately for a solicitor to 
represent that person, it entitles them to specialist 
advice from counsel or expert witnesses, and thereby 
overcoming any possible disparity in expertise reflected 
in the size of the practice. However, legal aid is not 
available in tribunals(2 S). It has been suggested that 
this is the most important forum for poorer clients since 
it tends to be fundamentally linked to their means, particu-
larly the Social Security Appeal Tribunal and Industrial 
Tribunal. (29 ) A paying client can afford to have legal 
representation in any situation where it is not prohibited, 
and this is proven to give a considerably increased chance 
of success(JO). Therefore here we see that although legal 
aid does cover all courts and therefore fulfils the require-
ment to some extent it is not available in perhaps the most 
important arena for the poorer client, and therefore again 
wealth gives a tangible advantage. 
28) Again a major complaint which shall be discussed later. 
29) See note (60) 
30) Ibid.,and also The President of the Sociel Security Appeal 
Tribunal, "Judging in the S.S.A.T", (1987), 
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The final duty which the Society of Labour Lawyers 
suggested was the law should allow the citizen to take 
advantage of the benefits which it has conferred upon him. 
The problems of legal aid being largely responsive have 
already been stressed and are again relevant here. The 
advantages given by money in this situation can best be 
shown by practical examples of factors which control the 
income of that person. The poor may depend on welfare and/ 
or unemployment benefits to provide their means. This is 
an extremely complex area of law and personal experience 
shows that those providing the benefits are often un-
willing to explain entitlements to benefits. Claimants 
are expected to place themselves completely into the hands of the 
welfare benefits officers by giving them all the informa-
tion required to make a claim, without being told how this 
will affect their claims. Theoretically advice on bene-
fit entitlements is available from solicitors using the 
green form scheme, but in reality few solicitors have 
adequate expertise in such fields to be of use( 3l) This 
approach also relies too heavily on the clients under-
standing of the necessity of obtaining advice, rather 
than providing an explanation as of right. 
We can compare this to the use of tax law by companies 
and wealthy private clients. For such clients it is 
standard practice, and they would probably be regarded as 
negligent if they were not to maximise their profits by 
31) Smith, B., "Unmet Need and Private Practice in Southampton", 
(1980), LAG Bulletin 55. 
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tax planning, so as to exploit loopholes in the tax laws. 
This involves a large amount of expenditure of resources 
and shows that wealth allows maximisation of benefits 
available whereas poverty removes choice and control 
over basic means, the exact opposite of allowing people to 
take advantage of the benefits the law confers upon them. 
Therefore while the legal aid scheme purports to create 
equality before the law it fails to do so to the extent 
that it only provides a limited responsive service. Legal 
aid fails to provide the advantages of preventive advice 
and assistance, rights awareness and to a large extent 
enforcement. Solicitors are able to provide all of these 
services to clients able to pay for them. Could this 
problem be overcome by providing further resources to 
increase availability and usage of legal aid, (32 ) 
there other latent defects in the scheme? 
or are 
(b) Solicitors' attitudes to legal aid clients. 
The greatest fear of the failure of legal aid as far 
as solicitors are concerned is that either consciously or 
sub-consciously they treat legal aid clients differently 
from those who are paying for their legal services. This 
has ~ost often been seen in terms of the necessity to 
standardise legal aid cases. Remuneration for legal aid 
work is low and therefore it becomes necessary to have a 
high turnover of cases to remain profitable. This neces-
sitates some standardisation in the advice and alternatives 
32) But see text to note (23). 
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that solicitors will offer their clients, which may mean a 
failure to match the correct remedy to the problems of the 
individual. We shall examine this through the opinions 
of solicitors themselves, the problem of running a legal 
aid practice, whether standardisation occurs, and if so 
whether or not it n.ay have an adverse effect on the advice 
given to the client. 
"Legal aid casework is characterised by a low 
value, high turnover case-load ... The average 
price for private bills was about £300 and for 
legal aid cases about £230 ... The legal aid 
average in particular is distorted ... as we earn 
something over £50,000 from the green form 
scheme where the average bill is around £50". (33) 
This is Henry Hodge's description of the workload of 
his private practice and it would seem to fall into 
Bridges< 34 ) description of a legal aid practice. They 
have to be able to cope with a rapid turnover of cases 
and there needs to be substantial delegation of the work-
load to non-professional staff. Problems such as social 
security or housing which can have complications tend to 
be left to be dealt with by other agencies while solici-
tors deal with the more standardized problems. (3 S) 
The views of the profession are varied. At one 
extreme there is the belief that it is never possible to 
standaridize the caseload since the parties to each action 
are different, even if the question of law is not. <36 ) 
This can be compared to the view that there will never be 
33) Op.cit., note (21) 
34) Bridges, L., "Legal Coverage", (10 July 1975), New Society 76. 
35) I am not suggesting that this specifically relates to either 
Hodge's firm in particular or any other which I may mention 
hereafter. 
36) Op.cit., Note (5) 
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a proper service for clients while private practice is 
profit orientated because the private practitioner does 
not have the necessary time to find the solution to each 
individual's problems. (37 ) 
There does appear to be some central ground which is 
probably palatable as at least a lowest common denomJnator 
of agreement. This would be that there are some firms who 
may provide a second-rate service, but it is not known 
what proportion they represent or why they do not provide 
top quality service. One argument is that only a few 
firms give a second-rate service, and that is because 
they are generally poor quality firms, their advice would 
be bad whoever it is given to, and if it is anyone who 
gives a second-rate service to legal aid clients it is 
them( 3S). The other argument suggests that there cer-
tainly are some firms who simply take on legal aid work 
because they know by processing standardized work they can 
make profit, but those who are really providing a second-
rate service are the inexperienced solicitors, those doing 
only a small amount of legal aid work, who find themselves 
faced with areas of the law in which they have no exper 
t . (39) lse. Since the vast majority of practices undertaking 
legal aid work only do a small amount, (40) this type of 
second-rate service could be very widespread. Therefore, 
although we have no firm factual evidence as to the extent 
37) Op.cit., note (20) 
38) Op.cit., note (12) 
39) Andy Cope, Convenor of North East Legal Action Group, inter-
view with the author. 
40) Op.cit., note (34) 
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of solicitors providing a second-rate service, or to the 
reasons for this, it is accepted among the profession 
that such service does exist, even David Edwards, former 
Law Society Secretary for legal aid, has said, 
"I think two standards of service would be 
regrettable ... But I am sorry to say that, 
particularly in the last ten years, there 
has been increasing evidence that some 
firms do operate two standards of service." ( 40a) 
It must therefore be accepted that to make legal aid 
effective, solicitors' attitudes would have to be changed. 
This may require either better funding, or better train-
ing, or both. 
(c) How suitable is the legal aid scheme to deal 
with the problems of the poor? 
What then of the proposition that the legal aid 
scheme itself is second-rate because of the limits of 
its form? This theory does have support which takes 
the form that legal aid does not assist in the solution 
of the problems which it is meant to overcome, i.e., 
those of the poorest members of society, because it misunder-
stands those problems. Wexler expressed this idea with 
great clarity, 
"Poor people do not lead settled lives into 
which the law seldom intrudes; they are con-
stantly involved with the law in its most 
intrusive forms". (41) 
This stresses the weakness of the legal aid scheme because 
it accepts as its basis the idea that the poor person is 
like a rich person without the resources to conduct a case. 
In other words that the problems they face which involve the 
law are isolated and distinct from the rest of their lives. 
40a) Op.cit., Note (18) 
41) Wexler, S., "Practicing Law for Poor People", (1970) 79 Yale Law 
Journal 1049, 1050. 
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. h h. . t th ( 42 } th . Wexler po1nts out t at t 1s 1s no e case, e1r 
basic problems are not individual, rather they are the 
product of their poverty and therefore common to most poor 
people. Where legal aid is used it still leaves clients 
exactly where they were before, except that each client is 
now reliant on the lawyer's skills to solve their most 
obvious legal problems. This argument is strongly 
supported by the figures for usage of legal aid. (43 ) 
There is a high proportion of expenditure on matrimonial 
and criminal law problems compared to the low expenditure 
on housing, landlord and tenant, welfare law, employment 
law, race and sex discrimination law, and immigration 
law problems. This shows that it is not the cause of 
poverty that legal aid helps solve, i.e., the latter 
list, but rather the symptoms of. it, i.e., marital breakdown 
and high crime rates. 
Therefore there are fundamental technical and struc-
tural defects in the legal aid scheme which make it an 
unsuitable, second-rate service as regards the needs of 
the poorest members of society. It does not give those 
people the same advantages as those able to pay for their 
legal services privately. 
42) Ibid., p.l053. 
43) see next section. 
24 
(3) Is legal aid suited to providing the services required 
by the poor? 
(a) For what purposesis legal aid used? 
A useful position from which to start is an analysis 
of the actual figures of use of the legal aid scheme. It 
is interesting to compare the national figures, as 
represented by the breakdown of use of green form work( 44 ), 
and the very specific figures of one typical legal aid 
practice. ( 45 ) These figures will not be directly com-
patible since those for the solicitors' practice cover all 
forms of legal aid work and the minority of private client 
work which they do. The interest will be in obtaining a 
rough indication of whether these differences produce any 
substantial variation in the proportion of work which 
each case type makes up. We are able to see that the 
casework undertaken by the legal aid practice does not 
differ substantially from the general use of green form 
despite the fact that the practice's figures are not 
directly compatible. The majority of the work under-
taken in both cases relates to divorce and other family 
matters and criminal work, with small but significant 
caseload of accident and injury litigation and landlord 
and tenant work. The private practice differs noticeably 
only to the extent that no H.P. or debt work is under-
taken, while this forms 5.9% of the total number of green 
form bills. 
44) Legal Aid, 37th Annual Report of the Law Society (1986-87), (1988) 
H.M.S.O. Appendix lF, p.42. 
45) op.cit., note (21). 
GREEN FORM HODGE JONES & ALLEN( 46 ) 
Type of Problem No. of Bills Paid %age of total No. of Bills Paid 
l.Divorce & Judicial Sep. 
(a) Petitioners 205,178 20.9 
(b) Respondents 17,778 - 40.6 - 1.8 ,_ 523 
2. Other Family Matters 175,111 17.9 
3 . Crime 226,168 23.1 683 
4. Landlord & Tenant,H/sing. 60,672 6.2 69 
5. Hire Purchase, Debt. 57,529 5.9 
6 . Employment 19,924 2.0 
7. Accident & Injury 44,575 4.5 67 
8. Welfare Benefits 28,823 2.9 
9. Immigration & Nationality 7,823 0.8 
10. Consumer Problems 21,138 2.2 
11. Other matters 115,788 11.8 454 
-
TOTAL: 980,507 100.00 1,796 
46) These figures have been adjusted to take account of the fact that conveyancing can not 
be done under legal aid. 
%age of total 
29.2 
38.0 
3.8 
3.7 
25.3 
100.00 
N 
Ul 
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Baldwin and Hill (47 ) noted the trend shown above more 
generally through all legal aid private practice with the 
emphasis very strongly on divorce and judicial separa-
tion, other family matters, and crime; and they stressed 
that this predominance had remained surprisingly stable 
over many years since the commencement of the scheme. They 
noted that despite the 'spiralling growth' in the scale of 
the work undertaken, there had been a failure to equalize 
the emphasis on areas of work particularly relevant to the 
poor, such as housing, employment, welfare benefits and 
debt problems, with those areas of work traditionally 
provided by private practice, i.e., divorce and family 
related matters, and crime. 
(b) Can the pattern of usage be explained? 
There are two possible explanations, both of which may 
use some of the same factual evidence but which are funda-
mentally different. Geddes said that although divorce and 
crime dominate the legal aid scheme, 
"This is not the fault of the scheme itself, but 
of public ignorance of its scope, the reluctance 
of many lawyers to take on cases involving social 
and welfare law, and the lack of both financial 
and human resources to bring the service to the 
people." (48-49) 
The question which this analysis begs is that is it not an 
integral part of the purpose of the scheme to provide for 
informing the public of its availability and how it may be 
used. Similarly, should not the scheme have been devised to 
47) "Research on the Green Form Scheme ... ", (1986) 5 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 247. 
48-49) Geddes, D., "How Can Legal Aid Bring Lawyers to the People", 
(19 Sept.,l975), The Times 8. 
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take account of the fact that social and welfare law topics 
are only taught to a very limited extent in either the 
d , f ' 1 f 1' 't I t , ' ( 50 ) aca emlc or pro esslona stages o so lCl ors ralnlng , 
and therefore it is little wonder that solicitors do not 
always have the relevant skills to deal with these problems? 
Also, surely it is integral to the proper construction of a 
scheme that it should make the best use of the financial 
and human resources which can be provided, rather than to 
suggest that the legal aid scheme would be workable if only 
the users were better informed, the providers better educated 
and the resources more abundant? Therefore Geddes' statement 
that the legal aid system is sound can not be regarded as 
valid. 
The Society of Labour Lawyers(Sl) carne much closer to 
explaining why legal aid tended to be used only in the more 
traditional areas of the law. Structurally the scheme 
depends wholly on the existing network of private practices, 
and by so doing it does not overcome the problems of the 
private practitioner failing to locate offices or branch 
offices in areas where the population tends to be poor, 
preferring to locate in town centres and often near the 
business community. Secondly the scheme makes no attempt 
to overcome the psychological or social problems which 
hamper contact between solicitors and poor clients. The 
service was therefore only for those with the "knowledge, 
resourcefulness and persistence" to seek assistance from 
the private lawyer. The scheme placed the emphasis wholly 
50) see Geffen, I., "What are Solicitors for?", (1985) 129 Solie. J .626. 
51) Op.cit., note (25). 
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on the initiative of individuals to recognise their prob-
lems and seek help. When this is combined with the fact 
that poorer people tend not to recognise that they have 
legal problems( 52 ) it is not surprising that the upshot is 
that the scheme is used largely in the most established and 
well known areas of solicitors' expertise. 
(c) What can we conclude from this limited use of 
legal aid? 
The most obvious, and perhaps fundamental result was 
discussed by Sufrin and Bridges( 53 ) when they recognised 
the same trend of use in Birmingham, 
" .. if legal advice is being provided to the poor 
in Birmingham on a wider range of problems [ .. than 
matrimonial and family ... ] then it is not being 
done under the umbrella of the Statutory Scheme." 
This obviously represents a failure in the legal aid scheme 
to embrace the specific concerns of the poor,their housing 
and employment rights, their debt problems and in relation 
to the powers and discretions exercised by the plethora of 
government agencies upon whom they rely, particularly with 
regard to the social welfare legislation which makes up the 
welfare state. Effective advice, assistance and representa-
tion in these areas is being provided by independant non-
statutary based advice, information and legal centres, (S 3a) 
which are characterized by under funding, overstretching of 
staff resources and a poor distribution particularly outside 
52) see Sander, M., "Legal Services for the Community", (1978). 
53) Sufrin, B.E., and Bridges, L.T., "Statutary Legal Advice in 
Birmingham", (1971), 121, N.L.J. 868. 
53a)see later. 
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of urban areas. This is not a satisfactory situation be-
cause it means that despite a scheme which is meant to allow 
people to understand and defend their rights by the use of 
the law, those rights are still going unenforced, and the 
scheme is failing in that aim. 
From a socio-legal viewpoint, what Ferrari has to say 
about the Italian legal system( 54 ) is of interest in rela-
tion to what solution this problem requires. He says that 
extending the traditional legal aid system for court pro-
ceedings, administered through a state run bureaucracy to 
cover the problems which were mentioned above would be un-
desirable , since it would redefine what are essentially 
social problems as purely legal ones. This would result in 
the provision of legal solutions to individual clients• 
problems while leaving in place the underlying social or 
economic problem. He shows the broader ramifications of 
such a policy, and by doing so he also throws further light 
on what Abel (55 ) said in relation to the power struggle 
resulting in creation of the legal aid scheme. Ferrari 
suggests a government might, 
" ... under this guise of reforming zeal, advocate 
the introduction of a legal reform which not 
only reinforces the status quo but also strengthens 
it by channelling disputes through it. At the 
same time such a move may silence those who argue 
that the system does not recognise genuine 
grievances." 
In which case Ferrari would not support an extension of the 
54) Ferrari, A.V., "Some Sociological Implications Concerning Legal 
Aid Refonn in Italy", (1974), l B.J.L.S. 81. 
55) Text to note (4). 
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current legal scheme. It is important to recognise that it 
is rather the form which such a scheme would take to which 
he objects, rather than the provision of what he would 
regard as adequate legal solutions to the problems which 
reflect socio-economic differences in society( 56 ). There-
fore when looking at whether legal aid provides the ser-
vices required by the poor Ferrari's analysis suggests 
that the services which are provided should take into 
account the fact that the poor are economically weak and 
often socially deprived, rather than presuming that their 
only problem is lack of financial resources. 
(d) What legal services are particularly relevant to 
the poor, but are not provided by the legal aid 
system'? 
There are two main arguments as to why tribunals 
should be covered by the legal aid scheme. The first is 
the more establishment position taken by both the Benson( 57 ) 
and Hughes(SS) Royal CoiT~issions, that tribunals are basi-
cally courts, and therefore at some stages they involve 
legal proceedings and problems which may be beyond the lay-
mans' comprehension. When this is the case and no suitable 
lay representation is available then legal aid should be 
available to prevent injustice. 
This argument can be contrasted to the client orien-
tated approach taken by Grimes and Martin( 59 ). They say 
that the failure to provide legal aid for administrative 
56) For example he might support the law centre model of provision. 
57) Op.cit. 1 note (9) para.l5.25. 
58) Op.cit. 1 note (3) paras.8.2l-22. 
59) Op.cit. 1 note (17) 
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tribunals results in the inability of the poor to protect 
their fundamental rights, i.e., for loss of livelihood 
(unfair dismissal before an industrial tribunal); bad 
housing conditions (proceedings before magistrates courts 
under s99 Public Health Act 1936); and loss of sole means 
of income (appeal to Social Security Appeals Tribunal). 
This viewpoint is also stressed by the Child Poverty Action 
Group (60) (C.P.A.G.) who note that Social Security Appeal 
Tribunals are the most important part of the legal system 
in redressing the problems of the poor since welfare bene-
fits are crucial to their fa.Inily income and wellbeing. 
Although both arguments differ as to purpose, their 
intended results are largely the same, differing only as 
to the degree of coverage there should be. Benson makes 
no suggestions as to guidelines for availability of legal 
aid for tribunals saying only that legal aid should be 
available in any case when representation is not specifi-
cally disallowed. Hughes suggests that only where the 
client cannot follow the proceedings, i.e. needs help to 
understand either the tribunal procedure or the law, or 
where a substantial point of law is likely to arise, should 
legal aid be available. The C.P.A.G. suggest that where 
the client cannot follow proceedings, or so that they should 
know in advance the case against them, and where there is 
any chance of injustice where representation could make a 
difference, then legal aid should be available. 
60) C.P.A.G. with Brooke et al., " .. Legal Rights for Low Income 
Families", (1969) 
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There have been calls for the extension of legal aid 
in other areas too. Advice and better co-ordination of all 
advisory services have been particularly stressed( 6l), and 
this culminated in an attempt to put some of these matters 
into the Legal Advice and Assistance Act (1972) Part rr( 62 ). 
As with the suggestions for the extension of legal aid to 
include tribunals, these have all been shelved due to the 
suggested extra expenditure they would involve( 63 ). 
We have seen how and why legal aid is most used and 
the possible improvement of this by extension to tribunals 
has been clearly set out particularly by Grimes and Martin 
and the C.P.A.G. But these calls for change have been long 
running and largely fruitless, and this must surely add 
weight to the structural criticisms of the legal aid system 
and its ability to provide the legal services which the 
poor require. 
61) Brooke, R., "Why Not More Legal Help?" (31 March,l966), New Society 13. 
62) Hillyard, s., "Current Developments in Legal Services Part 1 & 2", 
(1974), 71, Law Society's Gazette 36 and 63. 
63) Parry, D.J.T., "Help Legal Aid", (1974), 124 NLJ.415. 
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(4) Is the means testing of legal aid in the interest of 
the poor client? 
The central dilemma in ~eans testing legal aid was 
t h d b th H h C . . (64) ouc e on y _ e ug es onwlSSlOn , 
"We know that many people find means testing 
abhorrent; but we believe that it is only fair 
that those who are able should make some con-
tribution to the cost of the legal services 
they use." 
This reflects the dichotomy of feeling in this area, firstly 
the principle that access to the law is a right and should 
be available to anyone no matter whether they are rich 
or poor. But this should be weighed against the public 
subsidy of legal services which must exist to fulfil this 
ideal, v.rhich can be justified only if the community has to 
pay as a last resort. This of course necessitates that 
the ~eans of the individual, their ability to pay, remains 
a vital consideration in deciding the subsidy they are 
entitled to( 6S). 
(a) Is it the best way to target resources? 
The question we must ask here is whether means test-
ing is a good or bad concept, and whether rather than 
directing resources to those most in need of them as it 
purports to, it in some way acts against those same people. 
Partington's work for the C.P.A.G. is particularly useful 
in answering this question( 66 ). 
In framing the question of the ability of legal aid 
means tests to direct resources to where they are most 
64) Op.cit., note (3), para. 8.16. 
65) Partington, M., for C.P.A.G., "The Legal Aid Means-Tests, Time 
for a Re-Appraisal", (1978). 
66) Ibid. 
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needed it is important to remember a distinguishing fact 
about legal aid, it is not a service available to all, 
there is the initial hurdle of an eligibility test, based 
on income and capital resources, which defines a person 
as entitled to some assistance from the legal aid fund. 
It is only after having satisfied these conditions that 
the applicant will be assessed to decide whether they 
( 6 7) 
will have to pay a contribution towards their assistance. 
Bearing this in mind we must analyse the attitude that 
non-means tested benefits direct a certain amount of the 
help available to those whose need is not as great as 
others( 6S). This argument will always be valid to the 
extent that some people will always have more money than 
others. But we must ask whether the eligibility test 
already used by the legal aid scheme does not serve to 
define those people who require assistance, and the means 
test beyond that is a method of masking the very small 
proportion, the exceptionally poor, who are entitled to 
assistance without paying any contribution at all? As 
Wild goes on to point out (69 ) there are two components of 
need, the individual needs of the applicant which have to 
be met, and the financial resources they have to meet 
those needs. The means test attempts to deal with both 
parts at the same time, attempting to balance the amount to 
be paid with regard to both the individual needs and the 
family income. As a result Wild suggests that this policy 
67) Ibid. 
68) ~lild, J. 1 "The Means Testing Trap" in "The Future of Social 
Security" 1 ed. by Silburn, R. 1 (1985). 
69) Ibid. 
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tails to provide money where it is needed or to take it 
away where it is not. \Hld would suggest that rather 
than the non-means tested benefit directing resources 
incorrectly, it is the means tested benefits which are 
the most inefficient. Wild suggests that by the pro-
vision of specifically targeted non-means tested benefits 
resources can be provided to all those in need. If there is 
concern about the recipient having further income that can 
be dealt with through the existing income tax system, 
thereby ensuring that they do not get more than their share. 
This system already works for cases such as invalidity 
benefit. 
(b) Does it reduce take up of legal aid by those 
eligible for it? 
The Hughes Commission( 70) suggested that there was no 
evidence of means testing dissuading a significant number 
of people from applying for legal aid. Partington( 7 l) high-
lights the lack of any hard data as to possible applicants' 
responses to perceived stigmatisation by receiving means 
tested benefits. Therefore what is used by Hughes to 
suggest that there is evidence to prove the theory, can 
conversely suggest that there is no firm evidence to dis-
prove it either. 
It is possible to see from work done in relation to take 
up of means tested benefits the effect on the applicant of 
70) Op.cit., note (64). 
71) Op.cit., note (65). 
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that stage of the process. Benson(72 ) examined the take 
up figures for legal aid in 1979 and found that 14% of 
applicants failed to take up legal aid involving a con-
tribution of less than £50, and when the contribution v!as 
greater than £50 one third of all offers were not taken up. 
The report went on to say 11 this raises a question of general 
principle whether a contribution should be payable at all, 
and if so, on what basis. 11 These figures supported 
Partington's own work on the 1976/77 period. (73 ) These 
results are obviously serious in themselves, but it is 
possible that implications can be drawn to cast light on 
the effect of the means test on potential applicants. 
Those people who do not take up an offer of means tested 
legal aid have already overcome one major hurdle in going 
to see the solicitor, and putting in the legal aid applica-
tion. However the potential applicants have not even made 
these tentative steps and are possibly even more likely to 
be put off by those factors which applicants who drop out 
at a later stage have overcome. It seems at least argu-
able then that the legal aid means test does dissuade 
some people from applying for legal aid in the first place, 
and it certainly dissuades a considerable proportion from 
proceeding with their case when they realise the size of 
the contribution expected from them. 
72) Op.cit., note (9) para. 12.22. 
73) Anon, Editorial, "Legal Aid and Means Testing", (1978) 128 N.L.J. 846. 
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(c) Can means testing be otherwise justified? 
There are numerous technical probleffis related to the 
use of means testing(74 ). The financial eligibility limits 
have been a bone of contention since the inception of the 
legal aid scheme. The Benson Commission, not noted for 
its radical proposals, suggested( 7 S) these were so onerous 
as to require abolition. Their effect was said to be, 
" ... to create unfairness and to expose some 
individuals to a choice between abandoning 
their legal rights and accepting the risk of 
suffering an undue financial burdon." 
Also the contribution rules and legal aid charge have been 
criticised for their harsh effect on those least able to 
pay. This method is also fraught with administrative prob-
lems, some of which we discussed earlier( 76 ) The revenue 
raised from the contributions retained by the legal aid 
.fund contribute just over 3% of the total legal aid fund 
income. (77 ) 
It is difficult then to accept that the means test 
for legal aid is in the interest of the poor client, it 
may in fact dissuade those people from proceeding with their 
case or even beginning it. It does not seem to be the only, 
or most efficient way to balance the needs of the client 
and their income, and there are numerous other technical 
problems. Even the Benson Commission has suggested the 
abolition of the means test, at least in relation to 
74) Ibid., Partington provides an in depth analysis of the following 
issues, I shall therefore only draw an outline, adding further 
information where I have it. 
75) Op.cit., note (9), para. 12.32. 
76) See section (i) on the bureaucracy of the scheme. 
77) Op.cit., note (44) p.99 
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... 1 . t . (78) lnltla ln ervlews . What then is the purpose of the 
means test? Partington suggests that it is not for the 
recipients• benefit, but rather a compromise solution 
between the Law Society and the government. This has 
allowed private practice to act as the major outlet for 
publicly funded legal services and therefore receive legal 
aid money from the government. If a non-means tested 
scheme had been chosen it is questionable whether private 
practice as currently structured would have been allowed 
to operate such a system, and therefore receive the benefits 
of it. 
This view reflects the problems of the bureaucracy of 
the legal aid system, suggesting again that it is the 
treasury rather than the recipients• interests which are 
best served. 
78) Op.cit., note (9), para. 13.5. 
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(5) Is it a failing that legal aid prevents poor people 
from taking group action? 
When a company goes to a solicitor for information,advice 
or representation it is representing the interests of a 
number of people (managers, shareholders, creditors, 
employees) , but the company has a distinct legal personality 
and therefore is able to receive legal services. When a 
number of poor people with a corrmon complaint join together 
to express that grievance through the courts, they can not 
receive legal aid as a body but each must individually 
apply and be assessed, and then each individual may or 
may not be granted legal aid. It is impossible, even if 
one solicitor were to co-ordinate all the claims, to take 
a class action against the offending person or body, or to 
receive legal aid for that group rather than the individ-
uals who make it up. 
We have noted several times that the legal aid system 
was the result of a power struggle, and due to the success 
of the Law Society the private practice model was taken as 
the basis of the system. Those practices deal with 
private clients on a one to one basis, not on a group 
basis, so it was not necessary to provide that legal aid 
should be available to assist groups in any way. If the 
availability of legal aid for a group of people is signifi-
cantly different from its availability for individuals, 
then is it a significant failing in the legal aid system 
which needs to be corrected? 
(a) Why is group action important to the poor? 
Perhaps one of the best explanations of the advantages 
group work has over individual client work came from one of 
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the least likely sources. The Benson Commission in this 
respect at least was fully in favour of the idea of groups 
formed for a common interest or to solve a common problem. 
"Such groups may serve a number of useful pur-
poses. Views can be put with greater force. 
Work in a group causes people to feel more able 
to help themselves and to influence events. 
Groups can cope with modern bureaucracy more 
effectively than most individuals. Such groups 
often need legal advice in order fully to under-
stand the legal implications of a situation and 
the legal remedies available. In any event, 
time and expense can be saved if legal advice 
and assistance is given to a group rather than 
its members individually." (79) 
There are also other important rea~ons why group work is 
necessary, Wexler(SO) has stressed that the needs of the 
poor are by definition group problems since they are a 
direct result of their poverty and therefore are common 
to all poor people. Also on a similar idea Ferrari(Sl) 
expressed the need for group solutions to situations which 
he defined as "essentially problems of social differen-
tials" because only through such solutions would the under-
lying social and economic problems be dealt with. As we 
noted above(S 2 ) to deal with problems on an individual 
basis strengthens the existing system and structure by 
solving problems within its terms of reference, thereby 
ignoring the very factors which cause the problem in the 
first place. 
79) Op.cit., note (9) para. 12.58. 
80) Op.cit., note (41) p.1053. 
81) Op.cit., note (54). 
82) Text to notes (54) - (56) . 
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(b) How should legal aid be provided to groups of 
poor people? 
The need for reform has been recognised by the estab-
lishment. Benson's suggestion was that any group of which 
two-thirds of the members would be entitled to legal aid 
without a contribution (a fact which would be established 
by a statement by the Secretary of the group) , would be 
entitled to free advice and assistance from any solicitor. 
They did not suggest that representation should also be 
available since this would necessitate changes in the 
practice rules of the courts, and therefore fell outside 
the remit of the Commission. (SJ) More recently, the Law 
society itself has suggested reform( 84 )on more general lines, 
relating to class actions as well as group work for poor 
people, in a draft amendment to the Legal Aid Bill. Their 
proposals appear more radical than Bensons, suggesting 
that judges should be able to decide whether a case could 
be regarded as a class action, and if they did so then 
legal aid would be available for advice and representa-
tion. Also the draft amendment said that legal aid should 
be available to them without any means test, rather 
relying completely on the nature of the case not the means 
of the client to justify free legal assistance. Again the 
intention was that any solicitor could give the advice and/ 
or representation, and that those individuals who did not 
wish to be part of action need not be so. This proposal 
was itself superseeded by the Lord Canceller's own proposed 
amendment to the Legal Aid Bill(SS) which provides that 
83) Op.cit., note (9) para. 12.58. 
84) Dyer, C., "Easier Path for Disaster Victims",(25 February,l988) 
The Guardian 3 . 
85) Ibid. 
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the Legal Aid Board may (with the Lord Chancellor's 
approval} grant a contract to a particular firm of solici-
tors to handle a multiple claim case on a non-means tested 
legal aid basis. This is considerably different to the 
proposal of Benson, and even of the Law Society, with the 
decision as to the granting of such a contract, and there-
fore control of expenditure, being kept firmly in the hands 
of the government, through the Lord Chancellor. This also 
makes the process for granting it far more bureaucratic, the 
results of which were criticised in the first section. 
The major defect in the proposals as far as the poor 
are concerned is that they would all be reliant on private 
practitioners to operate the system. We have seen that 
private practitioners are used to dealing with private 
clients on a one to one basis and it is questionable whether 
they would be able to assist the client group in the way 
which Benson suggested earlier. The problem is closely 
intertwined with what we shall see as the difference between 
the legal and community orientated approach towards self 
help and independence of the client. The Adamsdown Com-
munity and Advice Centre established that group work was 
not a "technical exercise ... nor should it simply be another 
arrow in the lawyers quiver of solutions". (86 ) The problems 
inherent to the private practice approach which did not 
simply translate to group work were posed as questions by 
L.A.G. <87 ) They asked whether the barrier to solicitors 
86) Adamsdown Comunity and Advice Centre,"In Praise of Green Fonn -
Sort Of", (1975} Legal Adtion Group Bulletin 35. 
87) Anon, Editorial, "£25 x £120 x 15 .Aggrieved .Residents= £2,175", (1975) 
Legal Action Group Bulletin 30. 
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doing this work was purely financial and clarified this by 
two further points. Firstly they asked whether it was 
necessary for the lawyer to be present with the coro~unity 
on a day to day basis rather than simply at the end of the 
telephone; and secondly whether there was too great a cul-
tural barrier between the middle class lawyer and his poor 
clients to allow identification of their needs and atti-
tudes? 
The answers to these points show why private practice is 
not suitable to take on group work for poor people. The 
solicitor must play a tangible part in the group and there-
fore must be present and be seen to be working with the 
people not in some remote city office. Also it is not for 
solicitors to decide unilaterally what is the right move to 
make, rather they must accept that they are part of a team 
which involves the coiTmunity in the decision making process. 
Therefore the private practice is unable because of its 
traditional professional activity to contribute fully to a 
group work approach and to allow people the independent 
l f h l h . h t d b th B C · · ( B S) se e p w 1c was sugges e y e enson ommlSSlon . 
Therefore despite group work being of particular im-
portance to poor clients, legal aid does not provide for 
its availability. In theory this is a remediable tech-
nical defect but to treat it as such would not deal with 
it satisfactorily. What we shall see to be structural 
defects in the legal aid system make private practice an 
unfavourable medium through which to provide group legal 
services to the poor. 
88) Op.cit., note (79) 
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(6) Summary of technical defects 
There are five prominent technical problems with the 
legal aid system which have particular relevance to the poor. 
Firstly the scheme is bureaucratic to the extent that it pre-
judices the interests of the clients. 
The legal aid scheme is second-rate as far as poor 
people are concerned. It misunderstands their fundamental 
problems; it prevents them from receiving the same services 
as paying clients who may even have compatible problems-
and it is feared that the service which some legal aid 
clients receive is of a poorer quality to that which paying 
clients receive. 
Legal aid is used predominantly for work which is not 
relevant to the problems of poverty, concentrating on matri-
monial, family and criminal work, rather than housing and 
employment rights, debt problems and welfare rights issues. 
Also the scheme fails to provide services in some forums 
which are particularly relevant to the poor, i.e., tri-
bunals. 
The means testing necessary to obtain legal aid has 
disadvantages for those entitled to legal aid. The system 
used is not necessarily the most efficient in targeting 
resources, and it results in reduced take up of legal aid by 
those entitled, both at the stage of calculation of contri-
butions p~yable and beforehand. 
Finally legal aid does not provide assistance for 
groups of poor clients. This is despite its particular rele-
vance because of the homogeneity of many poor peoples' 
problems. Although these technical defects, when combined, 
amount to substantial criticisms of the legal aid scheme it 
is in their nature that they could be solved to a large extent 
without altering the method or means of provision of the legal 
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services to the poor. The bureaucracy and means testing 
could be made more compatible with the clients' interests. 
Additional funds could be used to increase the types of 
work which could be undertaken on legal aid. Retraining 
could improve solicitors' attitudes to legal aid clients, 
and their aptitude to solve a broader variety of poor 
peoples' problems. If these were the only problems which 
the legal aid system faced the changes mentioned might be 
sufficient, but there are other defects in the system 
which are perhaps more significant because they relate to 
its basic structure. 
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(C) The Structural Problems with Legal Aid. 
(l) Introduction 
It was noted earlier that there are various alter-
native ways to provide subsidised legal services for poor 
people. (S 9 ) The numerous technical defects with the 
legal aid scheme used in the United Kingdom have been 
outlined. It is now necessary to discuss the structural 
problems inherent in the scheme chosen. By their nature 
these problems are not remediable within the bounds of the 
existing legal aid scheme. To deal with them satisfac-
torily either the type of services provided, or the method 
of providing those services, or both, would have to be re-
thought and restructured. Although prima facie the criti-
cisms will be of the legal aid scheme itself, they are 
frequently based on a reassessment of the thinking under-
lying the scheme, and to that extent will include the 
acceptance of the importance of factors which may not have 
been contemplated by those originally choosing the scheme. 
89) Op.cit., note (3) 
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(2) The problems of the poor are social not legal. 
It is an accepted fact that there is widespread 
ignorance among the general public of their legal rights 
and the means by which these can be enforced. The Law 
Centres' Federation (L.C.F), has claimed that legal aid 
does not aim to overcome this problem and consequently 
fails to assist the public in areas which are central to 
t h . ht f . t . h . ( 9 0 ) e rlg s o Cl lzens lp . The Law Society's view on 
the faults of the legal aid system have already been seen(gl). 
The Hughes Cow~ission in attempting to define the limits 
of legal aid defined what they saw as the purpose of the 
scheme, 
"In civil matters ... the State should help a 
citizen to take legal action to assert or 
protect his rights". ( 92) 
This reflects/in positive terms what the Law Society 
and L.C.F. said in negative terms, that citizens must be 
provided with the means by which to acquire knowledge of 
their rights and duties so that they can ffiake decisions 
as to when and how they think those rights can be used. 
Therefore the legal aid system should involve provision of 
advice and assistance so that legal problems can be pre-
vented rather than merely responded to. The scheme could 
also be geared towards allowing self help for the user, so 
that wherever possible they do not become reliant on other 
peoples' skills. The scheme should also provide the means 
90) Law Centres' Federation, "Response to the Society of Labour 
Lawyers Discussion Document :Legal Services Under Labour", 
Undated. p.l4. This was an internal document circulated in 1986. 
91) op.cit., text to note (26} 
92) Op~cit., note (3) para. 8.17. 
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by which to overcome ignorance of rights among the public. 
(a) The Legal Advice and Assi~tance Act 1972. 
This need was recognised some years ago; in 1966 
Brook said, 
"People should know where to find legal advice 
and help as easily as they know how to find a 
doctor or a hospital." (93) 
She stressed the need for comprehensive provision of 
advice and information either through a national service 
of salaried lawyers and para-legals, or through the 
current structure of private practice. As we have seen( 94 ), 
these ideas were formulated into the Legal Advice and 
Assistance Act (1972). The comprehensive advice and assis-
tance scheme was moulded onto the existing legal aid scheme, 
in the guise of green form. However the liaison solicitors 
who were to promote the scheme, and the Law Society run 
law centres in certain urban areas to provide further 
advice and assistance, were less successful. The former 
was tried on a pilot basis, but there were never more than 
a handful of such solicitors, and the Law Society run law 
centres were never tried in practice. 
Despite this partial success we have already seen 
and examined the failure of legal aid and green form in 
particular to fulfil any more than its role as a limited 
and responsive advice and information service. (9S) While 
93) Op.cit., note (61) 
94) Text to notes (61) to (63) . 
95) See section (iii) above. 
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knowledge of the existence of the legal aid scheme itself 
remains limited. Hughes proved that those most likely to 
be in need of legal aid were least likely to know of its 
existence, or their entitlement to it. (96 ) Hillyard also 
noted the effect of a relatively minimal television and 
local press campaign on awareness of legal aid in the 
North East of England. The pre-campaign survey showed 
that 1% of respondents would consider using a solicitor, 
while after the campaign the figure rose to 28%( 97 ) 
It is not intended to look at alternative methods 
of providing such services here, but it is important to 
understand why this failure in the present system has 
occurred. 
(b) The problems with unmet legal need. 
The concept of unmet legal need was the central idea 
upon which the proposals arising from dissatisfaction with 
the legal aid scheme for failing to provide adequate legal 
services to the poor were based. It seemed the ideal hook 
on which to hang the criticisms of legal aid, which was 
failing to provide legal services to those most likely to 
be in need of them. However it soon became obvious that 
the analysis of the problem based on the concept of unmet 
legal need was no panacea. Leach(gS) captured the essence 
of the problem when saying that, "need, like beauty, is 
in the eyes of the beholder". There was some attempt to 
come to terms with the theoretical problems seen to be 
arising from definitional shortcomings of the concept of 
96) Op.cit., note (3), Appendix 4, para.l22. 
97) Op.cit., note (62). 
98) Leach, P., "Legal skills and Public Needs", (1972) 69 Law Soc.Gaz. 
958. 
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unmet legal need. Bradshaw ( 99 ) produced perhaps the 
most clearly formulated breakdown of the various expressions 
which need could take. He defined need in four distinct 
forms, normative, felt, expressed and comparative, and 
suggested that it was for the researcher to choose which was 
felt to be most appropriate to the work being done, so that 
at least the values of the researcher did not remain con-
cealed. All of these concepts have subsequently been used, 
but without the explicit statement as to which was being 
used, suggesting that the authors have probably been una-
ware of the preference in their own writing. This failure 
mirrored the original problems arising from the lack of 
focus of the concept of need. 
The validity of the concept of unmet legal need was 
significantly weakened by the three pronged attack which 
it sustained in 1973 from the book "Social Needs and Legal 
A t . " (100) C lOn • Although the contributions therein in no 
way purported to reflect a cohesive argument against the 
concept of unmet legal need, in their willingness to 
question the accepted basis they revealed the relatively 
simplistic level of analysis involved in it, and the prob-
lems which could result from that. The authors accepted 
that legal aid did not provide adequate legal services for 
the poor, but they questioned whether the services required 
were necessarily legal, and whether they were in fact needed. 
99) Bradshaw, J., "The Concept of Need", (13 March 1972) New Society 
640. 
100) Morris, P., White, R., and Lewis, P., "Social Needs and Legal 
Action", (lg73). 
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(i) Defining poor peoples' problems as legal. 
This issue was disucssed by all three authors, but 
Lewis's analysis has been the most quoted. His idea that 
(101) 
a person "may choose to get a ladder and not a lawyer" 
went to the heart of the possible problem. By defining the 
need as legal was rather a reflection of the possible solu-
tion to the problem than a statement of fact about the prob-
lem itself. Because of the differences in the socio-
economic backgrounds poor clients may regard their prob-
lem differenty to the frequently middle class providers of 
legal services. This could in turn result in different 
perspectives as to the most advantageous solutions to their 
problems. Lewis used the example of a tenant served with a 
notice to quit, although they have not done anything un-
toward. It is possible for them to stave off eviction for 
a short while by enforcing their legal rights, but the 
problem may be best dealt with by moving house or by joining 
a tenants or housing association. (l02 ) Therefore the def-
inition of the problem as legal may limit the possible 
action of clients, and perhaps worse, may prevent them from 
taking the action which is most appropriate to them. 
Morris on the same theme noted that this problem 
did not simply relate to a legal definition of a problem. 
She suggested that the problem would be defined in the terms 
of the first organization or agency that deals with it, and 
this can result in variation in the outcome of the problem 
and the time taken to resolve it. (lOJ) Also White notes. 
101) Ibid. I p.79. 
102) Ibid., p.81. 
103) Ibid., p.52. 
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that if the lawyer is controlling the definition of the 
problems this may result in an attempt, whether covert or 
not, to mould clients' behaviour to the demands of society! 104 ) 
This is achieved by channelling clients' problems through 
the system rather than allowing the clients to attempt to 
change the system if that is their preferred option. 
The criticism of regarding the problems as legal in 
nature shows the importance of allowing clients to define 
how they can best satisfy their own needs. Clients must 
not be limited to the use of the law, or to taking action 
which is legal in nature, when non-legalistic solutions may 
be equally valid and preferable, perhaps only because they 
do not involve legal procedures. 
(ii) The Concept of Need. 
The book also criticizes the concept of need itself. 
Morris went further than either Leach or Bradshaw in her 
criticism of need. She regarded the concept as impossible 
to use in any scientific manner because it was an absolute, 
it could not be isolated from other social needs. (lOS) 
This meant that there could be no scientific objectivity in 
the perception of need, rather it fell into the political 
sphere of values. (l06 ) Therefore the viewpoint which gained 
broad acceptance was likely to be that of those with the 
most power and status rather than those who were to receive 
the service. 
Lewis asked whether the clients would need a lawyer 
104} Ibid. I p.3S. 
lOS) Ibid., p.SO. 
106) Ibid. I p.S3. 
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at all. The basis of unmet legal need on the concepts of 
equality before the law failed to recognise that, despite 
purported flexibility, the lawyer was not always the 
. ( 107) 
relevant person to undertake the JOb. 
Finally White specifically called for a change in 
emphasis away from the concept of need to rights enforce-
ment. He stressed that this was less patronizing to the 
recipient, and that it brought into the open the need to 
examine the underlying values of what was trying to be 
achieved. (lOS) Morris too follows this theme stressing 
that a failure to do so could result in the simple repro-
duction of the problems already present in the system. (log) 
In the longer term such marginal piecerreal reforms might 
obstruct the development of a more relevant re-organiza-
t . f . (110) lon o servlces. 
(iii) The anarcho-marxist perspective. 
Bankowski and Mungham's analysis of developments 
in legal services(lll) focused on what they saw as "a 
crucial part of any future attempt to set up a 'national 
grid' of legal services aimed at ... bringing law and lawyers 
to the people." They concentrated on the duty solicitor 
scheme and the establishment of law centres, but their 
analysis is relevant to the legal aid scheiT.e as a whole. 
107) Ibid. I p.87. 
lOS) Ibid., p.37. 
109) Ibid., p.52. 
110) Ibid. I p.68. 
111) Bankowski 1 z • 1 and Mungham, G., "Images of Law", (1976) Chapter 3. 
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Their stated perspective is Marxist, but there are some 
elements of anarchism within the work. (ll2 ) It is per-
haps best then to set out their frame of reference rather 
than to rely on any established viewpoint. 
They state that law in the form that it is taught 
and practiced creates domination, oppression and desolation, 
and is a hindrance to those wishing to move towards a free 
society. (llJ) They follow an economic analysis to 
explain why there has been an increase in interest in the 
provision of legal services to poor people. They account 
for practitioners' interest as a reflection of their chang-
ing market situation which now provides them with a further 
market to exploit when traditional business is drying up; 
and law teachers attempting to show how law can help, 
based on the assumption that it is the content of law which 
needs to be changed rather than the form of society (sic.). (ll 4 ) 
They stress the importance of looking at the social forma-
tions which produce the law and accuse lawyers of failing 
to do this when trying to change the world. (llS) They go 
on to say that law in fact emasculates man by providing 
experts to solve his problems rather than allowing men to 
deal with their own problems within their own lives, 
rather than within the bounds of professionalized society. (ll 6 ) 
112) Murgatroyd, S.J., and Rees, W.M., "The Radical Estate", (1977) 
11 Law Teacher 151. 
113) Op.cit., note (111) p.xi. 
114) Ibid. I 
115) Ibid., p.xiii. 
116} Ibid., p.xiii. 
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The validity of their frame of reference can be 
questioned because the law need not always reflect the 
situation in which they see it. Legal Aid can be used to 
change the circumstances of both individuals and groups 
without being repressive,and to some extent used by the 
affected people to help themselves. A free society cannot 
be regarded as one without law since that would not place 
the weakest in society in a more advantageous position than 
they have under the present system. Ideally law can be 
used to safeguard the poor and the disadvantaged. Most 
importantly Bankowski and Mungham do recognise the nee-
essity to view law within a broader social perspective. 
Despite the criticisms of their frame of reference, its 
largest failing is in its extreme stance. At a more basic 
level its foundations largely mirror those of the authors 
of "Social Needs and Legal Action". That is, within a 
social context law is a tool of the strongest in society 
and therefore is set to prevent those in whose interest it 
would be to change society from doing so. Bankowski and 
Mungham state that legal assistance to the poor should not 
pre-suppose that legal rather than social solutions are 
most relevant to the poor. (ll 7 ) Any legal assistance to 
the poor should not increase dependence on lawyers(llS), 
or weaken social action by attempting to enforce rights 
117) Ibid., p.73. 
118) Ibid., p.75. 
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only through legal channels. 
Therefore the problems with unmet legal need as a 
theoretical basis for providing legal services to the poor 
are clear. They can be concentrated into two fundamental 
criticisms. Firstly the problems of the poor are not what 
has traditionally been defined as legal. It is true to 
say that like other people they require divorces, and commit 
crimes, but their broader problems are a result of their 
socio-economic position. Their housing conditions are 
poor, their health care is sub-standard, they have little 
job security, their employment rights are minimal, and 
they often have debt problems. Yet there are legal channels 
through which re-dress can be sought for many of the 
resultant problems, and a legal aid system should ensure 
the ability to use them. But non-legal means to improve 
their situation cannot and should not be ignored by those 
purporting to allow the poor to obtain justice. 
The second problem with unmet legal need is that 
the concept of need is too vague. It can not be scien-
tifically defined, and the quantity or quality of the ser-
vices required by the poor can not be gauged from it. 
(c) Legal v consumer response 
In practice the division of the unmet legal needs 
and social analyses can be seen in terms of the legally and 
consumer orientated responses to the problem. These can 
be usefully contrasted. 
The legally orientated response includes the legal 
aid model in use in the United Kingdom. It is epitomized 
by Geddes(llg), who responds to the problems of providing 
119) Op.cit., note (49) 
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legal services for the poor by suggesting how best to bring 
private practices into deprived areas, and the possibility 
of solicitors being employed to work in advice centres or 
providing services free of charge. This can be compared to 
the consumer approach which faces the same problerr: in these 
terms, 
"Society has become so complex that the 
experience of friends and neighbours is no 
longer enough. Specialist knowledge and 
skills are needed to cope with an increasingly 
forbidding bureaucratic aparatus." (120) 
The change in emphasis from the need for lawyers to the 
need for people with specialist knowledge and skills is 
the important factor. 
Perhaps surprisingly Seton Pollock touched on the 
crux of the issue when he considered the role of the 
proposed liaison officers( 121 ). He noted that only a 
relatively small number of the problems of the citizen are 
legal, and even then they may be such as to be answerable 
by an experienced person with knowledge of the facilities 
available for dealing with such problems. Also as has 
been seen problems may not be sirr:ply divisible into those 
which are legal and non-legal, one problem may necessitate 
help from several quarters. What this tells us is that 
lawyers' skills are not necessarily those most relevant to 
a first port of call advice agency. This is why the consumer 
orientated approach is more valid than the legally orien-
tated approach. The person coming in off the street does 
120) National Consumer Council, "The Fourth Right of Citizenship, A 
Review of Local Advice Services", (1977). 
121) Seton Pollock, A.F., "The Future of Legal Aid", (March 1969) 66 
Law Society Gazette 172. 
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does not usually need advice from a lawyer, but rather 
from someone with broad relevant knowledge and experi-
ence, someone who has the time to listen, to understand 
what that persons specific problem is and then help them 
to choose the most relevant course of action for them-
selves. This may involve re-directing them to a lawyer 
but that is a secondary not primary step. Also this 
specialist advisor is not feared like the lawyer, they are 
not historically revered members of the community, and 
therefore many of the preconceptions and fears which 
lawyers embody for those who are not used to using them 
are overcome. This is one part of the answer to why 
private practice was not the correct base from which to 
atitemttto give advice and assistance about the rights 
of the citizen which could have a preventative result. 
As regards self help and independence, Wexler shows 
why the legal aid system can not provide this. (122 ) The 
essence of the legal aid system is that a lawyer is provided 
to come into the scene where the problem has arisen, 
solve i~ and then leave again. Although there are parts of 
legal aid where this is a valid purpose for example crim-
inal legal aid, on the whole this approach reflects the 
philosophy that the problems which arise are distinct and 
unconnected from surrounding circumstances. \'iTexler supports 
the social needs approach, saying that in the area where 
legal aid works, i.e., for the poorer section of society, 
their problems are the product of that poverty and there-
fore the lawyer who simply solves a problem will have done 
122) Op.cit., note (41) p.1053. 
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nothing to change the circumstances of that person 1 the 
poor person will simply have become reliant on the lawyers' 
skills. 
The Adamsdown Community and Advice Centre suggests 
that the approach which is needed to encourage independent 
action and self help is to involve the community as a whole.( 123 ) 
Legal aid provides for the lawyer to decide the best way to 
solve the problem, and to do it quickly and on a limited 
budget. The Community based approach involves an inter-
play between the professionls and local people to identify 
the problem and form an appropriate strategy. This process 
is not simple and lawyers are only one part of it. The 
effort must be continuing and may be long term, and funding, 
or rather the lack of it, can not be allowed to interfere. 
The form which the legal aid system takes does not allow 
for this approach, and although in this case the Adams-
d d f . d (124) . o~TI Centre use green orms to 1ts a vantage 1t 
proved that the money obtained from that source, although 
important, was still only a part of a much broader strategy. 
(d) The consumer approach in practice. 
It is important to recognise that the consumer 
orientated approach is an equally orthodox model for the 
provision of legal services to the poor, as the legally 
orientated approach, of which legal aid is the archetype. 
It is of considerable value in this context to look at 
the American experience of the neighbourhood law firm 
123) "In Praise of Green Form- Sort Of.", (1975}, Legal Action Group 
Bulletin 35. 
124) Anon, Editorial, "£25 + £120 x 15 Aggrieved Residents= £2,175" 1 
(1975), Legal Action Group Bulletin 30. 
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(N.L.F.). Although these were the precursor of the law 
centre model in the United Kingdom the latter is not as 
satisfactory as a model of the consumer orientated approach. 
It is not the purpose of this work to compare the law 
centre model to the N.L.F., but it is suffice to say that 
the ideology of law centre movement has not been so con-
sistent as was that of the N.L.F. Despite borrowing 
heavily from the terminology of the American legal ser-
vices prograrr~e the law centres' en1phasis has been on 
a consistency of form, rather than of objectives. The 
definition of objectives has been left to local centres, 
and when viewed overall is found to be diverse and incon-
sistent. 
(i) The 'War on Poverty': recognising the social 
problems of the poor: The essential fact to remember when 
talking about the American legal services prograffill:e was 
that it was not an isolated policy, it was part of a 
strategy, the War on Poverty. The basis of this strategy 
was the Economic Opportunity Act (1964), the ideology be-
hind the Act was clearly stated in s2, 
"The United States can achieve its full economic 
and social potential as a nation only if every 
individual has the opportunity to contribute 
to the full extent of his capabilities and to 
participate in the workings of our society. It 
is therefore, the policy of the United States 
to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the 
midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to 
everyone the opportunity for education and 
training, the opportunity to work, and the 
opportunity to live in decency and dignity. It 
is the purpose of this Act to strengthen, supple-
ment and co-ordinate efforts in furtherance of 
that policy." (125). 
125) Quoted in Whitaker, B., "Participation and Poverty", (1968) 
Fabian Research Series, 272, 5. 
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This statement shows, as Cahn and Cahn pointed out,( 126 ) 
that there was a recognition of the interrelatedness of the 
problems of the poor. The probleffis were not only legal, 
they also included social, economic, educational, psycholo-
gical and other problems. The response therefore needed to 
be concerted and comprehensive to tackle the sources of 
poverty, and numerous programmes were launched( 127 ) primarily 
in the areas of job training, experience and creation; 
preparatory, continuing and remedial education; health, 
legal services, small business, and projects targetted at 
specific groups such as Indians or migrant workers. Central 
to all these projects was the "participation by the resi-
dents of the area who are ooor " (128 ) 
L • 
Therefore what we have so far are the first two 
stages of the development of a strategy. The first stage 
was to define the problem, in this case the problem was 
clear, poverty, in its broadest multifaceted form. The 
second stage was then to analyse the possible solutions. 
Here it was obvious from the nature of the problem that 
many different solutions would have to be provided simul-
taneously to deal with those factors which were seen as 
fundamental causes of poverty. The next stage was to 
assess strategies most likely to succeed in translating 
the theoretical solutions into practically successful pro-
grammes, and to implement those programmes. 
126;) Cahn, E. S. , and Cahn, J. C. , "The War on Poverty 
pective", (1963-64) 73 Yale Law Journal 1317. 
127:) Op.cit., note (125) c.t ll. 
A Civilian Pers-
128) Economic Opportunity Act s202 as amended in 1966, quoted in 
Whitaker, op.cit., note (125) at 5. 
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(ii) The Legal Services Progranune: Solving the Problems 
of the poor The position of N.L.F.s now becomes much 
clearer, they were seen as the best means by which to 
implement a strategy to deal with the legal problems of the 
poor. N.L.F.s were generally preferred to judicare systems 
(similar to our legal aid system provided on a case by case 
basis by private practitioners). This was because, as 
Bamberger the first Director of the legal services pro-
gran®e said, that system can achieve no other goal than the 
mere resolution of controversies and the legal services 
programme had much greater ambitions than that. (12 9) What 
the prograwme did hope to achieve was not simply to provide 
more services to those who were poor but also to represent 
organisations of the poor; to define or change the law 
where it was unclear or detrimental to the interests of the 
poor; to educate the poor; and to ensure the participation 
of the poor through representation on a project's board of 
d . d d . . (130) lrectors an a .vlsory comnn ttees. Judicare systems 
were not ruled out as a method for implementing the pro-
gramme, but it was recognised that they would have to 
adapt to fit the above requirements, and changes to achieve 
this were insisted upon before federal funds were given to 
any project. (l3 l) 
The theory underlying the legal services programme 
projects was very largely based on the ideas of Edgar and 
Jean Cahn, and their role was central to Office of Economic 
Opportunity 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
129) Johnson, Jr., E., "Justice and Reform", (1974), Part II. 
130) Tentative Guidelines for Legal Services Proposals to the Office 
of Economic Opportunity (Spring 1965), quoted in Pye, A.K., "The 
Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program", (1966) 31 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 211, at 223. 
131) Ibid., at 224. 
63 
(O.E.O.), and particularly the legal services programme's 
development. The N.L.F. was their brainchild and is worth 
(132) 
outlining their reasoning behind the proposal . While 
recognising that lawyers did not have a monopoly on the 
skills of advocacy the Cahns recognised that they were well 
equipped to deal ~ith the intricacies of social organization. 
As advocates lawyers were by necessity partisan and should 
identify with their clients. The Cahns felt that lawyers 
apart from educators or social workers who by their pro-
fessional training tended to be mediators. Finally they 
defined the lawyers role not simply in terms of what were 
narrowly regarded as being legal problems, but rather in 
broader terms of obtaining redress by communicating effec-
tively and properly to a person with the power to provide a 
remedy. This was the crux of the value placed on lawyers' 
skills by the Cahns, but it would be misleading to under-
stand the lawyers' role simply in terms of representation, 
the Cahns saw four areas where the lawyers' skills were of 
value. (lJ 2a) 
(i) Traditional legal assistance in establishing 
or asserting clearly defined legal rights. The Cahns did 
not see this simply as an exercise in assertion of rights, 
they also recognised the need to increase rights awareness 
generally throughout the corr~unity. The traditional law-
yers role of providing proactive assistance in defining 
contractual relationships between companies or paying 
clients was seen as equally important for the poor community. 
132) Op.cit., note (126) at 1334 
l32a) The proceeding section sets out a summary of the Cahns' proposals 
in Op.cit., note (126) 
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Finally the lawyers should assist individuals acting collec-
tively to create associations and binding legal obligations 
to form tenants associations or groups of welfare recipients 
or consumers, and assist them to press their demands. 
(2) Legal analysis and representation directed toward 
reform where the law is vague, uncertain, or destructively 
complex. The essence of the problem here was that poor 
people were frequently in contact with official dis-
cretion and "low visibility" decisions often couched in 
terms of benign paternalism. (133 ) Legal representation could 
lead to clarification, but if used improvidently it could 
equally produce rigid ill-considered law. The Cahns saw 
scrutiny of this "urban law" by legal scholars as the means 
by which to encourage accelerated rationalization of it. 
(3) Legal representation where the law appears con-
trary to the interests of the poor. Where a rule, statute 
or regulation created a hardship representation might sus-
pend or postpone its operation, or otherwise mitigate that 
hardship. Structured attacks on a rule could result in 
slackened enforcement or even a willingness to reconsider 
the wisdom of the rule. There may be the opportunity to 
make a direct attack on the validity of a rule or regula-
tion, perhaps through statutary interpretation. This 
process was recognised as being basically related to the 
exercise of political or governmental power. Representation 
133) Op.cit. 1 note (41) 1 at 1050. 
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could gain a fair hearing and political due process for 
the poor, or perhaps even initiate a decision making 
process. However, the Cahns felt that the changes this 
role could effect were likely to be limited. 
(4) Legal representation in contexts which appear to 
be non-legal. Where what is sought is a change in conduct 
or perception a legal theory used as a form of discourse 
need not be sufficiently,impregnable to obtain court judge-
ment, effective communication can be of significant value 
in itself. Similarly lawyers' sense of the administrative 
process can often either secure redress or locate a higher 
level of appeal for a grievance. 
These were the Cahns' theories of the purpose of the 
legal services programrr,e lawyer. They reflect the broad 
perspective of the Cahn's views of the role of law and the 
value of lawyers. It is noticeable that the skills of 
lawyers are central to each of the proposed roles, and it 
was these roles which were the touchstones of the OEO legal 
services programme. 
Therefore in this third stage of strategy development 
there was an initial stage of assessing the strategy most 
likely to suceed, as provided by the Cahns' model purposes, 
and a second stage of implementation of actual model pro-
graiTllT'.es. We shall now look at this second process. 
The Cahns did provide one possible model for the imple-
mentation of these functions, the N.L.F., but as mentioned 
above other models were not ruled out so long as they under-
t k t f lf • 1 th h I • t • (134} oo o u 1 e Ca n s purpose cr1 er1a. This open-
ness to numerous models was symptomatic of the feeling within 
134) Text to note (131) 
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the legal services programme that the support of the organised 
bar, the American Bar Association (A.B.A.), must be won over 
despite the inherent contradictions between the ABA's support 
for traditional judicare systems and the O.E.O.s support for 
prograrrmes which would have a meaningful impact on the 
problem of poverty. (l 3 S) This was a crucial turning point 
in the function of the programme although at the time the 
compromises involved seemed to be rather a matter of 
phraseology than of purpose. Johnson Jr. (the first 
Deputy Director and second Director of the O.E.O. legal 
services programme) refers to the "re-phrasing" of goals 
and methods of the programme to secure A.B.A. support, 
but Rye (1 36 ) noted a distinct shift in perspective. 
Although the eradication of poverty was still central to 
the programme the use of law reform, community involve-
ment, group organization and representation became sec-
ondary methods to the general provision of advice and 
representation, research, and education of the poor to 
recognise the aid of the law. This was still a preventive 
approach but it was no longer an ess:entially participatory 
(13 7) 
one. 
This perceived need to have A.B.A. support brought 
major problems to the implementation stage of the strategy. 
If O.E.O. grants were to be made to existing legal aid 
societies then there would often need to be prolonged nego-
tiations to secure fundamental structural changes to that 
135) Op.cit. 1 note (129) 
136) Op.cit. 1 note (130) ,at 227. 
137) For the possible repercussions of this see Hazard (1969-70), op.cit., 
note (142) 1 at 255. 
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project. If this could not be achieved, then grants would 
have to be used to create entirely new political entities, 
often at the expense of alienating powerful people. These 
factors, combined with the O.E.O. programme's preference for 
lawyer control of project management boards, increased 
the chances of project control falling to those who were 
unsywpathetic to the furtherance of the goals of the poor 
and to advancing their economic position by the use of the 
law. It has been suggested that over 50% of initial O.E.O. 
funding was provided for projects whose members were unsym-
pathetic to the aims of the O.E.O. (lJS) 
There were also resultant problems in the determina-
tion of project objectives. Important questions needed to 
be answered as to the relative priority to be given to 
the pursuance of due process as favoured by the conserva-
tive legal aid societies, or the reformist prescriptions 
supported by the more radical N.L.F. movement. Initially 
at least the O.E.O. programme avoided the issue, and despite 
its relatively small budget(lJg) proposed to deal with the 
assorted goals of both camps. The failure to set priorities 
meant that project members felt that they should simul-
taneously undertake all aspects of the model functions. 
This in turn lead to a tendency for projects to meet the 
articulated community demands for services, that is the 
basic individual requirement for advice and representation. 
Because of this approach many projects became swamped in 
casework. Also because of the overwhelming demand for this 
138) Generally see op.cit., note (129). 
139) $27.5 million, only the tenth largest O.E.O. programme budget, 
op.cit., note (125), at 12. 
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particular programme function the broader progressive 
and innovative functions requiring long term planning and a 
~ore participative approach were neglected. (l 40) 
(iii) The effect of programme ideology on programme 
orientation. 
The situation arising from the lack of priorities was 
not satisfactory and a pressing need for a choice to be made 
was obvious. This choice was viewed in terms of the continu-
ation of all rr.odel purposes at an equal level, which would 
be possible only at the expense of the number of clients 
who could be assisted, or the acceptance of the relative 
importance of some purpose goals above others. Johnson 
saw the choice as being essentially in terms of the desire 
to keep ABA support or to lose it. To turn away many 
clients would be contrary to the ABA desire to view the 
O.E.O. legal services programme in terms of due process 
justice in an attempted compromise the programme became 
prioratized in terms of a law reform strategy. This would 
be pursued through test cases, and other practices to change 
the laws and practices which form the social and economic 
structure of poverty. It was felt that such a purpose 
would satisfy both the conservative equal justice suppor-
ters, since it had a strong emphasis on the particular 
skills of lawyers, and had traditional links with lawyers' 
work for corporate clients; and also satisfy the more radical 
anti-poverty campaigners by offering the opportunity of 
social and economic change for many, for example by the 
result of a single test case, while protecting them from 
140) Op.cit., notes (129), and (130) at 244, and also see Cahn, E.S., 
and Cahn, J.C. "Power to the People or the Profession? -The Public 
Interest in Public Interest Law", (1969-70} 79 Yale Law Journal 1005, 
at 1012. 
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criticism for attempting to induce community organization or 
social change. (l4 l) 
Even within this prioratized strategy contrasts in 
the perception of the purpose o£ the programme, as reflected 
in the ideologies of the programme directors, were crucial 
in defining how each project worked. The range of opinion 
on the value of a law reform strategy varied from a whole-
hearted support and radical implementation, to a fear that 
the policy was fundamentally misguided and should be 
reversed immediately. It is useful to look at these 
polarized arguments since in many ways they encapsulate the 
crux of the debate as to the role of lawyers, the law, and 
the effect they could have in a legal or consumer orien-
tated approach for the American prograrr@e. 
It is worth noting that one of the main speakers 
against the law reform strategy was Hazard. (142 ) Although 
the opinions he expressed were not made in his official 
capacity as Executive Director of the American Bar Foun-
dation, it would be foolish to underestimate the influence 
of his views on his peers, and on the Bar generally. 
Hazard viewed the O.E.O. legal services programme in terms 
of a basic assumption that litigation to enforce the legal 
rights of poor people would significantly improve their 
socio-economic problems. (143 ) Ee saw the argument in terms 
141) Generally see Op.cit., note (129) 
142) Hazard Jr., G.C., "Social Justice Through Civil Justice," (1968-69) 
36 Uni. of Chicago Law Review 699; and "Law Reforming in the Anti-
Poverty Effort." (1969-70) 37 Uni. of Chicago Law Review 242. 
143) Hazard (1968-69), at 699. This is obviously far too limited an 
understanding of the programme theory, if one looks back at the 
Cahns' proposed lawyer functions, even viewed in terms of law reform 
strategy, enforcement of rights only forms a small part of many roles. 
Hazard's basic assumption is therefore incorrect, although as an under-
standing of the limits of a purely legislative law reform strategy it 
is more valuable, see Stumpf, H.P., "Conununity Politics and Legal 
Services", (1975) at 276. 
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of an attack on the structural problems of poverty, centred 
on change in the law itself5 144 ) The substantive rules of 
law often affected the poor unfairly, and even where rules 
were formulated in favour of the poor,the legislators failed 
to recognise that the poor had neither the ability nor the 
resources to enforce them. The O.E.O. legal services pro-
gramme would provide the poor with the means to remedy 
this situation and thereby decrease alienation stemming 
from feelings of inadequacy and despair in the poverty 
community. Also there would be a cumulative secondary 
effect of improving poor people's standard of housing, 
education and general livelihood~ 145 ) 
Hazard finds the fault in this argument to be that if 
those wrongs which are legally remediable are corrected 
for the poor as a class, the resultant gains will only be 
short term. This is because the market will adjust to take 
account of for example iinproved housing conditions and re-
sult in the poor having to pay higher rents. This is be-
cause the ability to obtain a fair decision in a particular 
case (civil justice), does not solve the problem of unequal 
allocation of community resources (social justice). (146 ) 
Reallocation of resources can only be achieved by litiga-
tion if it is aimed at taxation legislation. Such a strategy 
is rightly seen by Hazard as uneconomical, and possibly 
144) Hazard, (1968-69) , at 701 
145) Ibid., at 703. Again Hazard's understanding of the programme's 
intention is limited. Perhaps the crucial factor that he fails to 
grasp is the redistribution of power likely to result from the organi-
zation of the poor into groups as advocated in the first of the Cahns 
proposals. Also Hazard ignores the possible work in non-judicial, 
and non-legal areas, also advocated by the Cahns. Obtaining civil 
justice is therefore only one factor in the attempt to obtain social 
justice. Similar criticisms are also relevant (combined with a fail-
ure to see the Cahns emphasis on civilian control) Hazard (1969-70) , 
Op.cit., note (142). 
146) Hazard (1968-69), Op.cit., note (142), at 707. 
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unconstitutional since those facing the increased taxation 
would be unrepresented and therefore unable to put their 
side of the case. (l 4?) Therefore Hazard suggests that the 
proven record of legal aid to deal with what the public 
recognise as legal problems, such as cr irr.inal accusations, 
domestic conflict, debt etc., should result in its adoption 
in place of the existing legal services programme, and so 
the public would at least know that they would get due 
process justice. Some redistribution of wealth would be 
produced simply by providing the lawyers services freely, 
and also by any settlements obtained for an individual, 
but the attempt to obtain social justice should not be part 
of a legal prograrnme, rather it should remain "on the con-
science of the com~unity, and its sense of prudence, as 
expressed in its legislation". (148 ) This ideology would 
result in a programn1e providing legal services to individual 
clients in traditionally legal areas of work. Conmtunity 
organisation or social reform would not be given priority. 
The contrasting ideology to the above is one which 
accepts the law reform role as being fundamental to the 
anti-poverty programme. The role of the lawyer is not to 
provide equal justice or due process, but rather to help 
"poor people to organize themselves to change things so 
that either no one is poor or (less radically) so that 
poverty does not entail misery. (149 ) The involvement of 
law in poor people's lives is seen as being constant and 
abrasive, since the law which relates to them is often 
147) Ibid., at 709 to 711. 
148) Ibid., at 712. 
1491 Hazard (1968-69), op.cit., note (142), at 707. 
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that which is the most intrusive into their personal affairs. (lSO) 
Social justice for the poor is not simply to be achieved by 
obtaining a fair decision in a particular case (although 
that is a tactic which should not be ignored, particularly 
if a favourable decision could have broad ramifications for 
other poor people). A one to one relationship between law-
yer and poor client is seen as either not relevant or is 
positively harmful to clients because it isolates them from 
each other. The problems of the poor are not seen as indiv-
idual in the traditional legal sense, rather their problems 
are the result of their poverty and therefore are common to 
all poor people. 
This has implications for the methods adopted by the 
prograrr~e lawyers, and central to this is the participatory 
nature of the work. The lawyers role is to organise poor 
people, rather than to solve their legal problems, and then, 
as far as is possible, to teach those groups the skills 
they require to deal with their problems themselves, so 
that they do not develop a dependency on the lawyers skills 
which may be removed. In a programme based on this ideology 
individual advice and representation will have a very low 
priority, the emphasis is rrore likely to be on increasing 
community rights awareness, producing resource materials 
for corrmunity use and information, teaching traditionally 
legal skills to lay people, and educating and preparing groups 
150) Ibid., at 1050. 
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for confrontations with individuals and government officials 
. h h h . (lSl} aga1nst w om t ey ave gr1evances. 
Therefore although the O.E.O. legal services programme 
became prioratized in terms of a law reform strategy, the 
ideologies behind different projects would play a crucial 
part in defining the emphasis given to different methods of 
achieving that aim. It must be remembered as we have 
stated above, that there was an agreement made by all pro-
jects receiving O.E.O. grants that they would undertake to 
fulfil certain policy objectives. Given that this was the 
case satisfactory results should have been secured from all 
projects in their law reform work despite their differing 
ideologies. The assessment of the achievement of the pro-
gramme's goal produced results which are central to an 
understanding of the feasible achievements of the O.E.D. 
legal services programme, and any comparative model, such 
as the British law centre movement. 
It is useful at this point to set out the stages in 
the O.E.O. strategy development which we have seen:-
1. Defining the problem. 
2. Analysis of possible solutions. 
3. Assessment of strategies most likely to 
solve the problem/s. 
4. Implementation of the chosen programme/s. 
We have seen that the problem was regarded as being poverty, 
that numerous solutions would have to be available to meet 
the various causes of poverty. As far as solving the 'legal' 
151) Generally see, ibid,;atl053 to 1059. A useful perspective on 
the different views of society inherent in the views of Wexler 
and Hazard can be obtained by comparison to the continuum drawn 
in Rees, W.M., "Frames of Reference and the Public Interest", in 
"Labour Law and the Community", ed. by Lord Wedderburn and T.W. 
Murphy, (1982) at 129. 
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problems of the poor were concerned, we have seen that law 
reform was the chosen strategy, and that this policy would 
be implemented through a variety of programmes with dif-
fering approaches. Finman(lS 2 ) looked at the concept of 
slippage. This was the question of how far the goal of 
solving the problem of poverty (number 1. above) was 
achieved by the programmes implemented (number 4. above). 
The extent of slippage was obviously central to the success 
of the O.E.O. legal services programme. If the concentra-
tion of a projects resources were directed towards solving 
individual client problems rather than towards changing the 
social conditions of poverty, then the slippage would be 
such that that particular project would be invalid as far 
as solving the overall problem was concerned. If that 
project was typical of many in the O.E.O. legal services 
programme, then the overall programme would be doomed to 
failure. 
Finman found the ideological perspective of the pro-
gramme promoters to be "a critical and perhaps dominant 
influence" on the performance of their particular project. 
In the process of deciding whether to fund a project, the 
promoters of that programme would submit their outline 
proposals, and the O.E.O. would review these so that they 
conformed to the broader programme requirements. Finman 
found that this process was satisfactory for correcting 
152) Finman, T., "O.E.O. Legal Service Programs and the Pursuit of 
Social Change : The Relationship Between Program Ideology and 
Program Performance", (1971) Wisconsin Law Review 1001. The 
proceeding discussion on the importance of ideology is based on 
Finman's article. 
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practical matters such as staff numbers, but became mean-
ingless when the O.E.O. insisted on the insertion of the 
social reform objective. This latter change would be incon-
sistent with or contrary to the programme promoters ideology 
if not already included in their proposals, and therefore be 
unlikely to have any practical impact on the work of the 
programme. Also where it became obvious to the O.E.O. that 
no social reform function was being undertaken, and they 
wished to take remedial action to correct this, Finman 
showed that the controlling ideology of the programme would 
have to be changed usually by removal of the programme 
directors,rather than its stated commitment to social reform 
work. To do otherwise would be unlikely to result in a 
new commitment to undertaking social reform work. 
Finman identified three types of programme, perhaps 
most usefully viewed as a continuum. At one end were 
agencies committed to a social change orientation, accept-
ing all types of work as proper if assisting in the overall 
aim, and at the other extreme were agencies with a strong 
traditionally legal individual client orientation, who 
viewed the social change orientated function as inappro-
priate and troublesome. Between these extremes there were 
a number of agencies who undertook to meet individual client 
needs and basic reform work in approximately equal propor-
tions. Perhaps it was not surprising that these different 
agencies had differing amounts of success in fulfilling the 
O.E.O. programme's aim of working to relieve poverty. Those 
agencies further along the continuum towards the social 
change orientation were the most active in working for social 
change, and vice versa. This had direct implications for the 
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legal services programme since it wanted to fund only those 
projects which were going to undertake social reform work. 
Now that the projects had been identified as being of 
one sort or another it should have been possible to see 
which factors were responsible for the difference. Finman 
isolated the pervasiveness of the programme promoter's 
ideology as of central importance. 
As the promoters these people would define the pro-
gramrr,e image. This in turn would define staff selection, 
by self selection of applicants who felt their perspective 
was in line with that of the programme image, and similarly 
during the employment of the staff by the management. 
Ideology would define staff performance through a need for 
approval and acceptance by the staff resulting in their 
conforming to the programme ideology, despite there usually 
being no tangible barriers to the various approaches to work. 
Where no particular approach was demanded by the programme 
Finman found this to be a sign of an ideology preferring a 
diverse approach rather than the lack of any ideology. 
The clients' perspective was also controlled by the pro-
gramme's image. The poor comn1unity would provide the pro-
ject with the type of work which it saw as being appro-
priate to it, rather than demanding that it undertake dif-
ferent work. In this case particularly contrary programme 
intentions and image could have a significant and debili-
tating effect. Finman also pointed to the effect of ideology 
in defining workload priorities, defining project response 
to local and national pressure, and in defining relations 
with other community based organisations. 
The importance of Finman's findings must not be 
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underestimated. The performance of a prograrnme is basically 
the product of that programme's ideology, which given the 
O.E.O. programme approach to funding, v.las largely that of 
the programme promoters. Although this approach encouraged 
diversity among the progranunes it also resulted in a fail-
ure to ensure that each programme fulfilled the aim for 
which it was funded. It therefore becomes essential in 
an attempt to minimise slippage in the broad strategy be-
tween the problem definition and programme implerr,entation 
that the underlying ideology is understood and supported 
by those purporting to further the aims of the programme. 
This will not present a varied approach since there are 
numerous suitable methods for implementing the policy(lSJ) 
which can not all be undertaken simultaneously. Such an 
approach will ensure that the broader perspective of the 
aim of the prograrrune is central to the understanding by 
each agency of its role and therefore its most suitable 
strategy. It will also provide a more concerted effort 
to combat the problem which is seen as the justification 
for the programme, since all the programmes will be work-
ing towards the same end. 
(e) Conclusion. 
It has been seen that the problems of the poor are 
essentially a result of their socio-econo~ic position. As 
a result, a traditionally legally orientated response, such 
as legal aid, which fails to take account of this fact, is 
153) See the various strategies suggested by the Cahns above, see 
text to notes (132) to (134). 
78 
inappropriate to assist the poor. The American experience 
shows the validity of the alternative approach of providing 
legal services to the poor based on the principle of con-
sumer participation, and geared towards using the skills 
of lawyers to obtain redress through legal and non legal 
methods. The American experience proved that the legal 
aid or judicare system was incompatible to the consumer 
or social justice models since its only purpose was to 
solve the individual problems of poor people. It was 
shown that compromise between the principles of the two 
alternative systems to retain A.B.A. support was detre-
mental to the consumer orientation because of the size 
of the individual client caseload produced by the legal 
aid system. Most importantly, Finman established that 
the success of the consumer approach could be ensured by 
emphasising the importance of the compatability of pro-
gramme ideologies. If all the programmes worked with the 
same purpose towards the same ends then the poor could 
obtain assistance so that they could begin to resolve 
their socio-economic problems through legal and non-legal 
channels. 
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(D) Private practice is an inappropriate outlet for the 
provision of legal services to the poor. 
(l) Introduction 
This section is intended to establish that private 
practice, as an outlet for the legal aid system which is 
provided, is inappropriate. That private practice tends 
to hinder rather than help poor people to obtain the legal 
services to which they are entitled. 
Firstly the attitudes of both lawyers and clients 
will be noted. Their differences in perception will be 
mentioned, as will their lack of empathy with one another, 
and consequent unease in interaction. The distribution 
of solicitors will then be examined. The variation in 
accessability to both solicitors and their practices will 
be shown. The nature of the distribution will be seen to 
be unrelated to the requirements of a uniform system for 
the provision of legal services to the poor. The likeli-
hood of future redress will be seen to be minimal. 
Finally a detailed practical view will be taken of the 
role of advice agencies in compensating for the failings 
of the legal aid scheme. 
By such discussion it is intended to show that for the 
poor to obtain the legal services which they require an 
alternative outlet for those services must be provided. 
80 
(2) The attitudes of both lawyers and clients are a 
hindrance to accessarility. 
By its nature this problem is not easily quantifiable. 
Therefore it is not intended to consider the problem in 
great depth. Here it is intended only to establish that 
the problem exists. The solution to the problem is 
inexorably bound to the preference of the poor for using 
independent advice agencies, rather than lawyers, which 
shall be seen later. The problem should therefore be 
borne in mind during the subsequent sections. 
Considerable work has been done to prove that both 
lawyers and clients' attitudes create obstacles to the 
accessability of legal services. Carlin and Howard(lS 4 ) 
noted it was lawyers' role to decide whether their clients' 
problems were categorised as legal or not. Such lawyers 
may be unwilling to take on work regarded as less pres-
tigious, or on a purely financial basis they may be reluc-
tant to take cases because of low axpectation of financial 
gain. Hazell (lSS) noted lawyers' preference to establish 
their practices in city centre locations rather than in 
close proximity to the poorer sections of the cowmunity. 
This caused problems not only of inaccessibility, but also 
of intimidation by the nature of the buildings and decor 
which was directed towards more affluent clientele. 
154) Carlin, J.E., and Howard, J., "Legal Representation and Class 
Justice," in Sociology of Law, ed. , Aubert, V., (1969) . 
155) Hazell, R., "Law and the People", (1976), & 73 Law Soc. Gazette 
75. 
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Clients attitudes have also been important factors. 
The lack of knowledge of the existence of the legal aid 
system itself has been proven. (156 ) Hughes has pointed out 
the attitudes of clients which dissuade them from seeing a 
solicitor despite their awareness of legal aid and their 
entitlement to it. Fear of cost was the most important 
factor, but other less obvious factors were also mentioned. 
The feeling that people of their socio-economic position 
did not go to lawyers, feeling uncomfortable and ill-at-
ease with lawyers, and the position and opening hours of 
lawyers offices were all mentioned in a significant number 
of cases. (157 ) Also of importance is the reluctance of 
poorer people to take legal action. Carlin and Howard( 158 ) 
showed that after car accidents in New York 27% of those 
from lower socio-economic groups took no action against 
the offending party, while amongst higher socio-economic 
groups the percentage fell to 2% taking no action. The 
people taking no action expressed alienation from the legal 
process and fear of reprisal as the factors which deterred 
them from doing so. 
This work suggests that the probleFs involved are 
largely due to the failings of the legal aid scheme. The 
scheme does not overcome ignorance of the use of legal aid 
and it fails to provide the correct advice and information 
through suitable sources. The barriers of lawyer and client 
attitudes are a syrnpton of the failure of the legal aid 
system to approach the clients' problems from a preventative 
156) Op.cit., note (3), Appendix 4, para. 122. 
157) Ibid., para. lOB. 
158) Op.cit., note (154). 
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starting point, and to involve clients in the decision 
making process. 
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(3) The distribution of solicitors. 
There are two broad issues which this sections will 
note. Firstly the geographical distribution of solicitors 
will be examined to assess its effect on the ability of the 
poor to obtain legal services. Secondly the future supply 
of solicitors with regard to the type of work they wish to 
undertake will be mentioned. 
The most important source of information on the geo-
graphical distribution of solicitors is still foster . (159 ) 
The Legal Action Group (L.A.G.) have supported the theory 
that the distribution of solicitors was related to home 
o~~ership, (l 60) but Foster's research suggested rather 
that there was a correlation between the distribution and 
the level of retail sales. Whatever the explanation for 
the variation in distribution, Foster's data is sufficient 
here to show that such variations do occur. The bulk of 
the ratios for the number of population per solicitor fell 
between 913:1. Bournemouth, and 9635:1, Gillingham. How-
ever there were extreme variations, with some tovms having 
almost nine times the latter ration, eg. 88475:1 in Alridge-
Bro~nhills. 
(161) Tables l(a) and (b), and 2(a) and (b) show 
that such variations are still apparent today in the North 
East of England. The differences between the district council 
areas in both the table relating to the ratio of population 
159) Foster, K., "The Location of SolicitOrs", (1973) 36 M.L.R. 153. 
160} Anon., Editorial, "Who Uses Lawyers", (1979) L.A.G. Bulletin 55. 
1611 See pp. 88- 89 post. 
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per solicitor, and population per solicitor's office is 
considerable. It is noticeable that there are also dif-
ferences between the ratios for all solicitors and offices, 
and those solicitors and offices offering to undertake 
legal aid work. In both cases the ratios are greater for 
the legal aid related figures, suggesting that both legal 
aid solicitors and offices would be less common. This 
obviously decreases ease of accessability to legal services 
for those entitled to legal aid. 
It should be noted that the more up-to-date ratios are 
generally more favourable than Fosters. This is not because 
the North East is particularly well provided with solicitors, 
but rather that there has been a general increase in the 
number of solicitors since the time of Foster's research. 
Comparative ratios for other areas are also more favourable, 
for example Gillingham from 9635:1 in 1973 to 5833:1 in 1988. 
Even the district variation does not reflect fully 
the inconsistency of distribution within those regions. 
(162) Table 3 shows the advantages of the urban over the 
rural population in their comparative ease of access to both 
solicitors and offices. It should be noted in Northumberland, 
Ashington and Cramlington, as the largest population centres, 
appear not to exert a disproportionate influence on the 
situation of solicitors or their offices. However, Morpeth, 
despite its smaller population, exerts the characteristics of 
an urban centre perhaps because it is the local government 
162) See p. 90 post. 
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administrative centre. Bearing this in mind it can be 
seen that each urban area is disproportionately better 
served with both solicitors and their offices than the 
remainder of the county. 
This situation is itself worsened by the concen-
tration of the solicitors and practices in the commercial 
centres of the urban areas. (163) Table 4 shows a break-
down of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne by postal district and the 
corresponding spread of solicitors and their offices. The 
disproportionate number of solicitors and their offices in 
NEl can be noted. Also importantly the emphasis on corn-
rnercial work for many of the solicitors in the central dis-
trict is shown by the relatively small number who offer to 
undertake legal aid work. 
It was not possible to obtain figures to break down 
the concentration of work among those firms involved in 
the legal aid scheme, but David Edwards( 164 ) has said that 
specialisation is on the increase. Hore than two-thirds 
of the payments from the legal aid fund now go to about 
one quarter of the firms which form the profession. More 
specifically, in relation to Birmingham, Bridges has shown 
that of the 160 practices in 1972 approximately one in four 
did a perceptible amount of legal aid work; one in sixteen 
did a substantial amount; while the ten most prominent legal 
aid practices dealt with over half of all the civil and 
criminal cases(165 ). The Lord Chancellor's Advisory Com-
mittee on Legal Aid have co:rr.rr,ented (l 6 6 ) "that the supply and 
163) See p. 91 post. 
164) Op.Cit., note (18) 
165) Op.Cit., note (34) 
166) 26th Legal Aid Annual Report 1975-76, (1976) HMSO. 
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distribution of solicitors is ill suited to serve nany of 
the poorer sections of the community". The evidence which 
has been seen above supports this concentration. 
Nor does it seem that the position for the future 
will be any better. Research(167 ) has shown that among 
Durham University Law Department under graduates over 60% 
wished to complete their articles with city commercial or 
large provincial practices, while only 22% expressed any 
interest in areas of legal aid work. Also the recruitment 
crisis for article clerks has increased competition among 
the larger firms to get the best graduates, and this has 
been ~arked by considerable salary offers to those under-
graduates wishing to move into the City, allowing earnings 
of more than twice their counterparts working for smaller 
firms in the provinces. This does not bode well for legal 
aid since practices tend tc be small and salaries close to 
the Law Society reco~mended minimum. Recruiting article 
clerks if already difficult will become more so and can 
only lead to a decrease in standards in the long term. 
Therefore we see that legal aid suffers from a 
serious deficiency. Basing the system on private practice 
meant reliance on a system which already had massive varia-
tions in geographical coverage of the country, this was 
accentuated by the concentration of the work in only a small 
number of firms. Now the low levels of remuneration for 
167) Unpublished undergraduate degree paper, by the author. 
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legal aid work -v.rill prevent legal aid firms from competing 
for quality article clerks. The possibilities for expan-
sion will therefore be lirrlited and there will not be any 
possibility of rectifying the unsatisfactory situation 
which exists at present. 
TABLE 1 : Table of Population per Solicitor by District. 
Table l(a) Table l(b) 
DISTRICT Pop.per Helative DISTRICT Pop.per legal Relative 
Solicitor size. Aid Solicitor size. 
Newcastle 744 100 Newcastle 1443 100 
Middlesbrough 1336 179 Middlesbrough 1924 133 
Darlington 1600 215 Darlington 2255 156 
Wear Valley 2407 324 Hartlepool 3128 217 
Alnwick 2483 334 Alnwick 3311 229 
Hartlepool 2519 339 Wear Valley 3611 250 
Sunderland 2566 345 Sunderland 3721 258 
Berwick-Upon-Tweed 2650 356 Chester-le-Street 3814 264 
Tynes ide 2765 372 Castle Morpeth 4225 2 93 ()) 
Castle Morpeth 2817 379 South Tyneside 4755 330 ()) 
Durham 2870 386 Durham 4783 331 
Stockton 2980 401 Sedgefield 4922 341 
South Tyneside 3017 406 Stockton 5171 358 
North Tyneside 3152 424 Berwick-Upon-Tweed 5300 367 
Blyth Valley 3263 439 North Tyneside 5342 370 
Chester-le-Street 3338 449 Tynedale 5530 383 
Sedge field 36 92 496 Blyth Valley 6023 417 
Gateshead 3769 507 Wansbeck 6040 419 
Derwent side 3914 526 Teesdale 6200 430 
Teesdale 4133 556 Gate she ad 6282 435 
vV'ansbeck 4314 580 Langbaurgh 6990 484 
Langbaurgh 4318 580 Derwent side 8610 597 
Easington 9650 1297 Easington 12063 836 
TABLE 2 Table of Population per Solicitor's Office by District. 
Table 2(a) Table 2(b) 
DISTRICT Pop. per Relative Pop. per legal Relative 
Office size aid Office. size 
Newcastle 2606 100 Newcastle 2786 100 
Middlesbrough 3436 132 Middlesbrough 3700 133 
Alnwick 3725 143 Berwick-Upon-Tweed 3786 136 
Berwick-Upon-Tweed 3786 145 Alnwick 4257 153 
Darlington 4133 159 Wear Valley 4333 156 
Castle Morpeth 4225 162 Castle I'1orpeth 4609 165 
Y'Jear Valley 4333 166 Darlington 4960 178 
Durham 4783 184 Tynedale 5027 180 
co 
Tynedale 5027 193 l'Vansbeck 5491 197 1..0 
Wansbeck 5033 193 Durham 5740 206 
Sedge field 5583 213 Chester-le-Street 5933 213 
Sunderland 5617 216 Teesdale 6200 223 
Gateshead 5 923 227 Sunderland 6202 223 
Chester-le-Street 5933 228 Sedge field 632 9 227 
Teesdale 6200 238 Blyth Valley 6525 234 
North Tyneside 6410 246 Gateshead 6910 248 
Stockton 6511 250 North Tyneside 7122 256 
Blyth Valley 6525 250 Stockton 7643 274 
Langbaurgh 6990 268 Langbaurgh 7726 277 
Derv,,entside 7175 275 Derwent side 7827 281 
South Tyneside 7471 287 South Tyneside 7845 282 
Hartlepool 8245 316 Hartlepool 8245 2 96 
Easington 12063 463 Easington 13786 4 95 
TABLE 3: 
Remainder of 
County/Urban 
Area or Centres 
Ashington + 
Cramlington 
Northumberland 
TOI'AL 
Morpeth 
Nortumberland 
TOI'AL 
Urban T+W (1) 
Tyne & Wear 
TOI'AL 
Urban (2) 
Tyne & Wear 
TOI'AL 
Newcastle 
Tyne & Wear 
TOI'AL 
Darlington & 
Durham 
Co.Durham 
TOTAL 
Urban (3) 
Cleveland 
TOI'AL 
Middlesbrough 
Cleveland 
TOI'AL 
%age of total 
Area/County 
Population 
18% 
82% 
100% 
5% 
95% 
100% 
51% 
49% 
100% 
35% 
65% 
100% 
18% 
82% 
100% 
21% 
79% 
100% 
61% 
39% 
100% 
29% 
71% 
100% 
%age of 
Solicitors 
15% 
85% 
100% 
11% 
89% 
100% 
78% 
22% 
100% 
66% 
34% 
100% 
53% 
47% 
100% 
47% 
53% 
100% 
79% 
21% 
100% 
44% 
56% 
100% 
Population 
per solic. 
3556 
2984 
1317 
3293 
1123 
3789 
910 
3301 
582 
2987 
1386 
4497 
1812 
4376 
1533 
2994 
%age of 
legal aid 
solics. 
17% 
83% 
100% 
19% 
81% 
100% 
77% 
23% 
100% 
65% 
35% 
100% 
48% 
52% 
100% 
46% 
54% 
100% 
79% 
21% 
100% 
46% 
54% 
100% 
Population 
per legal 
aid solic. 
5334 
5054 
1317 
5969 
1995 
6403 
1637 
5535 
1131 
4731 
2057 
6558 
2710 
6436 
2184 
4930 
%age of 
offices 
18% 
82% 
100% 
11% 
89% 
100% 
68% 
32% 
100% 
54% 
46% 
100% 
38% 
62% 
100% 
40% 
60% 
100% 
64% 
36% 
100% 
36% 
64% 
100% 
Pop.per 
office 
4849 
4856 
2070 
5209 
3464 
6964 
2981 
6514 
2143 
6132 
3037 
7378 
4910 
5758 
4088 
5856 
%age of 
Legal Aid 
offices 
19% 
81% 
100% 
l4%:(Al) 
86% 
100% 
69% 
31% 
100% 
56% 
44% 
100% 
41% 
59% 
100% 
37% 
63% 
100% 
68% 
32% 
100% 
39% 
61% 
100% 
Pop. per legal 
aid office 
4849 
5160 
1812 
5618 
3757 
8074 
3196 
7511 
2237 
7061 
3644 
7869 
5378 
7545 
4428 
7110 
* Al I suspect this figure and the ratio of solicitors to population are slightly incorrect since the Regional Directory counted 
one more legal aid firm than the Diary and Directory had as the total firms. 
* 1 Urban areas in Tyne & Wear with a population above 85,000 i.e., Newcastle, Gateshead, Sunderland and South Shields. 
* 2 Urban areas in Tyne & Wear with a population above 190,000 i.e. Newcastle and Sunderland. 
* 3 Urban areas in Cleveland with a population greater than 85,000, i.e., Middlesbrough, Stockton and Hartlepool. 
"' 0 
TABLE 4 : Distribution of solicitors and offices in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne by Postal District. 
nb - Newcastle-Upon-Tyne was the only North Eastern city large enough to be divided into numerous postal districts, but 
this is no reason to suspect that the situation would be otherwise than this elsewhere, it is just much harder and 
more time consuming to prove, requiring a street by street breakdown. 
nb - c = consultant. 
Postal District No. of % of No. of Legal 96 of Legal No.of % of No. of Legal % of Legal 
Solicitors Solicitors Aid Solic.s Aid Solics. Offices Offices Aid Offices Aid Offices. 
NE 1 278 + 20c 79% 128 46% 62 65% 61 98% 
NE 2 38 + 2c l 32 l 8 8 
NE 3 3 0 3 2 
NE4 3 1 5 4 
~'E 5 2 t 2 7?'k 2 --35% 1 j 91% 21% ~ 0 
NE 6 12 10 7 7 
NE 7 4 2 3 3 
NE 12 8 3 4 4 
NE 15 2 2 1 1 
TOTAL 350 100% 180 --- 95 100% 91 
\.0 
f--' 
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(4) The role of independent advice agencies in the pro-
vision of legal services. (167A} 
The intention of this section was to establish the 
extent of the role played ty independent advice agencies 
in the North East of England in the provision of legal and 
advice services to the public. 
The advice sector differs substantially from the 
traditional means of providing legal services through 
private practice. Advice agencies use a variety of dif-
ferent and largely informal methods for the provision of 
their services. They are not limited by being controlled 
by a single professional body, and therefore take various 
forms and can have significant ideological differences. 
They are fre~uently the result of local initiatives, and 
often have a strong basis in the local coiT~unity. The 
advice sector therefore serves to contrast the methods of 
private practitioners in providing legal services to 
the poor. It was not the intention of this section to 
concentrate on the differences in ideology and methods 
between the advice sector and private practice 1 but it was 
recognised that the fact should be noted. 
The purpose was rather to look at the physical extent 
to which an alternative to the legal aid scheme, and par-
ticularly the green form 1 had been created. By so doing, 
the failing of the legal aid scheme to provide the type 
of services required ty the poor in a form which was 
l67A) These were agencies identified as providing advice services in 
the North East of England. See Appendix B for an explanation 
of the means by which they were identified and the difficulties 
of classification. 
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acceptable to them, would te highlighted. 
It was not intended to look at the role of the law 
centres or Citizens Advice Bureaux (CABX) in the North 
East of England. There are four law centres in the area( 168 ) 
each of which has an up-to-date annual report detailing 
the work undertaken and their perceived role. Similarly 
the North Eastern CABX, while more significant in numbers( 169 ) 
have a role which is well documented. In 1986/87 they 
dealt with approximately 300,000 enquiries, which fell into 
the following categories:-(170 ) 
Social Security 28.5% 
Consumer 20.9% 
Housing 11.5% 
Employment 10.3% 
Family and Personal 7.8% 
Administration of Justice 6.7% 
Others (individually less than 3%) 14.3% 
The advice agencies which it was intended to be 
studied were a sample of ninety two who provided a 
variety of services. By contrast to the local law 
centres and CABX, no information existed on these agen-
cies. Although some produced annual reports, no data-
base of them existed, perhaps because no central body was 
responsible for their funding or administration. Research 
was therefore undertaken to generate the information 
re~uired to establish their value in providing legal 
. (171) 
serv1ces. 
168) Gateshead, Newcastle, Middlesbrough and Stockton. 
169) There are currently 31 bureaux located throughout the North East. 
See North East CAB, "Annual Report 1986/87", (1987), at 28. 
170) Ibid., at 5. 
171) See Appendix B for methodological issues. 
94 
(a) Nature of the agencies. 
It was attempted to define the agencies with ref-
erence to those factors stressed by the organisations 
themselves to be important to them. Weight was given 
to any statewents made which clarified the organisation's 
purpose or aims. Also the type of advice offered was 
considered as of particular importance when categorising 
the agency. As mentioned later( 172 ) it would have been 
valuable to allow the organisations to define their own 
role, but as this was not done the categorisations must 
not be regarded as comprehensive, but rather as appro-
priate working categories for the agencies dealt with, 
and on the limited information which they provided. There 
were four groups:-
1. Group A 
2. Group B 
3. Group C 
4. Group D 
General legal advice agencies basically 
on the CABX model, provided advice and 
assistance on a variety of subjects to 
individual clients. 
Agencies which catered for a specific 
clientele rather than the public in 
general, and had specific legal advice 
aspect to their work. 
Agencies which predominantly provided 
counselling services, and were likely 
to view problems as distinct from a 
legal perspective. This also included 
those who saw themselves as sign-
posting or referral agencies. 
Resource or umbrella organisations. 
(b) The distribution of advice agencies. 
The next phase was to assess the distribution of 
agencies. At its most basic level this related to the 
number of responses per county to see whether the distribution 
172) Ibid. 
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of agencies was related to the size of population(173 ) (See 
Table l, P·llS) · 
The three larger counties had a rough similarlity 
between the relationships of population size and the number 
of agencies, but these figures can make little sense within 
themselves. It seems reasonable to point out that the 
figures are very considerable, and even assuming that each 
agency was willing to give advice on any subject to anyone 
who came through the door< 174 ), it would seem impossible for 
the organisations to even contemplate giving advice to 
even the smallest proportion of their theoretical quota. 
A more useful analysis was obtained by a breakdo~~ of the 
agencies per county as defined by their type. This gave a 
picture of the county itself, and by comparison to the 
other counties any pattern in the types of agencies could 
be considered.< 175 )(See Table 2, P-llS). 
The similarity between the breakdown of Durham and 
Tyne and Wear was noticeable, with each of the general 
(A), specific issue (B), and counselling orientated advice 
agencies (C) representing about one third of the agencies. 
But it could not be seen as any sort of pattern in pro-
vision generally, since the breakdown for Cleveland was 
markedly different. There the emphasis was switched from 
an even division of agencies to a heavy emphasis on agencies 
providing legal advice services to a specific clientele 
(B) type(nearly half all of the agencies) while a much 
173) Population figures from Roope, W.A.C., ed., "The Municipal Yearbook 
Vol.2", (1988). 
174) Which as we have seen from our definitions above is not true. 
175) In this situation the response from Northumberland was of little 
or no use. 
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smaller percentage of A type agencies provided general 
advice. To some extent the variations could be the 
result of the existence of other agencies in the area such 
as law centres or local council welfare rights units. 
Also the use of broader areas tends to hide variations 
within the counties themselves. For example Sunderland 
in Tyne and Wear had a breakdown of 62% general (Group A) 
agencies, 23% specific issue agencies (B), 15% counselling 
advice agencies (C), and no group D resource agencies. 
Therefore rather than finding a pattern, what seemed to 
appear was a suggestion of a lack of similarity between 
the distribution of agencies. From this data it was 
impossible to say whether if taken as a whole the legal 
services in an area would have tended to balance out more 
evenly, but there was so~e indiciation that agencies were 
created to meet the perceived needs of the community at a 
particular time. This would obviously depend as much on 
power struggles and the ability of one type of agency to 
persuade the funding body that it was more suitable, than 
any other to meet that need. There certainly seemed to be 
no evidence of a co-ordinated policy to respond to or even 
avert, the problems which the public faced. 
These questions of distribution would be of little 
value if the agencies were not delimited by County borders, 
therefore all agencies were asked to define the geographical 
catchment area covered by themselves. (See Table 3, P·llS). 
This showed that the assumptions about lack of 
co-ordination were not affected to any great extent by the 
catchment areas of the agencies. In each case the majority 
of agencies covered no more than a borough or district in 
that county, this even being true for the resource/umbrella 
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(group D) agencies. This again would seem reflective of 
the absence of an overall strategy or approach, and would 
appear to show that agencies were set up to cope with 
localised or isolated problems. Therefore rather than 
there being a co-ordinated approach with a specific purpose 
there was an ad hoc approach with many relatively small 
areas having agencies of different types with different 
objectives. 
Overall the distribution of advice agencies was very 
varied, and did not conform to any pattern in relation to 
the population of the county. Nor did the distribution of 
agencies within each county seem to match the distribution 
in the other counties. The emphasis of the agencies was 
on a local level. This would suggest that there was not 
an accepted broad based model for co-ordinated advice 
centre work. 
(c) The background of the advice agencies. 
To get some idea of the background and future pros-
pects of the advice agencies, questions were asked as to 
the age and the security of funding which the agencies 
had. It was hoped that this would raise several factors, 
the age of the agency when put into context with other 
agencies would show whether relatively there were more 
older or younger organisations. An emphasis on the former 
would reflect a continuing support for agencies created 
some time ago, but not much current support for the crea-
tion of new agencies of that type, and vice versa. Ques-
tions regarding security of funding obviously would have 
serious implications, not only internally for morale of 
the agency in terms of job security for those employed, but 
perhaps more seriously externally in terms of the ability 
of the agency to plan for the future with certainty. This 
would be an important factor without which the ability of 
the agency to develop, to broaden or even change its role, 
could be seriously impaired. (See Table 4, p .116 ) . 
Firstly it should be noted that the numbers of 
resource or umbrella agencies in group D were such that 
care should be taken in drawing too firm conclusions from 
(17 6) those results. In the other groups interesting com-
parisons were made. The emphasis on the more generally 
legally orientated group i.e., group A could be placed 
historically in the mid 1970's with nearly half the agencies 
dating from around then. That impetus had been lost to 
some extent, and the numbers of new agencies being created 
was falling off. However there was still some momentum as 
reflected by the comparatively reasonable number of agencies 
created in the last three years. Issue based advice agencies 
i.e., Group B, were also very much a creation of the mid 
1970's, but this group had enjoyed its :main boost in the 
early 1980's when over half of the operating agencies were 
created. It was perhaps because of this that there had 
been very few group B agencies created in the very recent 
past. Counselling advice agencies in group C seemed to 
reflect the steadiest pattern of development. They had 
by far the greatest proportion established for over fif-
teen years, nearly one-third of group C organisations. While 
176) This applies generally hereafter where the breakdown of agencies 
is by type. 
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there was a drop in the mid 1970's this was not so severe 
as to disperse n;omentum from this type of organisation, 
and there was a reaffiriTation of faith in group C with over 
a third of agencies being created in the early 1980's. 
This had again been followed by a drop in the most recent 
past, but this could be attributable to some cyclical 
pattern in the creation of C type agencies. 
The picture was somewhat different with regard to the 
future. (see Table 5, P·ll6). Before discussing the results 
themselves it is worth mentioning the non-responses to this 
question. It does seem odd that the responses for particular 
questions having generally been so good that this question 
should prove so difficult to answer with approxi~ately one-
fifth of each group failing to respond. Obviously this 
could be attributable to any number of factors but it does 
not seem unreasonable to credit some part of it to lack of 
certainty in the iFmediate future about where funding was 
to come from. This would suggest that the figures in the 
second category of funding currently uncertain or lasting 
for less than one year are if anything slightly lower than 
they should be. 
With regard to the positive responses a surprising 
situation emerged where one third of A type general advice 
agencies, nearly half of specific issue (B) and counselling 
C type agencies, and over three-quarters of the resource 
(D) type agencies, had no funding or funding which was cur-
rently uncertain, or would last them for less than one year. 
Even if it was satisfactory to have funding security for 
only three years in advance, and this must be arguable, a 
considerable number of further agencies would be unable to 
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claim such security. As mentioned above, the effects of 
this could be considerable, for example effort would have 
to be diverted from day to day work to formulate a con-
certed appeal for continuation of funding; less optimistic 
members of staff might feel that it would be a suitable 
time to leave the organisation and so staff change could 
be precipitated at a difficult time. Funding uncertainty 
encourages crisis planning which could involve use of 
very short term aDms and objectives, often hoping to do 
little more than 'hold the fort'. There could also be 
repercussions on client confidence in the organisation. 
These are just a few of the possible results of the reli-
ance on short term funding, and they reflect a failure by 
funders to give long term support even to those agencies 
who have considerable standing because of their age. 
(d) Staffing of agencies. 
Again in attempting to gain a background knowledge 
of these advice agencies several questions were asked 
about each centre's staffing. It was learnt that the 
sample agencies had about 1000 staff in total, but this 
figure tells little about anything but the total number 
itself, particularly since no comparison is possible to 
private practise. For example the breakdown of staff 
within each agency could give pointers to the adequacy of 
funding of that organisation. (See Table 6, P-117). The 
results show that in all agencies there was a considerable 
reliance on part-time and unpaid staff, a factor which 
shall be dealt with in more detail. General advice (Type A) 
agencies had the highest percentage of paid staff. This 
could initially suggest two things, that they were the best 
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funded agency and therefore could afford to employ more 
of the full-time staff that they required, and therefore 
they did not need to rely on voluntary assistance. Alter-
natively it could suggest that volunteers, because of the 
nature of the work undertaken could not play as valuable a 
role as they could in other types of agency. With groups 
B, specific issue, and C, counselling advice agencies, a 
much heavier reliance on unpaid staff then in group A can 
be seen. In groups B and C there were approximately equal 
proportions of full and part-time paid staff and part-time 
unpaid staff. It was not as simple to draw conclusions 
from this as it was from the breakdo~~ of staff within 
resource agencies (group D), where there is a 75% reliance 
on unpaid part-time staff. This reflected the expected 
nature of umbrella or resource type agency where represen-
tatives of other groups meet to discuss and/or formulate 
cowmon policies, while the only permanent staff that were 
necessary were to service the body and act as a secretariat. 
It was thought that further information could be 
gleaned by comparison between, rather than within, the 
advice agencies. Table 7 (p .117 ) shows that the assurnp-
tion that general advice (A type) agencies were better 
funded was incorrect. All the agencies employed full-time 
paid staff in proportion to their relative number in the 
sample. The same was not true for paid part-time staff with 
relatively few being errployed in A agencies while specific 
issue (B) and counselling (C) agencies relied more heavily 
on them. This would suggest either that part-time staff 
were more useful to B and C type agencies, or that A agencies 
simply could not afford to employ any more staff, full or 
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part-time. Since we have seen that each agency employed a 
proportionate number of full-time staff it would lead to 
the assumption that they would employ the same proportions 
of part-time staff. Because this is not the case, and 
bearing in mind that we do not have any absolute standards 
against which to compare, the data seems to suggest that A 
type agencies may be less well funded than B and C type 
agencies. As suggested above, Table 7 supports the pic-
ture of resource (D type) agencies as having small full-time 
paid staff, but a disproportionately large number of part-
time voluntary staff. 
With regard to unpaid staff in the other groups, it 
would be assumed that if A type general advice agencies did 
not have enough funds to obtain more paid staff then they 
would have attempted to attract more voluntary staff to 
meet that gap. Yet A type agencies had a disproportionately 
sEall number of voluntary staff. Again it is impossible to 
say why this is so without further research. Possible 
factors could be suggested, perhaps voluntary staff were 
not sufficiently skilled to undertake the work A type 
agencies required; perhaps because of their generalist 
nature A type agencies did not attract voluntary staff in 
the same way that the more specifically targetted issues 
covered by groups B and C did. 
Now that some idea of the staffing in advice agencies 
has been created the quality of the staff shall be con-
sidered. This was based on a question which tried to 
establish whether the staff in an organisation were 
regarded as specialist or generalist. The quality of 
staff was divided into three possible groups, the professionally 
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qualified advice worker, this could be in many disciplines 
such as legal, social work, or housing qualifications; the 
experienced or trained advice worker, this category is 
important since there are very few courses created specifi-
cally for advice workers, so 'in-training' and experience 
count for a lot; and finally those who were neither trained 
nor qualified. The results were formulated on the basis 
that each agency could tick one or more of the boxes pro-
vided, and therefore the highest qualified staff in each 
agency were noted. (See Table 8, p.ll7). 
Overall the quality of the staff appeared to be very 
good with only 5% of agencies without staff of proven 
ability. If variations within the agencies were compared 
it could be seen that general (A) and counselling (C) type 
advice agencies had broadly similar types of staff with the 
majority of positive responses falling into the profes-
sionally qualified bracket, and a smaller percentage 
falling into the experienced or trained adviser bracket. 
C type agencies had a sizeable proportion of agencies 
without either type of qualification. This could suggest 
that the work undertaken by them did not necessitate 
providing advice requiring more than everyday experience. 
Specific issue related, (B type), organisations had an 
emphasis on experience and training rather than professional 
qualification which could suggest that when advice work is 
more specialised there are not as many specialised train-
ing programmes to teach the advisers what to do. As regards 
the resource and umbrella (group D} organisations, with 60% 
of agencies not providing information it did not seem 
reasonable to draw any conclusions. 
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By assessing the number of paid staff per agency an 
idea of the sizes of advice agencies could be established. 
(See Table 9, p.ll8). This information was very revealing 
showing that the majority of advice agencies had four or 
less staff. This put a more realistic perspective on the 
figures in Table 3 (p.llS), showing the catchment areas of 
the agencies. The ability of a staff of four workers or 
less must be very limited in the area ·that it hopes to 
cover effectively, particularly if advice was offered to 
any member of the general public who carne to the agency. 
More generally it could be seen that A type general advice 
agencies were the sn,allest on the whole, with over three-
quarters with a staff of less than five. Although only 
about half of specific issue (B type) and counselling (C 
type) advice agencies had a staff of less than five, 
around three-quarters of both had staffs of less than 
ten. Although the difference between the two is quite 
considerable in practical terms it does still give a 
picture of the agencies as tending to be small rather 
than comparable to even a medium sizes private practice. 
As was made clear in the discussion related to Table 
6 there was an obvious reliance in all agencies on unpaid 
voluntary staff. In fact 48% of agencies using paid staff 
relied on some voluntary assistance to supplement their 
staff. It has also been seen that the agencies providing 
general legal advice, i.e., group A agencies, tended to 
use fewer unpaid staff than the other groups. Table 10, 
(p.ll8} shows that of the total agencies the emphasis was 
towards the use of a small number of volunteers, with six-
teen agencies using less than five. It is interesting to 
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note that at least some of the agencies were using a con-
siderable number of volunteers, ll% had the service of 
fifteen or more volunteers. There is no data with which 
to compare this use of unpaid workers, but it does seem 
a considerable reliance on the voluntary sector which 
could reflect underfunding. This could result in insta-
bility and very rapid turnover of staff, which could pre-
vent the build up of skills and knowledge. 
(e) Access to advice agencies. 
The question of access to advice was approached by a 
series of simple questions aimed at establishing how, when 
and where advice could be obtained, and also attempting 
to clarify whether those clients with special difficulties 
would be catered for as well as those without. The means 
of contact was the first issue, all of the general (A) and 
specific issue (B) type agencies could be contacted by 
telephone or by personal visit to the offices of the organi-
sation. 85% of the counselling (Group C) agencies could 
be contacted by either telephone or visit, while 7.5% could 
be contacted by telephone only, (7.5% provided no information). 
Of the resource/umbrella (group D) organisations responding, 
all could be contacted by either telephone or personal visit. 
The next questions related to the times when advice 
was available to the public. Firstly there was a basic 
question about opening hours. The results were divided into 
three categories, full week opening, which was taken as 
availability between approximately 9 A.r-1 and 5 P.M between 
Monday and Friday or the greater percentage thereof; part 
week opening was taken as less than half of a thirty-five 
hour week between the hours of 9 AM to 5 PM between Monday 
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and Friday; and extraordinary opening was defined as avail-
ability at any time outside the hours of 9 AM to 5 PM and 
other than between Monday to Friday. The number of agencies 
with extraordinary opening is expressed as a percentage of 
those providing either full or part week opening. These 
extraordinary opening hours often took the form of Satur-
day or evening opening either at the normal address of the 
agency or an outreach session. (See Table 11, p .119) . 
The fact that resource (D type) agencies represented 
such a small number of the total agencies and the failure 
of two of the five agencies to provide any information on 
this question threw doubt on the value of those responses. 
This also made the agencies with extraordinary opening 
hours appear to be considerably more than they actually 
were. The responses from the general (A), specific issue 
(B) , and counselling (C) advice agencies showed that the 
vast majority of agencies were open to the public through-
out the week. But if the client needed advice outside 
those times then it would be far more difficult to obtain. 
This could particularly work against those who are in work, 
meaning that they could only go to advice sessions by 
taking time off work or losing pay. 
People with special difficulties would have varying 
degrees of ease or difficulty in obtaining advice. Those 
who needed advice in an emergency outside the normal open-
ing hours of an organisation might simply find themselves 
speaking to an answerphone. To some extent the responses 
in Table 12 (P·ll9) must have reflected the nature of each 
agency. The advice given may not be of such a type that 
it would be required in an emergency. This could perhaps 
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explain the slightly higher percentage of specific issue 
of (type B) advice organisations available over a twenty-
four hour period. Because of the more specific form of 
advice offered by them it might have been more likely that 
people would turn to them in an emergency, because their 
role is more obvious than those agencies who offer advice 
generally, or on a number of subjects. It is impossible to 
judge whether the percentage of organisations offering 
emergency advice is adequate because of the lack of com-
parative daffi. However the effect of the public's per-
ception of the catchment areas of these agencies could have 
repercussions on the reality of coverage during the twenty 
four hour period. 
Advice services for the housebound were seen as 
another important issue. Those unable to reach an advice 
agency could easily be excluded from obtaining advice on 
subjects which might be more valuable to them than those 
who could manage to get to a source of assistance. Table 
13 (P·ll9) shows a marked contrast to Table 12 (p.ll9) with 
at least groups A, B and C having a majority of between 
two and three to one agencies providing the service. This 
could be explained by the ability to provide this service 
during normal working hours and with the minimum of extra 
cost or fuss. The fact that the resource agencies did not 
provide horne visits could be due to the fact that the maj-
ority of their time is not spent working with the public. 
Despite that it might still seem a valuable service to offer 
should the need arise. 
Quite separately from the housebound is the issue of 
the physically disabled clients. They may be willing to 
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come to the advice centre, but may find when they get 
there that access is difficult if not impossible and that 
assistance is necessary. The Law Centres Federation (L.C.F.) 
have recognised the necessity of providing facilities for 
the disabled and have drawn up guidelines which are aimed 
at complementing the legal requirements on this subject. 
All law centres affiliated to the L.C.F. must abide by these 
guidelines. (177 ) The question then was how well do advice 
agencies in general deal with disabled clients? Table 14 
(P·l2Q) reflects a generally quite poor response to the 
problem with less than one-third of specific issue (B), 
counselling (C) and resource (D) advice agencies having 
access to disabled people. This adds a rider to the 
figures relating to the means of contacting the advice 
agencies it being considerably more difficult to obtain 
advice by personal visit if the person seeking advice 
should be disabled. General advice (A type) agencies 
appear to have adjusted better to this issue than the 
other agencies. Although nearly two-thirds of them do 
have disabled access to their premises this should be 
seen as a good start towards the longer term objective of 
all agencies having equal access for all their possible 
clientele. 
Finally in relation to access for people with special 
difficulties is the problerr. for those people who do not 
speak English, or for whom English is not their first language, 
and for those with hearing, speech or sight difficulties, 
to obtain advice in a form which is easily understandable 
to them. There is no information from which the precise 
need for these provisions can be guaged. However it is 
177) L.C.F. Evaluation Framework Re.search Team, "Questions of Value, 
Prt.l:The Evaluative Process", (1988) p.S, Case Study D. 
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worth noting with regard to non-English speaking indigenous 
cultures that some tenc to form homogenous communities, and 
therefore could be dealt with by agencies specifically tar-
getting their work towards them. Similarly with sense 
impaired people, if agencies throughout the region are 
specifically aimed at them they too may appear to be poorly 
served by advice agencies as a whole but they may be ade-
quately served in reality because some agencies provide 
adequate facilities for their use. Of course both these 
possible amendments are subject to there being sufficient 
provision of targetted services to cater for both these 
groups, a question again on which no information is avail-
able. (See Table 15, P-120). It is also important in rela-
tion to this table to note the types of translation or 
interpretation facilities available, and the frequency with 
which they were mentioned. The number of agencies pro-
viding facilities for each of the following is noted in 
brackets afterwards. For sense irrpaired people: hearing 
impaired (2), speech impaired (l), visually impaired (l). 
For those with language difficulties: Urdu (5), Punjabi (3), 
Bengali (2), Hindi (2), Gujerati (l), Chinese (l), Italian (l), 
Iranian (l), unspecified Asian languages (3), unspecified 
European languages (l), and one agency had translated docu-
ments and leaflets but no staff members who could provide 
additional information in the same language. Rather sur-
prisingly five agencies claimed to have translation and 
interpretation facilities but did not know of what sort. 
Taken together Table 15 and this information suggest that 
the provision of services for these people is very limited, 
whether or not it is proportionate to the numbers of such 
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people. 
(f) Services provided by the advice agencies. 
Finally from the questionnaire the contr.ibution 
sample of advice agencies make to legal services provision 
in the North East shall be examined by looking at the 
areas of advice and representation offered by them. This 
information took the form of a list of possible case 
areas which the agency would like to have referred to it. 
In retrospect there are two problems with this format. 
Firstly the list might have encouraged respondents simply 
to tick as many boxes as possible, and by so doing removes 
the emphasis from thinking which work was actually done. Secondly 
the list provided no data as to how much time the agency 
spent giving advice on that area of work, and so no con-
clusions could be drawn as to where the emphasis of the 
work of that agency was. It is impossible to tell the 
effect of these £actors on the final results. 
The areas of work of£ered by the advice agencies can 
be seen in Table 16 (p.l2l ) . There was a division of 
those offering general and those offering specialist advice. 
The table can show little more than was concluded in the 
N.E.L.S.C. report, (l 7S) that it "provides solid evidence of 
the extent to which the voluntary sector has a contribution 
to make to legal services". Unsurprisingly generalist 
advice is more widely available than specialist but it is 
important to note that specialist advice is available on 
every topic mentioned from some agency or other, except to 
gay men. This could be the result of a sampling error 
178) See Appendix B on methodology. 
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rather than a lack of any specialist advice in that area at 
all. The various types of agency respond very much how 
one would expect them to. Most A type agencies offered a 
wide variety of general advice with as many as 19 agencies 
offering advice on the same subject (i.e. housing and health). 
This reflects the localised nature of these agencies as 
shown in Table 3 (P·ll5). It is interesting to note that 
there was also a considerable back up of specialist advice 
given by those organisations. Welfare rights were perhaps 
exceptional with 15 agencies offering specialist advice, 
but several topics were offered at a specialist level by 
five or six agencies i.e., around 20% of all A type agen-
cies. 
Group B agencies showed themselves to be more selec-
tive in the advice they gave, but they tended to offer 
specialist advice almost as frequently as generalist. This 
can be presumed to reflect their concentration on advising 
on more particular client groups. 
The emphasis in Group C narrowed still further and 
shifted to those types of advice which could possibly be 
solved or assisted by counselling. While there was less 
emphasis on problems with more strictly defined points of 
legal intervention. It is particularly in the former areas 
that specialist advice was offered by more agencies. 
As for the D type agencies, the question was framed 
in a way which must have appeared particularly unsuitable 
to them and only three of the five agencies responded to 
it. Bearing this in mind the responses do show a concen-
tration on a limited number of topics, this could reflect 
advice on broader issues of common policy in umbrella or 
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resource agencies. 
As well as advice, representation was also researched. 
Here the results were probably more reflective than in 
Table 16 of the frames of reference of the different types 
of advice agencies. Table 17 (p.l23) shows that a large 
majority of A type agencies offered tribunal representation, 
reflecting their basically legal perception of circumstances. 
Similarly with Group B agencies a reasonable proportion show 
the legal system to be central to their operation. This 
can be contrasted to group C organisation who did not see 
the legal analysis as central to their role, and therefore 
although they gave advice which was essentially legal they 
were unwilling to become involved in the legal process by 
representation. Tribunal representation was not relevant 
to agencies in Group D, and therefore it was not surprising 
that it was not undertaken by these organizations. 
A further form which advice and information can take 
is in the written word. It was thought relevant to ask 
each agency whether they had any publications. As can be 
seen in Table 18 (p.l23) many forms of publication were 
produced by a very high percentage of agencies. It is 
worth noting that B type agencies have the most publications 
which is likely to be the result of their issue based stance. 
Although some agencies probably only produced an annual 
report, which could not be regarded as being for advice 
purposes, obviously many agencies did produce leaflets, 
pamphlets or other information specifically aimed at 
assisting the clientele. This could play a crucial role 
in explaining rights and thereby increasing rights aware-
ness. 
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(g) Conclusion 
In dealing with advice agencies it has proved im-
possible to say definitely that they are responding par-
ticularly to the needs of the poor. This is because advice 
agencies tend not to means test their clients. Despite 
this a presumption that advice agencies do serve poor 
peoples' needs could be raised. Table 16 (P-121) showed 
that a number of areas of particular relevance to poor 
clients, i.e. welfare rights, housing and employment, were 
central to the role of the more legally orientated advice 
agencies. Also experience shows that these agencies were 
often situated in those geographical areas most affected by 
poverty. 
As regards to the extent to which the provision of 
advice agencies reflects the failure of the legal aid scheme 
to provide the services required in an acceptable form, it 
can be accepted as significant. The variety of agencies 
and their different perspectives has been proven. The 
advice offered was seen to be broad ranging, covering 
many of the areas one would expect to be covered by legal 
aid, and emphasising the importance of others for which 
legal aid is not available. Also those agencies with a 
more legallyorientated perception of the problems of their 
clients offered representation at tribunals, catering 
directly for the failure of legal aid to be provided in 
that anea. Also the importance of increasing rights aware-
ness and educating the poor to understand their rights have 
been recognised by the advice agencies who produced informa-
tion specifically related to this. The failure to do this 
has been seen to be a substantial failing of the legal aid 
114 
scheme. The advice agencies were found to be acc~ptably 
accessible throughout the week for both the mobile and 
housebound. This was helped by the availability of advice 
outside normal working hours. Also importantly the 
quality of the advisers was proven, with virtually all 
agencies having some staff with a high level of training 
or experience. 
However the advice agencies did have some problems. 
These could be largely explained by their lack of re-
sources. The agencies tended to be small, and were un-
evenly distributed throughout the North East. Despite 
being well established many advice agencies did not have 
any secure funding for the future. Also many agencies 
found it necessary to place a significant reliance on the 
use of part-time and unpaid staff. Since these problems 
could be solved by increasing the funding for the advice 
agencies they in no way weaken the failures in the legal 
aid system which the necessity for such an advice network 
highlights. It is arguable that given adequate funding 
the advice agencies' role would place substantial doubt on 
the validity of the legal aid system as a means to provide 
legal services for the poor. As they stand, the advice 
agencies in the North East play a significant role in 
attempting to compensate for the failings and inadequacies 
of the present legal aid scheme. 
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The Distribution of Advice Agencies: 
TABLE 1 : The Proportion of Advice Agencies to County 
Populations. 
County Population No.of Ratio 
Agencies 
Tyne & Wear 1,135,600 59 19,248:1 
Northumberland 301,000 1 301,000:1 
Durham 599,700 17 35,276:1 
Cleveland .557,600 15 37,173:1 
Table 2: Breakdown of Agencies per County by Type of Agency: 
County A B c D 
Tyne & Wear 32% (19) 34% (20) 27% (16) 7% ( 4) 
Northumberland 0 1 0 0 
Durham 36% 6) 29% 5) 29% 5) 6% ( 1) 
Cleveland 13% ( 2) 47% 7) 40% 6) 0 
GRAND TOTAL 2 9% ( 2 7) 36% (33) 29% (2 7) 6% ( 5) 
Table 3 : The Geographical/Catchment Areas of Advice Agencies: 
Area Covered A B c D 
i) More than 4% 21% 33% 20% 
one county 
(ii) County Wide 7% 15% 7% 20% 
(iii) Borough or 33% 55% 56% 40% District Limits 
(iv) Limited to 56% 9% 4% 20% Suburb 
(v) Not 0 0 0 0 Specified 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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The Background of Advice Agencies. 
Table 4 Age of Advice Agencies. 
Age of Agency Type of Agency 
A B c D 
(i) Less than 3 years 11% 3% 18% 20% 
(ii) Between 3 & 9 26% 55% 37% 0 
years 
(iii) Between 10 & 15 yrs.48% 30% 15% 60% 
( i v) Longer than 15 yrs. 7.5% 9% 30% 20% 
(v) Not specified 7.5% 3% 0 0 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 5 Security of Advice Agencies' Funding. 
Security of Type of Agency 
Funding for 
A B c D 
( i) No funding at all 0 0 4% 20% 
( ii) Currently uncertain 33% 46% 44% 60% /<lyr 
(iii) Between l and 3 yrs.26% 21% 11% 0 
(iv) Between 4 and 9 yrs. 0 0 4% 0 
(v) Longer than 9 yrs. ll% 9% 18.5% 0 
(vi) Not specified 30% 24% 18.5% 20% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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STAFFING OF AGENCIES: 
Table 6 
Type of 
The Comparison of the Distribution of Staff 
Within the Different Agencies. 
Type of Agency 
Staff A B c D 
Paid Full Time 64% (107) 29% (120) 31%(106) 23%(11) Part Time 24% ( 39) 33%(138) 32%(109) 2% ( l) 
Unpaid Full Time 2% ( 3) 5%( 24) l% ( 2) 0 0 Part Time 10% ( 17) 33%(138) 36%(125) 75%(36) 
TOTAL 100% (166)100%(420)100%(342)100%(48) 
Table 7 The Comparison of the Proportion of Staff 
Distributed Betwaen the Different Agencies. 
Type and %age Paid Staff Unpaid Staff 
of agencies Full-Time Part-Time Full-Time Part-Time 
A ( 2 9%) 31% (107) 14% (39) 10% ( 3) 5% (17) 
B ( 3 6%) 35% ( 120) 48% (138) 83% ( 2 4) 44% (138) 
c (2 9%) 31% (106) 38% (109) 7% ( 2) 40% (125) 
D ( 6%) 3% ( 11) ( l) 0 0 11% ( 36) 
TOTAL 100% (34 4) 100% (28 7) 100% (2 9) 100% ( 316) 
Table 8 Quality of Staff 
Type of Agency Quality of Staff 
Profesionally Experienced/ Neither No 
Qualified. Trained 
A (100%} 12 ( 4 4%) 10 (3 7%) 1 ( 4%) 4 
B (100%) 13 (3 9%) 20 ( 61%) 0 0 0 
c ( 100%) 15 (56%) 6 (22%) 4 ( 15%) 2 
D (100%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 0 0 3 
TOTAL 41 ( 45%) 37 (40%) 5 5%) 9 
Infc 
(15% 
0 
( 7% 
(60% 
(10% 
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Table 9 Size of Advice Agencies in the North East. 
No.of Paid Staff No. of Agencies Breakdown within agencies 
A B c D 
None 3 3% 0 0 7% 20% 
l-4 50 54% 77% 49% 45% 20% 
5-9 17 19% ll% 27% 19% 0 
l0-14 6 6.5% 0 9% 7% 20% 
15-20 5 5.5% 4% 6% 7% 0 
>20 6 6.5% 4% 6% ll% 0 
No Info. 5 5.5% 4% 3% 4% 40% 
TOTAL 92 - 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 10 Numbers of Unpaid Workers used by Advice Agencies 
Number of Workers Number of Agencies 
None 47 51% 
1-4 16 17% 
5-9 7 8% 
10-14 2 2% 
15-20 4 4.5% 
>20 6 6.5% 
No Info. 10 11% 
TOTAL 92 100% 
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ACCESS TO ADVICE AGENCIES: 
Table ll Opening Hours to the Public for Contact by Personal 
Visit or Telephone. 
Opening Hours Type of Agency 
A B c D 
i) Full week 74% 85% 78% 40% 
ii) Part week 26% 15% 11% 20% 
(iii) Not specified 0 0 11% 40% 
( iv} Extraordinary Opening 15% 18% 21% 33% 
Table 12 : Advice Agencies with a 24 Hour Contact System 
(other than an Answerphone). 
24 hr. Contact Type of Agency 
A B c D 
i} Yes 11% 18% 11% 0 
( ii} No 8 9% 82% 85% 80% 
(iii) Not specified 0 0 4% 20% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 13 Advice Agencies offering a Home Visits Service: 
Home Visits Type of Agency 
A B c D 
i} Yes 74% 79% 59% 0 
ii) No 26% 18% 33% 80% 
(iii) Not specified 0 3% 8% 20% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 14 Disabled Access to Advice Agencies Premises. 
Disabled Access Type of Agency 
A B c 
i) Yes 63% 39% 30% 
ii) No 30% 61% 56% 
(iii} Not specified 7% 0 14% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Table 15 Advice Agencies with Translation and/or 
Interpretation Facilities. 
Translation or Type of Agency 
Interpretation 
Facilities A B c 
i) Yes 22% 24% 7% 
ii} No 70% 73% 78% 
(iii) No Response 8% 3% 15% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
D 
20% 
40% 
40% 
100% 
D 
0 
40% 
60% 
100% 
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Services provided by Advice Agencies 
Table 16 Generalist and Specialist Advice Offered by Advice 
Agencies in the North East. 
Advice 
Offered 
Number and Type of Agencies Offering Aavice 
A B C D 
Gen. Spec. Gen. Spec. Gen. Spec. Gen. Spec 
Addictions: 
Alcohol 
Drugs 
Gambling 
Children/ 
Young People 
Community/ 
Relations 
Consumer 
Affairs 
7 
6 
5 
13 
16 
13 
Discrimination 
Racial ll 
Sexual ll 
Education 17 
Elderly 15 
Employment 16 
Fuel 18 
Gay Men ll 
Handicapped -
Mentally 12 
Physically 12 
Health 19 
Homelessness 17 
Housing 19 
Legal Matters 17 
Lesbians 
Marriage/ 
Family 
Offenders/ 
ex-offenders 
Pregnancy 
Rape 
Social Serv. 
13 
16 
12 
15 
12 
17 
Welfare Rights15 Social Sec. 
l 
0 
0 
4 
4 
l 
5 
4 
2 
6 
8 
5 
0 
4 
6 
l 
6 
7 
5 
0 
l 
2 
0 
0 
6 
15 
3 
4 
3 
7 
8 
5 
6 
5 
5 
9 
6 
7 
3 
6 
7 
9 
5 
ll 
8 
6 
6 
3 
3 
8 
9 
12 
l 
3 
l 
5 
3 
2 
0 
l 
4 
3 
4 
4 
0 
6 
5 
5 
5 
7 
3 
2 
3 
l 
l 
5 
6 
ll 
6 
6 
6 
5 
l 
0 
l 
2 
2 
7 
2 
2 
3 
5 
4 
6 
l 
4 
l 
3 
6 
l 
2 
2 
l 
2 
6 
6 
4 
4 
l 
0 
0 
2 
2 
4 
0 
0 
0 
2 
l 
2 
l 
0 
l 
l 
5 
l 
4 
3 
2 
l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l 
l 
l 
l 
0 
0 
l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l 
0 
l 
0 
l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l 
l 
Contd/ ... 
0 
0 
0 
l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l 
0 
l 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l 
0 
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Others:- (one of each unless stated otherwise) 
Group A Generalist Advice in Tax 
Specialist Advice None 
Group B Generalist Advice in Mental Illness; victims of 
crime. 
Specialist Advice in Victims of Crime ( 2) ; debt, 
sexual assault; sexual harras-
ment; incest; violence against 
women; business counselling; 
patients rights in hospital; 
holidays; elderly owner 
occupiers. 
Group c Generalist Advice in Tourism; local government; 
loss/bereavement; self 
development; people skills; 
alcohol free lifestyle; 
child sex abuse. 
Specialist Advice in Tranquilizer withdrawal; 
anxiety management, loss/ 
bereavement; self development; 
people skills, AIDS and HIV+; 
mental health issues; child 
sexual abuse; womens health 
Group D Generalist advice in Womens issues 
Specialist advice in None 
Some agencies did not respond to this question:-
A l 
B 0 
c 2 
D 2 
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Table 17 Advice Agencies Offering Tribunal Representation 
Tribunal Type of Agency 
Representation 
A B c D 
i) Yes 70% 39% 0 0 
ii) No 22% 61% 93% 60% 
(iii) No Response 8% 0 7% 40% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Type of Tribunal Type of Agency 
A B 
Mental Health Review 2 l 
Industrial Tribunal 13 l 
Social Security Appeal 17 ll 
Medical Appeal 3 3 
Small Claims Arbitration 2 l 
Criminal Injuries 2 l Compensation 
Rent Tribunal l 0 
Council Committees l 0 
Table 18 : Advice Agencies Publishing Information 
Any Publications Type of Agency. 
A B c D 
( i) Yes 63% 91% 70% 60% 
ii) No 30% 9% 22% 20% 
(iii) No Response 7% 0 8% 20% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Type of Publication A/27 B/33 C/27 D/5 
i} Leaflet 12 27 17 3 
ii) Pamphlet 7 20 9 0 
(iii} Annual Report 8 24 14 1 
( iv} Other 2 4 7 l 
PART 2 
LEGAL AID UNDER REVIEW - THE LEGAL AID ACT 1988 
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(A) Introduction 
We have seen that the legal aid system is fraught 
with problems, and we have outlined a series of crippling 
deficiencies which it is necessary to overcome. The 
Government has recently shown its' interest in the reform 
of the means of provision of legal aid. It intended to 
see whether legal aid was being provided efficiently, 
affectively and that it gave the best possible value for 
money spent. (l) This was the purpose of the Legal Aid 
Efficiency Scrutiny Report (hereafter the Efficiency 
Scrutiny). {2 ) The findings of the Efficiency Scrutiny 
formed the basis of the Government's White Paper, Legal 
Aid in England and Wales : A New Framework, (J) from which 
in turn was produced the Legal Aid Act (1988) (4 ) 
In this section it is intended to outline both tan-
gible proposals of the Act and the possible sub-agenda of 
reform implicitly suggested in the White Paper and Efficiency 
Scrutiny Report. The most prominent fears of commentators 
will then be drawn together and their intended response to 
their perception of the situation will be examined. With 
regard to this latter section particular reference will be 
made to the response of advice agencies in the North East 
of England. 
1) Lord Chancellor's Department, "Legal Aid in England and Wales : A 
New Framework", (1987) Cm 118, para.3. 
2) Lord Chancellor's Department, "Legal Aid : Efficiency Scrutiny 
Report, (1986). 
3) Op.cit., Note (1). 
4) This section was written using the Legal Aid Bill, HCB 182, as 
amended by Standing Committee D. This contained the majority of 
amendments to the Bill as originally published by the House of 
Commons (HCB 113). Further minor amendments were made in the House of 
commons and these were set out in HLB 114. It was this amended Bill 
which was sent to the House of Lords, and was passed unamended to 
become the Legal Aid Act 1988, receiving the Royal Assent on 29.7.88. 
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(B) The Legal Aid Act (1988). 
The Legal Aid ~ct has two main purposes, the first 
being to create a Legal Aid Board. The Board's functions 
would be to ensure that advice, assistance and representa-
tion were available in accordance with the Act, and to 
administer the Act(S) The second purpose of the Act was 
to provide the Lord Chancellor with a considerable array 
of discretionary powers. {6 ) Each will be examined in turn. 
(l) The Legal Aid Board. In line with the research 
preceding the Act the most important change implemented 
was in the administrat~on of legal aid. The legal aid 
scheme itself remained, in structure, very ffiuch as it was 
in the repealed Legal Aid Acts, but with much of the detail 
of eligibility left to be defined by regulations. 
The role of the Board is initially at least envisaged 
as being similar to that which the Law Society has played. 
That is, to ensure that the various types of legal aid are 
being provided without actually providing advice or repre-
sentation themselves and taking a general administrative 
role with regard to the implementation of the Act.(?) 
Those areas of work currently part of the administration of 
legal aid, but which are handled by bodies other than the 
Law Society, e.g., the determination of client's means by 
the D.S.S., remain out of the ambit of the Board's role( 8 ) 
5) H. c. B. 182 I 53 (2) . 
6) Some 56 such powers according to Smith, R., and Arnott, H., "The 
Legal Aid Bill", (January 1988), Legal Action 6. 
7) Op. cit. 1 note (3) s3 (c). 
8) Ibid. 1 s3 (4) 
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at least initially. In the longer term the Board does 
have the power to suggest that it should take over those, 
or any other functions, in relation to the provision of 
1 1 "d (9) ega al . 
As regards the practical work which the Board may 
undertake in the future, the Act provides little or no 
clue. There is extensive guidance as to how the Board 
will arrange its affairs financially(lO). However guid-
ance as to all other aspects of the Board's role is avoided 
by the granting of an exceptionally broad power to do "any-
thing'' in relation to making available advice, assistance, 
and representation, or which is facilitative, incidental 
or conducive, to the Board's role of ensuring provision of 
1 1 "d d d .. t . . (ll) ega al an a m1n1s er1ng 1t. The Act does provide 
for specific powers at the Board's disposal, but stresses 
that these in no way limit the broadranging powers already 
confered. (l 2 ) These specified powers are related largely 
to financial matters(l 3 ), but also include the power to 
publicise the Board's function(l 4 ), and most importantly a 
research and development role. 
(a) Research and Development. This power points the Board 
towards a role which has been notoriously badly fulfilled 
by the Lord ChcnCJ:ellor' s Department (lS) The importance of 
9) ~·I S 4 (8) • 
10) Ibid., s 4(2 a-d), s 4 (7), s 5 (2), s 6, s 7. 
ll) Ibid., s 4(1). 
12) Ibid., s 4 (2). 
13) Ibid., ss (2a) - (2d). 
14) Ibid., ss (2e). 
15) Legal Action Group, "The Legal Aid Board : Implications for Lawyers 
and Advisers", (26th March 1988) Conference Papers, para. ll.l. 
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inquiry and investigation into any of the proposed 
Board's functions(l 6 ), and closely related to that, the 
power to advise the Lord Chancellor on any appropriate 
matter relating to advice, assistance, or representa-
tion, under the Legal Aid Act, (l 7 ) is recognised. These 
powers are the cornerstone of a research and development 
role for the Board, and must be seen as being of particular 
importance because of the stress placed upon them in the 
Act. This view can be supported from other sections, 
particularly bearing in mind that the Act makes specific 
separate note of the requirement on the Board to provide 
the Lord Chancellor with an annual report. This should be 
similar in purpose to that currently produced by the Law 
Society, explaining how it has discharged its functions in 
relation to legal aid. (lS) The Act places a positive duty 
on the Board to publish information "as to the discharge of 
its functions". This relates not only to the provision of 
advice and representation services, but also to the adminis-
trative work associated with that, and more generally "other 
matters connected therewith."(lg) This compliments the 
power to advise the Lord Chancellor by ensuring the publi-
cation of analysed data on the current workings of legal 
aid. Also this duty implicitly encourages the questioning 
and assessment of all matters relating to the current and 
16) Op.cit., note (5), s 4 (2f) .. 
17) Ibid., ss (2g). 
18) Ibid. I s 5 (3). 
19) Ibid. I s 5 (l). 
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future provision of those services. 
(b) Contracting Power:- The second clearly stated power 
of the Board may have a more considerable effect on the 
provision of legal aid. This is the power of the Board 
to make contracts with, or grants of loans to, other 
persons or bodies to provide advice, assistance, and 
representation. (20) It is important to note iwmediately 
the role which the Lord Chancellor will play in this power. 
The Board can not exercise the power of its own accord, 
rather it must be directed by the Lord Chancellor to use 
its power. Even then it is quite clear that the Lord 
Chancellor will specifically decide the extent of the 
contract. This presumably means that the area of legal 
aid work to be contracted out, the amount of work or geo-
graphical area to be covered by the contract, and all 
financial aspects thereof will be controlled by the Lord 
Chgncellor. The Act goes on to stress again that the 
Board must not stray from the directions specifically 
given by the Lord Chancellor himself. (2 l) 
This power is typical of the Act in general in that 
it is vague in its meaning. There is no guidance as to 
the circumstances when contracts may be deemed suitable for 
implementation by the Lord Chancellor, and there is seemingly 
no limit as to the forms of legal aid work which may be 
contracted out of the general scheme. The Act provides no 
hint as to how the contracts may work. The possibilities 
include exclusive contracts, with whoever gains the contract 
20) Ibid., s 4 (4). 
21) Ibid., s 4 (4a) , s 4 (4b) . 
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being the only source of that advice in that particular 
area. Alternatively the contracts may cover a specific 
number of cases which that agency must deal with, while 
remaining non-exclusive. In the latter case no guidance 
is given as to the extent that other agencies will still 
be able to receive payment for advice given in the same 
area as that in which the contract operates should a 
client come to them with that particular problem. The 
Act does provide that the client shall still have the 
right to select their own solicitor or barrister to pro-
vide them with the appropriate advice, assistance or 
representation, (22 ) (subject in the case or representa-
tion to the existence of a contract in civil legal aid 
cases, (23 ) or regulations in criminal legal aid cases. (24 )) 
This might appear to enshrine non-exclusive contracts 1 
but this right is subject to the willingness of the 
solicitor or barrister to provide the service under the 
Act. Therefore if there is a contract which excludes other 
providers from offering advice, assistance and representa-
tion then under the Act those 'willing' to provide the 
service can only be those holding the contract 1 and there-
fore consumer choice could be limited. 
Also there are no clues as to whether there will be 
minimum standards of provision imposed on contractors, both 
as to the quality of the service 1 and as to the number of 
clients seen. Once one forsees standards of service as a 
criterion in contract relationships the question of how 
22} ~· 1 S 32 (1} o 
23) Ibid. I s 32 (2). 
241 Ibid., s 32 (3). 
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these standards could be enforced must also be solved. 
Here again the Act provides no guidance, all that we can 
presume is that these factors fall to the discretion of 
the Lord Chancellor. 
Therefore we have seen that the Board does have new 
powers over those which were held by the Law Society when 
it administered legal aid. The research and development 
function of the Board is quite clearly formed in the Act, 
and it is up to the Board to grasp the nettle in assessing 
the purpose of legal aid as well as day to day business of 
usage and administration. With regard to the power to 
contract aspects of legal aid to other persons or bodies 
the role of the Board is far less clear. Obviously by 
research the Board should be able to influence the Lord 
Chancellor's decision as to whether to make contracts and 
on what conditions. However, ultimately the decision 
remains with the Lord Chancellor, who, unfettered by 
limitations in the legislation on his power, may do largely 
as he sees fit. 
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(2) The Lord Chancellor's Powers. 
Two words are particularly noticeable in the Bill 
for their persistent recurrence, Lord Chancellor. It is 
to be expected that the representative of the Government, 
and, although not directly elected( 2S), of the people, should 
retain some measure of control and supervision over 
legal aid, which constitutes a considerable percentage of 
his department's total budget. The question which we must 
ask is whether the powers which the Lord Chancellor will 
have when the Act comes into force are merely sufficient 
to allow him to keep an ultimate check on how the Legal 
Aid Act is put into practice, or whether they could repre-
sent an unarticulated desire on the part of the Lord 
Chancellor to play a more direct and interventionist role 
in the provision of legal aid. There are five main areas 
within the Bill where the Lord Chancellor's powers play a 
central part, we shall now look at these. 
(a) The Legal Aid Board:- There are factors inherent in 
the creation of a centrally controlled Board which mean 
that inevitably the Lord Chancellor will exercise a large 
measure of control over it. The creation of the Board 
obviously involves powers as to the appointment of members( 26 ), 
and to the size of the Board. (27 ) However the discretion 
of the Lord Chancellor is given much room for maneouvre 
in the size of the Board, the type and skills of the 
25) The Lord Chancellor sits in the House of Lords rather than the 
House of Commons. 
26) Op.cit., note (5), s3 (5}. 
2 7) ·~. , s 3 (6) • 
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people appointed, (2 S) and most importantly the ratios of 
one particular skill to another on the Board. There are 
four guaranteed places for legal professionals( 29 ), and 
none for consumers or interest groups. These factors 
obviously would not prevent appointments from such bodies 
as interest groups, but it is important that groups other 
than the professionals can not be certain of a voice as of 
right, and they must rely on the Lord Chancellor's good will 
for their seat. 
Similarly given the Board's responsibility for expen-
diture it is procedurally correct that the Lord Chancellor 
should have powers to inspect and audit the Board's accou~ts, (30) 
and also have some control over the use of capital for the 
purchase and sale of land, (3l) since he is personally res-
ponsible for presenting the annual report of the Board to 
both Houses of Parliament. (32 ) Essentially the Lord 
Chancellor's role would be to ensure that the Board was 
correctly fulfilling its function without straying across 
the para8eters of what it is financially entitled to do. 
The Lord Chancellor will hold further powers in relation 
to both the income and expenditure of the Board. As regards 
expenditure the Board can make payments which are "incurred 
under the Act", (3J) which seems reasonable, but the Lord 
Chancellor is given an additional power to make payments 
(with Treasury toncurrence) for the "purposes of the Act''. <34 ) 
28) Ibid., s 3 (9) . 
29) Ibid. I s 3 (7) and (8) . 
30) Ibid., s 5 (7) , s ( 7) • 
31} Ibid., s 4 (7) • 
32) Ibid., s 37. 
33) Ibid., s 6 (2a) . 
34) Ibid. I s 6 (2d). 
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Although the distinction is grammatically slight it's 
implications could be much broader. The Lord Chancellor 
does not have to remain within the bounds of what is laid 
down in the statute, but rather he can use his discretion 
to decide the broader purpose of the Act. This is an 
important power, and it is a weakness to the Board that it 
does not possess it. The Lord Chancellor also has an 
additional power over that of the Board with regard to 
income to the legal aid fund. He may (again with Treasury 
concurrence) determine that other receipts of the Board 
should be paid into the fund. (3 S) Again it is a marked 
omission that the Board itself should not have such a 
power. 
The Lord Chancellor also has powers conferred upon 
him as regards the practical day to day business of the 
Board. One would expect that the Board would positively 
desire guidance on some aspects of their work from the 
Lord Chancellor. The right of the Lord Chancellor to 
give guidance is covered by the Act, (36 ) and the Board 
must have regard to it, but it is not bound by it. Of 
course this could be a matter of semantics because the 
Lord Chancellor may frame his "guidance" in such a way 
that the Board has little choice but to act accordingly. 
The Lord Chancellor may also play a considerable role in 
defining the research role which the Board can take since 
the annual report of the Board must deal with all matters 
35) Ibid. I s 6 (3£) 
36) Ibid., s 5 (5) 
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Which the Lord Chancellor directs. 0 7 1 Should the Lord 
Chancellor wish this section of the Act would allow him 
to direct the Board to undertake such work that would either 
leave no time, or no resources to allow them to undertake 
other research which they would prefer to prioritize. 
There are two areas where the Lord Chancellor has 
particular power to control the Board, and these both 
relate to the future development and possible changing role 
of the Board. The powers place the ability of the Board 
to define it's own development and purpose into jeopardy. 
Firstly we should note that the Board is given the power 
to advise the Lord Chancellor that it wishes to take over 
functions relating to legal aid currently undertaken by 
bodies other than the Law Society. (3S) However ultimately 
it will be the Lord Chancellor who assesses the suitability 
and readiness of that function to be transferred to the 
Board's control. (39 ) His decision may be based on many 
factors which may not include the development of the Board 
as an independent and respected body as a central purpose. 
The ability to make contracts for the provision of 
advice, assistance or representation by other per-
sons or bodies is, as we have seen, (40) s~rictly at 
the Lord Chancellor's discretion and control. Should the 
Board decide that contracting with agencies to provide 
services currently provided under the legal aid scheme is 
the most desireable way to proceed, then the Lord Chan-
cellar could either oppose such contracts completely or 
allow only an emasculated form to be put into operation. 
37) ~-I s 5 (4) 
38) Ibid., s 4 (8) 
39) Ibid., s 3 ( 4) 
40) Ibid., s 4 ( 4) . See text to notes (20) to (24) . 
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Equally it is possible that against the advice of the 
Board the Lord Chancellor could direct the Board to imple-
ment such a policy. (4 l) 
Therefore we have seen that as far as the Lord 
Chancellor's powers in relation to the Board are concerned, 
he could exert considerable influence in relation to the 
financial activities of the Board and in directing its day 
to day running. He could feasibly exert a controlling 
influence over the composition of the Board, its research, 
and both its development plans, and policy. The powers 
which the Lord Chancellor has in relation to the Board 
are formidable, they appear to go beyond the powers nec-
essary to keep the Board in check, and they could be 
seen as giving the Lord Chancellor an intrusive superiority 
over the Board. 
(b) Legal Aid:- The availability of, and payment for 
advice and assistance (including both green form advice 
and assistance, and assistance by way of representation), 
and for representation under civil and criminal legal aid 
are dealt with in turn by Parts III, IV and V of the Act. 
Parts IV and V contain the bare practical details of how 
civil and criminal legal aid can be obtained. Part III 
relating to advice and assistance contains no details 
as to where or from whom the client will be able to 
receive it. There are opportunities for the change or 
exclusion of such advice and assistance from that which 
exists as a result of ~urrent legislation. Any part or 
all of the advice and assistance available could be provided 
41) Op •• cit., note (5), s 4 (4a). 
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in a form different from that for which the scant details 
of the Act provide, (42 } and advice and assistance under 
the scheme could be limited to specifically defined groups 
of people. (43 ) This latter clause would allow delimita-
tion of free legal aid to people receiving income support 
should the Lord Chancellor so wish, and the former allows 
for the contracting out of all or part of advice and 
assistance. For civil legal aid if a contract for repre-
sentation exists then the client's choice of representative 
may be limited to those who hold that contract. (44 ) More 
generally the choice of a solicitor or counsel to provide 
advice assistance or representation may be limited to 
( 4 5) 
those who are members of a particular panel, and there-
fore deemed as experts in that area. These powers are 
exerciseable by the use of regulations by the Lord Chan-
cellor. (46 ) 
Although the powers outlined above could prove to 
be part of a scheme of considerable change they are not 
immediately the most important powers which the Lord 
Chancellor holds in relation to legal aid. The areas 
which the Act deals with are to do with administrative 
matters, the Act makes no mention of financial matters. For 
all forms of legal aid the eligibility levels which are 
defined by the financial resources of the person applying 
42) Ibid. I s 8 (3). 
43) Ibid. I s 8 ( 4) . 
44) Ibid. I s 15 (5}, s 32 (2) . 
45) Ibid. I s 32 ( 7} • 
46) Subject to the conditions in s 36 of the Bill. 
137 
for legal aid are to be defined by regulations made by the 
Lord Chancellor. (47 ) The Act makes no mention of a set 
percentage of the population as an approximate level of 
eligibility. In fact it does not give any guidance at all 
as to how many people the Lord Chancellor feels should be 
entitled to legal aid either freely or paying some contri-
bution 1 or what criteria he will use to decide these ques-
tions. As far as an unchanged demand led scheme of legal 
aid is concerned this power is the single most important 
factor in controlling the total expenditure on legal aid. 
Its control by the Lord Chancellor alone through regula-
tions suggests that the levels will be set according to 
their financial expediency rather than within a broader 
framework of improving access to justice for those of 
small or moderate means. (48 ) 
(c) Regulation Making Powers:- Although the Lord Chan-
cellar is provided with regulation making powers through-
out the Act. s34 draws together and elaborates on some 
of these. Basically the Lord Chancellor's power to make 
regulations is without express bounds. He may make regu-
lations for any purpose when it appears to hi~ to be 
necessary or desireable 1 to give effect to the Act or 
prevent abuse of it. (49 ) 
Particularly important regulatory powers include the 
ability to control eligibility levels according to financial 
47) O£.Cit. I 
s 231 s 
48) Op. cit. 1 
49) op.cit. 1 
note 
24. 
note 
note 
(4) 1 s9 ss (1) (2) (6) (7), s 15 ss(1) (6) (7) 1 s16 1 s21 (5) 1 
(1) 1 para. l. 
(4) 1 S 34 (1} • 
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resources as mentioned above, (50) and the ability to 
control the rev.uneration from all legal aid work to 
solicitors and counsel. (5l) In this latter area the Lord 
Chancellor has additional powers to impose penalties and 
restrictions on the remuneration, (52 ) and also to deter-
mine the level of reQuneration with reference to set 
criteria which include not only the quality and quantity 
of the work undertaken, but also the cost to public funds. (53 ) 
This suggests a requirement to perform a balancing role 
between what in reality the work of the solicitor or 
barrister is worth, and \vhat the government is prepared 
to pay. (54 ) 
The regulatory powers also extend to the ability to 
fundamentally alter the applicability of the Act itself 
in terms of the people to whom, and circumstances in which, 
legal aid is available. (55 ) This again reflects the very 
broad and wide-ranging power which the Lord Chancellor 
will receive in the Act. His role will not simply be to 
ITonitor and check at the edges the provision of legal aid, 
leaving the running to the Board, but rather these are 
powers to permit the structural control and definition of 
legal aid. 
(d) Lord Chancellor's Legal A.id Advisory Co:rmnittee :- The 
Lord Chancellor has the power to abolish the Advisory Com-
mittee at will, (56 ) without any guarantee that it's function 
50) Ibid., s 34 (2c) and text to notes (47) and (48) above. 
51) Ibid., s 34 (2e) . 
52) Ibid. I s 34 (7). 
53) Ibid., s34 (9). 
54) It is worth comparing s39 of the Legal Aid Act 1974 and the new s 34 (9) 
which will take its place. See Legal Aid Bill 1988, Schedule 8, para.3. 
55) Ibid. I s 34 (3). 
56) Ibid. 1 s 35 (6). 
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will be carried out by any other body of an equally indepen-
dent nature. 
(e) Finance of the Board and Legal Aid Fund:- Here again 
the Lord Chancellor's powers of control are extensive. 
The Lord Chancellor will assist in making payments to cover 
the Board's expenditure in respect of provision of advice, 
assistance, and representation, and costs, but he shall 
retain control over the wanner and timing of such pay-
ments. <57 ) For all other expenditure by the Board, 
presumably involving administration, research and other 
expenses not directly incurred in the provision of advice, 
assistance or representation, the Lord Chancellor can impose 
such conditions as he sees fit on the provision of those 
monies. <58 ) 
(3) Conclusion 
It does not seem unreasonable to conclude, from what 
we have seen of the powers which the Lord Chancellor will 
receive under the Legal Aid Act 1988, that it will be 
possible for him to control the Legal Aid Board, its work 
and its development, and define the scope and availability 
of legal aid. The creation of the Legal Aid Board may be 
seen as secondary to a redefinition of power and discretion 
by the Act in favour of the Lord Chancellor. All will in 
reality depend on the intentions of the Lord Chancellor. 
57). Ibid., s 42 (2a}. 
58). Ibid. I s 42 (2b}. 
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If he desires a strong independent Board then he will 
appoint one, and vice versa. The only thing that we can 
say with certainty is that the Board is not assured of 
independence from the Lord Chancellor. It is therefore 
the duty of the Board to clarify its perspective and define 
its purpose. If the Board takes a strong and independent 
stance as to what it sees as the plan for legal aid then at 
least the Lord Chancellor's response will bring his own 
perspective to the fore. 
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(C) The Lord Chancellor's Perspective. 
Although we can not be certain as to what the Lord 
Chancellor's planned role for the Legal Aid Board or for 
legal aid in the future is, there is some information which 
might be of use in giving at least a partial view. The 
White Paper, Legal Aid in England and Wales : A New 
Framework(S 9 ) included both the Lord Chancellor's response 
to the proposals of the Efficiency Scrutiny, and his own 
proposals for reform of Legal Aid, and as such provides a 
distillation of the broader perspective of the Lord Chan-
cellor's Department. (60 ) The White Paper( 6l) achieves 
this in a way that the Efficiency Scrutiny could not 
since it was made up of members of the Efficiency Unit 
itself, and Treasury staff as well as members of the Lord 
Chancellor's Department, and as such held a combined 
perspective. Therefore we shall look at the White Paper 
to see what clues are given as to what role the Lord 
Chancellor expects the Board to take particularly with 
regard to the provision of legal aid. 
59) Op.cit., note (1) 
60) During the production of the Bill there were three different Lord 
Chancellors in office, Lord Hailsham when the Efficiency Scrutiny 
and lihite Paper were produced, Lord Havers during much of the 
period of preparation of the Bill, and Lord Mackay when the Bill 
was presented. There does not appear to have been any significant 
change in the Department's perspective. 
61) Loc. cit., note (1). 
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(l) Problem and Response. It would appear that the 
problem of legal aid has been viewed as largely one of 
administrative structure, which has lead to inefficiency in 
both the organisation of, and means of providing, the ser-
vice. The Lord Chancellor therefore suggested adminis-
trative change by the creation of the Board( 62 ) which 
would ensure that one body would be responsible for adminis-
tering all aspects of legal aid( 63 ) while also allowing it 
to review provision of advice and assistance. (64 ) 
This analysis would suggest that the role of the 
Board as seen by the Lord Chancellor will be an adminis-
trative one, rather than an active and creative one. This 
view can be supported by the different work which the V'Jhite 
Paper emphasises as suitable for the Board, and then looking 
at the work which is regarded as suitable for the Lord 
Chancellor to undertake. The following are four examples 
of which are specifically stated as being appropriate for 
the Board to undertake, and all involve the Board's 
research role. "As an early task" the Board will be 
required to consider the most cost effective way of pro-
viding advice and assistanc~( 6 S) and to consider whether 
there should be further exclusions of areas of work from 
the green form scheme. (66 ) The Board could also consider 
whether there should be a single scheme for advice and 
representation in criminal cases, (6?) and should monitor 
62) Ibid. I para. 15. 
63) Ibid. I paras. 13 and 18. 
641 Ibid. I para. 5. 
65) Ibid. I para. 26. 
66) Ibid. I para. 28. 
671 Ibid. I Annex B, Chapter II, Part l. 
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the number of applications for a change of solicitor. (68 ) 
We should note iiTIDediately that these would all be duties 
to enquire into new areas, but not to do anything about 
them. 
When these powers are compared to those suggested 
as suitable for the Lord Chancellor to exercise the dif-
ference in the power distribution envisaged is quite obvious. 
The Lord Chancellor has re~oved conveyancing and wills from 
the work which can be undertaken on green form advice and 
assistance( 69 ); the opposing party in litigation will be 
given the right to make representations against the grant 
of legal aid to the applicant; (70) the litigant receiving 
civil legal aid will have to pay contributions throughout 
their case rather than for a period of only one year; (7l) 
fee rates can be substantially controlled since they will 
no longer be related in any way to equivalent private 
fees, and standard fees and paywent on account will be 
introduced on more permanent cases; (72 ) the situation of 
cases will automatically be reviev1ed when costs reach 
£8000 or when the case has been in progress for one 
year( 73 ); and also judges and magistrates may order soli-
citors to pay the cost of predictably unnecessary adjourn-
ments. (? 4 ) 'I'hese are all examples of the substantial con-
trolling powers which the Lord Chancellor has, (7 S) they 
68) Ibid., Annex B, Chapter III,Part 2. 
69) Ibid., para. 28. 
70) Ibid., Annex B, Chapter II, Part l. 
71) Ibid., Annex B, Chapter II, part 2. 
72) Ibid., Annex B, Chapter II, Part 3. 
73) Ibid., Annex B, Chapter III, Part l. 
74) Ibid., 
75) Other such powers can be seen in paras. 31, 42 and 44, and in 
Annex B in Chapter III, Parts 2 and 3. 
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represent an active and influential role within legal aid. 
The contrast to the role of the Board, as the new adminis-
tration, can be further emphasised by the types of proposals 
which the White Paper notes as being areas for discussion 
with the administration before the Government implements 
thenl. These include control over solicitors travelling 
expenses; a ~ore careful approach to the use of more than 
one counsel; and a more careful approach to disbursements. (76 ) 
These are minor issues, at the periphery of expenditure 
on legal aid, they show that the Lord Chancellor could have 
proposed discussion of more important issues with the Board, 
but the reality would appear to te that he wishes to keep 
the major policy and strategy decisions on legal aid to 
himself. 
Therefore the evidence in the White Paper suggests 
that the Lord Chancellor sees the way to the production 
of an effective, efficient and value for money system of 
legal aid as being through a tightening of the adminis-
tration of the scheme. The Eoard is the new broom to 
sweep clean, and its duties will be administrative rather 
than in a decision making capacity. The Board•s role in 
consultation on decisions by the Lord Chancellor is also 
apparently envisaged as being at the margins of the scheme 
rather than in its centre. 
76) Ibid. 
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(2) Cost Cutting. T~e changes to legal aid and its adminis-
tration proposed by the V'Jhite Paper had financial impli-
cations of atout a £10 million per annum saving. (77 ) This 
is a small saving in comparison to the total expenditure 
on legal aid which in the year of the White Paper was £365 
million. (78 ) The Lord Chancellor could in no way be 
accused of undertaking an overt cost cutting exercise, but 
within his perspective could the tangible savings pro-
posed by the White Paper be the thin end of the cost cutting 
strategy wedge to be implemented when the Board has been 
set up? Let us look then at how the Lord Chancellor 
intends to make savings. 
(a) Green Form:- Assistance in making wills or 
in;conveyancing will no longer be available under the 
green form scheme. Although there are no current plans to 
restrict the scope of green form further, the Lord 
Chancellor will make one of the early tasks of the Board 
to see whether further exclusions are appropriate. (80) 
Whether this policy becomes one of cost cutting may 
depend on a number of factors, including the perspective 
and strength of the Board, the savings made by the immedi-
ate cuts, and the resources available in the future. 
What we can see from the statement is an openness to further 
narrrowing of the scope of green form, and eagerness that 
this should be on the Board's immediate agenda. 
77) Op.cit., note (1), para. 7. 
78) Lord Chancellor's Department, "37th Annual Reports of the Law 
Society 1986-87", (1988), p.86. 
(79-80) Op.cit., note (1), para. 28. 
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(b) Appeal against the grant of legal aid:-(8l) It 
is recognised that the grant of legal aid to one party can 
have a major impact on their opponent, and therefore the 
opponent will now be given the right to appeal against the 
grant of legal aid, before it is made. Presumably the 
criteria for judging whether or not to grant legal aid must 
largely rest on the merits of the case! 82 ) given that the 
financial criteria are satisfied. The interests of the 
opponent are not included as one of the criteria to be 
borne in mind while making the decision on the grant of 
criminal legal aid, (B 3 ) while for civil legal aid the 
granting of aid must appear reasonable in the circum-
stances. (84 ) Therefore for civil legal aid the case of 
the opponent could feasibly be argued solely on the basis 
of the resource advantage that the grant of legal aid 
could give to the applicant. However this situation would 
seem unlikely to arise because if the opponent was to be at 
such a disadvantage it would appear likely that he or 
she would also be entitled to legal aid. 
Therefore we must assume that a decision on the grant 
of legal aid after an opponent's appeal would be decided 
in the light of the chances of success of either party. 
This situation would prejudge the outcome of the case since 
an applicant would be unable to proceed if aid was refused. 
81) Ibid., para. 37. 
82) The "interests of justice" test for criminal legal aid, see s 21 (2) 
of the HCB 182, and the "reasonable grounds" test for civil legal 
aid, see slS (l), same Bill. 
83) Ibid., s22(2). 
84) Ibid., s 15 (3a). 
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Also there would be no certainty that the Board (or other 
assessor's) judgement of the relative merits of the case 
would agree with that of the court. What we can be certain 
of is that the ability of the opponent to make representa-
tions can not result in more applicants being granted legal 
aid. It is likely to result in fewer successful applica-
tions, and thereby save legal aid monies. It should be 
borne in mind that the White Paper does not suggest that 
the present system is working unfairly against opponents 
or resulting in litigation which is futile and wasteful 
to their resources. The only justification for this 
additional layer of bureaucracy is that granting aid 
"may have a major impact"(SS) on the opponent. If the 
assessment of the merits of the case will define whether 
legal aid is granted or not, those entitled on toth finan-
cial and merit grounds to legal aid, will be denied that 
aid because it is decided that they can not win their 
case, rather than on the grounds of any disadvantage to 
their opponent should aid have been granted. 
(c) Abolition of Discretionary Allowances( 86 ) :- The 
Lord Chancellor again shows open willingness to cut costs 
by reducing eligibility for legal aid by looking into the 
removal of these allowances which allow earmarked funds to 
be ignored when assessing an applicants financial eligibility. 
The obvious result of this will be that applicants appear 
to have greater amounts of capital and income. This will 
result in a shunting up effect with less people being 
85) Loc.cit., note (81). 
86) Op.cit., note (l), para. 42. 
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entitled to legal aid without any contribution, and more 
people falling outside the eligibility limits for legal 
aid altogether. Again this will have financial resource 
implications resulting in overall savings in legal aid expen-
diture due to less people being entitled to legal aid, and 
more of those who are entitled falling into the bracket 
of those who have to pay contributions. 
(d) Continuing Contributions:- A legally aided 
client in a civil action for whom it is necessary to pay a 
contribution to the cost of their case will usually be 
assessed as being able to pay a fixed amount each month. 
The practice has previously been that the assisted person 
should pay this monthly instalment for a period of one 
year only. However in the White Paper the Lord Chancellor 
expresses his view that if the person can afford a fixed 
amount each month, then these payments should not last 
simply for one year, but should continue throughout the 
case however long that might be. (S 7 ) 
Taken in abstract and at a theoretical level this 
proposal could be seen as being simply logical, but that 
would be to ignore its purpose and its result. The White 
Paper stresses(SS) that the intention of this change is to 
instill a better sense of the cost of litigation to the 
legally aided client, not just to the taxpayer but also 
possibly to themselves. Almost without doubt:instilling this 
sense will result in some people being unwilling to take up 
offers of civil legal aid with contributions because of 
the uncertainty of the final cost of the case to them. This 
87) Ibid., para.44. 
88) Ibid., paras. 43 and 44. 
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fact, combined with the extra revenue from the new pro-
cedure, will again result in further savings in legal aid 
expenditure. The proposed change in procedure could also 
make a change in the perspective of the legal aid contri-
bution, moving away from the idea of aid, and tov1ards a 
system of payment on account. This can be supported by 
the statement that the client will not have to pay more 
than the cost of his or her case( 89 ). This does not rule 
out the idea that the client may in fact have to pay the 
total cost of their case, thereby receiving no benefit 
from the legal aid scheme at all, which would simply act 
as a guarantor. 
(~) Remuneration:- We have seen that in the Legal 
Aid Act (1988) the Lord Chancellor has taken the power to 
set the levels of remuneration for all legal aid work, 
and to do so with particular reference to the cost to the 
taxpayer. (90) These proposals were made in the White 
Paper, and appear to represent an inclination on the 
Lord Chancellor's behalf to take a firmer control over 
lawyers' remuneration. The inclusion of the taxpayers' 
perspective shifts the emphasis away from simply being fair 
to the lawyers undertaking the legal aid work. This 
change may result in a fixing of remuneration at current 
levels, and thereby introducing a drop in rates in real 
terms. It seems likely that in the future it will be used 
as a justification for keeping remuneration for legal aid 
89) Ibid., para. 44. 
90) Text to notes (52) to (54). 
150 
work even further behind private client work than it was 
before, despite widespread concern over the current lack 
of resources available, (goa) particularly with regard to 
criminal legal aid. 
The White Paper also shows the Lord Chancellor's 
interest in introducing more standard fees for work 
done( 9 l). This is justified on simplified adiminstration 
grounds, but it would also give the Lord Chancellor the 
power to control expenditure more rigidly, and it would 
be reasonable to assume that the standard fee would be 
set at the lowest average fee point for that type of 
work, rather than at a more generous point. This could 
result in lawyers undertaking work paid at standard fee 
rates having to expect to make a loss on those cases which 
prove to be more complex and time consuming. Therefore we 
can forsee cost cutting in various areas relating to remuner-
ation of lawyers undertaking legal aid work. 
Overall we have seen that the White Paper shows the 
willingness to make savings in the expenditure on legal 
aid at the expense of both consumers and providers of the 
service by narrowing the scope of the green form schemei 
decreasing eligibility levels for legal aidi discouraging 
take up of legal aid by introducing appeals procedure 
against grants of aid; proposing to introduce continuing 
contributionsi and finally by placing tighter control on 
90a) For example see Anon,"First Division Association Sounds Alarm 
on Legal Aid", (18 August 1988), The Lawyer 2. 
91) Op.cit., note (l), para. 49. 
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lav~ers remuneration. These factors could be seen as the 
thin end of a cost cutting strategy wedge. In sorre cases 
the implications will not be quantifiable until the extent 
of the Lord Chancellor's will to implement them has 
been made clear, but we can be sure that the Lord Chan-
cellor is amenable to cuts in legal aid, however small, 
which are contrary to the interests of the consumers. 
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(3) Redefining Legal Aid. Legal aid has traditionally 
been provided by private practitioners v-rho have been paid 
on a case by case basis. The Legal Aid Act (1988) intro-
duces the possibility of contracting out advice, assis-
tance and representation to other persons or bodies. (92 ) 
However the proposals in the White Paper relating to this, 
and other areas, implicitly show the tentative beginnings 
of a redefinition of legal aid in terms of legal services 
provision, of which the powers proposed in the Act form 
only part. 
v!e have noted that this is within the Lord Chancellor's 
discretion to use the contracting powers in the Act, but 
that we could not tell to what extent he intended to use 
there, ( 93 ) the White Paper sheds light on this. We have 
seen that the Lord Chancellor will require the Board as 
an early task to look into the most cost effective way of 
providing advice and assistance, (94 ) but the positive 
approach which the Lord Chancellor takes to the result of 
this work is revealing. The White Paper states that 
"Once the Board has set up suitable arrangements for 
contrac-ting ..... <95 ) which seems to prejudge that the Board 
will report that contracting out advice and assistance 
is more cost effective than the present scheme of pro-
vision. Also in the following paragraph( 96 ) when talking 
92) See text to notes (20) to (24) 1 and notes (40) to (41). 
93) Ibid. 
94) Op. cit. 1 note (65). 
95) Ibid. 
96) Op.cit. 1 note (1), para. 27. 
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of the implementation of a contract into broader provision 
the White Paper says that this "will mean ... " and "will 
take place". If the Lord Chancellor had intended to wait 
for the result of the Board's research before making his 
decision one would suspect that the terminology used would 
have been qualified so that it read "would mean ... " 
and "would take place if ... ". The result is that we can be 
virtually certain that contracting will take place, and 
that the Lord Chancellor is particularly keen for it to be 
'th d . . (97 ) Wl a Vlce agencles. 
This commitment to contracting shows dissatisfaction 
on the Lord Chancellor's part with the current provision 
of services in the advice and assistance area by tradi-
tional private practice, and an eagerness to find alter-
native means of providing those services. This theory is 
backed up by other proposals in the White Paper, particu-
larly in relation to the creation of panels of solicitors 
skilled in particular fields. This is not a new idea, 
and in fact there are already existing panels for example 
for child care work, but what is new is that the Lord 
Chancellor wishes to make their use compulsory. (9S) This 
idea can also be seen in the Act where the Lord Chancellor 
will have the power through regulations to curtail a per-
sons entitlement to choose their own solicitor by saying 
they may choose only a solicitor who is a member of a 
prescribed panel. (99 ) The repercussions of this power 
97) Ibid., paras. 24, and 26. 
98) Ibid., para. 58. 
99) HCB 182, s 32 (7). 
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could be wideranging but we will only be able to tell if 
and when the Lord Chancellor decides to use his power. 
What we can conclude is that the Lord Chancellor is inter-
ested in limiting the outlets of advice, assistance and 
representation, by concentrating the work in the hands of 
those with proven expertise. Working within the present 
infrastructure of a mass of small private practices, the 
formation of specialist panels is the best way to draw 
together those with relevant skills who could not be 
drawn together in one practice or in the public sector. 
Because private practitioners have presumably chosen to 
work in the private rather than in the public sector the 
creation of specialist panels and delimitation of client 
choice of solicitor to those on that panel is possibly 
the closest the Lord Chancellor could come to forming a 
salaried legal service. 
A further sign of the Lord Chancellor's recognition 
of the benefits of a salaried legal profession can be 
seen in respect of lawyers' remuneration. A system of 
payments on account has been in use by the Law Society for 
some time, but only on a temporary basis. The White 
Paper recognises that this system is useful, and proposes 
the creation of a permanent scheme, under the justifi-
cation of the undesireability of lawyers having to wait a 
considerable time for payment for work done. (lOO) This is 
at best only a partial explanation, what it does not men-
tion is that payments on account are a considerable advan-
tage to the Lord Chancellor, particularly when combined 
with the proposed standard fees. Payments on account on a 
100} Op~cit. 1 note (l} 1 para. 52. 
155 
simple case by case model will provide the Lord Chancellor 
with a much simpler administrative task, but if he should 
decide to use a more complex model whereby, for example, 
solicitors were paid on a yearly basis on the understanding 
that they would undertake a minimum of X cases in any part-
icular field of work, with X being similar to the usual 
yearly number of cases of that type which that firm under-
took, and they would receive a payment on account of X 
multiplied by the standard fee for that work. Given that 
the Lord Chancellor does not own the legal practice, the 
contract would basically be quite similar to him employing 
someone to do the legal aid work. Again given the present 
infrastructure this model would be as close as the Lord 
Chancellor could get to creating a salaried legal pro-
fession. As it stands the Lord Chancellor's interest in 
payments on account is at least a recognition of the 
problems of a case by case approach to payment, part-
icularly for the Lord Chancellor in his attempt to budget 
expenditure on legal aid accurately. If a more complex 
model of the scheme is implemented it could be another 
significant alteration in the current model of legal aid. 
Therefore it would not be accurate to say that the 
Lord Chancellor intends to drastically shift the emphasis 
of legal aid as a payment to solicitors for legal services 
on a broader perspective in the near future, but what we can 
see is a distinct shift in emphasis with legal aid no longer 
being seen purelyinterms of the private practice. The volun-
tary sector of advice agencies may now become involved in 
legal aid, private practitioners may have to become members 
of specialist panels to obtain legal aid work, and methods 
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of payment may become more geared towards a standardi-
sation of commitment to legal aid. These are all important 
possibilities which could be the first tentative steps 
towards a redefinition of legal aid. 
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(4) Coverage of the Legal Aid Scheme. The statement of 
coverage of legal aid contained in the White Paper(l02 } 
is very carefully worded and should be closely examined. 
It begins with a statement of eligibility for legal aid, 
some 70% of households qualify, but it is also stated that 
this is an estimated figure. No indication is given 
as to where this figure comes from. Therefore the first 
sentence gives the impression that eligibility is high 
without having any actual evidence of this. The second 
sentence states that there will be no extension of the 
proportion of the population eligible, what this does is 
place the emphasis of the sentence on to extending 
eliqibility so that the reader looks back to the pro-
portion of people eligible and notes that 70% of the popu-
lation does seem satisfactorily high. Of course what the 
sentence does not do is guarantee that eligibility will 
remain at current levels, nor does it say that eligi-
bility will not be reduced. The final two sentences refer 
to the income and capital limits for legal aid, these will 
not be significantly changed, but they will be kept at 
an appropriate level. The meaning of this is obscure but 
shows the possible means justifying decreased eligibility. 
An appropriate level does not necessarily mean the 70% 
mentioned earlier in the paragraph, and could be a decreased 
percentage (we have seen that it will definitely not be 
increased). If there are no significant changes in the 
income and capital limits then far from keeping eligibility 
the same as the negative phrasing of relative non-change 
101-102) op~cit., note (l), para. 41. 
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implies, eligibility will fall as inflation raises average 
capital and income limits above current levels. The para-
graph is very carefully constructed but far from being 
reassuring, it implicitly opens the door to decreasing 
eligibility for legal aid. 
This idea can be supported from two other paragraphs 
in the White Paper. The subsequent paragraph relating 
to the civil legal aid means test(l03 ) includes the pro-
posal to consider the abolition of discretionary allow-
ances which are discounted when assessing clients income 
and capital limits. (104) This would obviously increase 
the income or capital which an applicant would appear to 
have, and therefore make there less likely to qualify for 
legal aid at all, or it would increase the contributions 
they would have to make. Therefore we see that as a direct 
result of the Lord Chancellor's unwillingness to change 
the income and capital limits, eligibility for legal aid 
will fall. Also as we have already seen(lOS) the Lord 
Chancellor will decrease eligibility for advice and assis-
tance under the green form scheme by removing the scheme's 
applicability to wills and conveyancing. Therefore we can 
see that the coverage of legal aid, which is already 
uncertain, is likely to fall in the iwmediate future, 
despite the wording of the White Paper which purports to 
at least maintain the level of eligibility. 
103} Ibid., para. 42. 
104) See text to note (86) . 
lOS) See text to note (80). 
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(5) Conclusion. If the Legal Aid Act told us very little 
about the Lord Chancellor's intentions then the White 
Paper is the opposite, giving us several insights into 
his thoughts at that time. We have seen that some of the 
ideas in the White Paper appeared directly in the Act, but 
it would be wrong to assume that those which did not are 
no longer on the agenda. The Lord Chancellor will have 
very broad regulatory powers under the new Act, and in 
his response to the Efficiency Scrutiny Report he under-
took to implement several proposals which do not appear in 
the Act. 
It appears that the White Paper provides an often 
clear distillation of the Lord Chancellors' intentions, 
for example he appears to intend the Board to take a largely 
administrative vote with some advisory powers, and cost 
cutting is certainly on the agenda. If the proposals in 
the Bill are implemented fewer people will be eligible for 
fewer legal aid services, which may be more difficult to 
obtain, and they may well have to pay more for them in 
contributions. Not only will the client suffer but sotoo 
might the lawyers who may face reduced remuneration. 
Other of the Lord Chancellor's intentions are less clear 
but we have clues that he may be slowly moving away from 
the traditional means of provision of legal aid, although 
his motives for this are uncertain, and also we can see that 
the door is open to reducing eligibility for legal aid 
further, and tentative moves have been made in this direc-
tion, but the extent of his intentions are uncertain. The 
White Paper has proved to be a very important source of 
clarification of the thinking behind the bare bones of the 
Act, much of value can be surmised from it. 
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(D) Response to the Proposals. 
In looking at the response of various agencies and 
cowmentators to the proposals for changes in legal aid 
there are two important factors which must be borne in 
mind. Firstly in many agencies detailed work was under-
taken in response to the Efficiency Scrutiny Report, and 
in particular concentrated on the proposals therein 
relating to the abolition of green form advice and assis-
( 106) tance scheme. The force of the arguments in these 
documents was recognised by the Lord Chancellor in the 
White Paper(lO?) and the proposal to abolish green form 
legal aid completely was dropped. Although some of the 
problems identified as being likely results of the termina-
tion of the green form scheme are equally applicable to 
the likely results of contracting out of some areas of 
green form work, the salient features of the Efficiency 
Scrutiny proposal are removed and therefore the arguments 
used against the proposal beco~e irrelevant to the new 
situation. This can be proved by example. It would be 
true to say of both the abolition of the green form scheme 
and contracting proposals that they will reduce the number 
of access points for consumers~ they may lead to worsened 
relations between agencies; consumers may receive a less 
106) e.g. Advice services Alliance Newsletter, "Advice and Legal Ser-
vices into the 1990s, the need for a National Debate", (Autumn 
1986); Law Centres Federation, "Response to the Legal Aid Scrutiny 
Report", (1986); London Advice Services Alliance, "Response to the 
Report of the Legal Aid Efficiency Scrutiny", (Undated, presumably 
1986); National Consumer Council, "The Reform of Publicly Funded 
Legal Services in England and Wales", (1986); North Eastern Legal 
Services Committee, "Submissions on the Scrutiny Report Prepared 
for the Lord Chancellor's Department", (Undated, presumably 1986); 
and Sunderland Advice Workers Group." "Response to the Legal Aid 
Efficiency Scrutiny Report," (1986}. 
107) Op.cit., note (1), para.23. 
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flexible and responsive service from the agency offering 
the advice, and other agencies ~ay not be able to offer 
such a flexible service; there may be unwillingness to 
take cases on referal after initial work has already been 
undertaken on them; and there may also be the possibility 
of conflicts of interest with one agency representing both 
parties to a dispute. vvhat these factors have in common 
is their general nature, but when we look at those factors 
which were the crux of the proposal to abolish the green 
form scheme we can see that they a r e not relevant to the 
current proposals. There will be no second tier bureauc-
racy in the form of compulsory attendance at an advice 
agency before referal to a solicitor, and therefore there 
will not necessarily be disjointed case development with 
clients being passed from one agency or solicitor to 
another. Advice agencies will retain their independence 
and local character rather than becoming pseudo-government 
agencies. There will be no need for extensive retraining 
of advice centre workers to cope with their new role. 
People with multiple proble~s should not be passed from 
agency to another (lOS). Th '11 b . t one ere Wl e no requlremen 
for people contacting solicitors direct to pay a £10 fee. 
Contracts will only cover the areas of work that are applied 
for and therefore the problem of defining the boundary of 
work suitable for lawyers and that suitable for advice 
workers should not arise. All advice agencies will not 
have to cope with an enormous enforced increase in work-
load, for those who require alternative remedies, e.g., 
108) HCB 182, s 8 (5). 
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through collective action, that should still be avail-
able. Therefore it wculd be inappropriate to look at 
the responses to the Efficiency Scrutiny in relation to 
the proposals we are dealing with. 
The seccnd factor vJhich should be noted is that 
uhe timescale and progress of the Act has meant that 
co~ment on it has tended to be of a journalistic rather 
than analytical nature. Some agencies have concentrated 
their efforts on attempting to secure changes by Parlia-
mentary briefing and lobbying rather than attempting to 
publish their analyses to generate debate on the pro-
posals. It is because of these factors that the problems 
forseen by commentators will be dealt with relatively 
briefly. 
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(l) Independence of the Board. The independence and stature 
of the Board have rightly been noted as fundamental to 
obtaining the trust of both the legal profession and 
its clients for the work it will do. (log) 
Even before the White Paper was produced fears 
that the Board would not play as independent a role as the 
Law Society had done were felt by commentators. (llO) 
This resulted in some attempts to influence the Lord 
Chancellor's decision as to the make up of the Board by 
suggesting that a wide range of agencies should have 
nomination rights to the Board, (lll) but this suggestion 
was not recognised in the Act. The publication of the 
Bill also brought some confirmation of the intended 
position of the Board, and this brought its independence 
further into question. The control of appointments, 
lawyers remuneration and the contracting power of the 
Lord Chancellor rather than the Board were all noted, as 
was the relative inability of the Board to incur expen-
diture unauthorised by the Lord Chancellor. The Law 
Society itself commentated that the Board's independence 
must be at risk when such a variety of powers were held 
by the Lord Chancellor(ll 2 ). This feeling was rein-
forced by the qualified statements of the Board's indepen-
dence which the Lord Chancellor made, (llJ), and his 
decision to keep his Advisory Committee which was seen as 
109) Anon, Editorial, "The Bill, the Board and Opren", (April 1988), 
Legal Action 3. 
110) Anon, Editorial, "Focus for Action", (March 1987), Legal Action 3. 
lll) Jl..non, "A New Framework", (May 1987), Legal Action 4; Anon, Edit-
orial, "The Legal Aid Board", (June 1987), Legal Action 3. 
112) All noted in Smith, R., and Arnott, H., "The Legal Aid Bill", 
January 1988), Legal Action 6. 
113) Ibid., and Smith, R., "Legal Aid's New Guardian", (April 1988) 
Legal Action 6. 
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a sign that the Board would not be taking over its 
. d d t d . •t• (114} 1n epen en a v1sory pos1 1on. · 
The combination of these factors has lead to a 
seerr.ing resignation at least in certain circles that the 
question of the Board's independence is "purely academic" 
because o£ the amount of power held by the Lord Chan-
cellor. (llS) It is in this final analysis that it is 
possible to take issue with the conclusion. It is 
certainly correct in the earlier analysis to recognise 
the substantial powers which we have seen that the Lord 
Chancellor will hold in relation to the Board, but it does 
not logically follow that the Board will not be indepen-
dent. (Although the ability of Board to remain indepen-
dent in the light of a long term diversence of interest 
from the Lord Chancellor must be in question) . 
If we look at the perspective of the Scottish 
Board we see that it does not regard itself as a "tool 
of Government", and its Chairman does not see its pur-
pose as being to i~plement cuts in legal aid expendi-
t (116) ure. The Legal Action Group (LAG) conference paper 
contained an important analysis of the perspective which 
they proposed the Board should take, and each member of 
the Board has been presented with a copy of this. (llB) 
Combining this with the background of the newly appointed 
114) Smith, R., Ibid. 
115) Cape, E., "Legal Aid Proposals :A Practitioners Opinion," 
(May 1988) Legal Action 6. 
116) Grosskurth, A., "LAG Conference", (May 1988), Legal Action 7. 
117) Op.cit., note (15). 
118) Op.cit., note (114). 
( 117) 
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Board members, (llg) who include two former members of the 
LAG management comrr,ittee, two solicitors with signifi-
cant experience of, and corrmitment to legal aid work, and 
one barrister of similar experience, it would be unwise 
to underestimate the independence and perspective which 
the Board may seek to bring to bear on its broadly 
defined role in the Act. It will only be when the 
Board has taken control of legal aid that we shall see 
how much of a free hand the Lord Chancellor intends to give 
it, but assuming he does not intend to rule it with a rod 
of iron the Board could take a positive and independent 
view of legal aid and its administration. 
119) Anon, Editorial, "Directing the Management", and Anon, "Manage-
ment at the Helm", both (June 1988) Legal Action 3 and 4 respec-
tively. 
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(2) The Board's Role and Purpose. We have looked in some 
depth at what the Act could mean practically in terms of 
the work of the Board, and at the possible intentions 
which the Lord Chancellor may have with regard to the 
Board's role as shown in the White Paper. This theme has 
also been one of the major areas of concern expressed by 
corr.mentators. 
There have been two particular areas of discussion, 
the first has been cost cutting. The introduction of the 
idea of a Board to replace the Law Society in the Efficiency 
Scrutiny report was immediately picked upon as a sign that 
the Lord Chancellor intended to place tighter constraints 
on legal aid finances, (l2 0) and in some cases lead to 
strongly worded rejections of the proposal being made to 
the Lord Chancellor. (l2 l) Several areas of possible cuts 
or savings by the Lord Chancellor have received comment 
including the reduced scope of green form, (122 ) and the 
changed approach to remuneration of lawyers, (123 ) but 
perhaps the most important comment has related to the 
effect of the proposal that contributions to civil legal 
aid should continue throughout a case. (124 ) This is 
noted as changing the fundamental principle behind contri-
butions for civil legal aid. Contributions will no longer 
be finite and fixed before the start of a case, and the 
result of this, it is claimed, could be as drastic as the 
120) Godden, G., "Two Advisers Give a Personal View", (September,l986) 
Legal Action 4. 
121} See Law Centres Federation (p.30), and North Eastern Legal 
Services Committee (pages not numbered, fifth sheet of report), 
op.cit., note (106}. 
122} Smith, R., "Scrutinising the Scrutiny", (October 1986) Legal 
Action 4. 
123) Anon, "Lawyers Fear for Future of Legal Aid", (1987) 131 
Solicitors Journal 1636. 
124) Anon, Editorial,"Reviving the Poor Persons Procedure", (May 1987) 
Legal Action 3. 
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collapse of the system of contributory legal aid through 
disuse. This would be a very serious result, and although 
in reality it may not ultimately lead to the collapse of 
the legal aid contribution scheme it is likely to have a 
considerable and widespread result, particularly bearing 
in mind that more people will probably be liable to pay 
contributions as a result of the likely abolition of 
discretionary allowances. (125 ) 
The second area where discussion has focussed has 
been on eligibility levels, and whether the Lord Chan-
cellor intends to reduce these. There has been some con-
fusion with Smith and Arnott feeling that the Bill gave 
no clues as to whether cuts were intended. (126 ) Although 
this may be the case, we have seen that the Lord Chan-
cellar's intentions as expressed in the White Paper give 
very clear signs that eligibility levels will fall in 
real terms in the i~ediate future. (127 ) This question has 
stimulated perhaps two of the most important articles 
relating to the effects of the Act. Glasser has shown 
that there has been a massive drop in eligibility for 
legal aid between 1979 and 1986 and that this has not 
been improved to date. This fall has been largely dis-
guised by selective redefinition of the concepts by which 
eligibility is measured, namely in terms of population or 
household groups. We are now in a situation where Glasser 
125) See text to note (86). 
126) Op.cit., note (112). 
12 7) Text to notes (1021 to (lOS) . 
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estimates that just over 50% of the population are en-
titled to legal aid. (128 ) He sees this decline as irre-
versible and likely to cut off a substantial part of the 
population from access to the courts and the legal pro-
cess. (129 ) These are significant findings considering 
that the White Paper itself suggested that eligibility 
was still as high as 70%, (l 30) although this figure 
related to the number of households covered rather than 
the total population covered, which one would expect to 
be considerably less. 
Both the areas where we have seen disucssion of the 
proposals in the White Paper and Act have given cause 
for concern that the Board's purpose may be being mapped 
out in terms of at least restraint and possibility cuts 
in legal aid. The response to these possibilities has 
been positive. LAG in particular have stressed the 
importance of public debate as a means of influencing 
the Board's agenda, (l 3 l) calling for a clear policy 
framework(lJ 2 ) based on strong administration and a 
broad research and monitoring role. (133 ) Glasser too has 
looked into influencing the priorities of the Board 
suggesting reducing bureaucracy, creating more flexible 
financial conditions, concentrating legal aid work among 
fewer outlets, and again a research and planning role( 134 ) 
128) Glasser, C., "Legal Aid Eligibility", (9 March 1988) Law 
Society's Gazette 11, at 12. 
129) Glasser, C., "Financing Legal Services", (20 April 1988) Law 
Society's Gazette 11, at 14. 
130) Text to note (102). 
131) Op.cit., note (114). 
132) Op.cit., note (119} . 
133) 0,!2.Cit. 1 note (114). 
134) Op.cit., note (128}. 
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for the Board, though noting warily that continued control 
(13 5) 
rests firmly with the Lord Chancellor · . The most 
i~portant document has certainly been the above mentioned 
LAG submission to the Board, reproduced in its conference 
papers. The paper attempts a clear definition of the 
Board's purpose with reference to the Bill, White Paper, 
Efficiency Scrutiny, and comments of the Lord Chancellor 
in relevant House of Lords debates. This definition 
stresses the broadest role which the Board could be inter-
preted as having, noting management as only one segment 
of a more rounded role which should include a corrmitment 
to the provision of adequate services,research and 
development cocbined with monitoring and evaluation of 
both adffiinistration and services, a co-ordinating function 
for both legal and broader advice services, and a ques-
tioning attitude to its administrative structure. 
The thought behind this action must be seen as 
logical. We have seen that the Lord Chancellor has 
sufficient powers to control the Board's actions to a 
large extent, and that his intentions for the Board's 
role may include cost cutting and decreasing eligibility 
levels for legal aid. Therefore the only unknown factor 
is the a~enability of the Board to the Lord Chancellor's 
perspective, and given the difficult circumstances there 
seems to be most chance of positive results in attempting 
to win the Board IP.embers over to these alternative pers-
pectives. We have seen above, with regard to the c;:uestion 
135) Ibid., and oo.cit. note (129) 
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of the Board's independence, that there are likely to be 
members sympathetic to the LAG perspective. Therefore, 
it seems logical to attempt to maximise the value of this 
influence over the Board's perspective before the Lord 
Chancellor exercises his influence in delimiting the way 
the Board can think and act. 
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(3) Contracting Out Advice and Assistance. We have seen that 
the Lord Chancellor is keen to contract out advice and 
assistance in some areas of work from the green form 
scheme(136 ). Commentators on this have never doubted 
that the powers relating to contracting will be used, 
which seems a reasonable conclusion given the vie~Toint 
expressed in the White Paper. Discussion on contracting 
has centred around two issues, firstly what the form which 
contracts will take, and secondly the problems which are 
seen as inherent in any form of contract. We shall look 
at these in turn. 
(a) Contract Models:- We noted earlier that the Bill 
is cast in very general terms and gives no positive indi-
cations as to the form a contract may take, and although 
the White Paper does provide some clues it does not pro-
vide a comprehensive form which a contract might take. It 
is because of this that there has been speculation among 
cornmentators as to how and with whom contracts will be 
made. There have been several suggestions encompassing 
both the suspected intentions of the Lord Chancellor and 
the preferred options of individual cowmentators or groups. 
(i) White Paper Model:-( 137 ) This refers to a system 
involving agencies tendering for a specific area of work, 
welfare benefits advice being noted in the White Paper, 
over a specific geographical area, with the area of one of 
the Board's Area Offices being suggested. These areas of 
136) Text to notes (_92) to (_97). 
137) Op;cit., note (1), para. 26. 
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work would thereafter be excluded from the green form 
scheme so that no other solicitor or agency in that geo-
graphical area would be paid for advice or assistance 
given which related to that particular area of work. 
There are two riders to this description. Firstly that 
the form of coverage could vary from one area to another, 
and secondly that the Government would have to be satis-
fied that all areas of the country were fully provided 
for in all types of work. The Lord Chancellor himself 
has stressed his support for this flexible approach 
"I think the power of the Legal Aid Board to 
contract out this sort of advice should be 
preserved in fairly general terms, so that 
the particular agencies available in each 
locality could be considered. (138) 
(ii) Conditional Tendering:- This model reflects 
a response to the White Paper model based on the assump-
tion that tendering will be. implerrented and therefore 
the only influence an agency can have is to try to impose 
their own conditions on the contract. This has basically 
been where the National Association of Citizens Advice 
Bureaux (NACAB) have expressed their interest, and because 
of that, where there has been most discussion. 
Smith in his response to the White Paper, (l 39 ) 
recognising the likelihood of money being taken from the 
legal aid budget immediately set a number of priority 
points. These were relatively general concerns regarding 
the need for continuing specialist advice, whether 
directly from solicitors or from support centres on a 
138} Thompson, P., "Lord Mackay talks to the Gazette", (24 February 
1988) Law Society's Gazette 10. 
139) Smith, R., "Warring Over 'ltl:elfare", (May 1987) Legal Action 5. 
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national basis; continuing incentives for solicitors to 
do social security work; and a period of experiro.entation 
with new ideas before full implementation was considered. 
These ideas were refined when Blake and Beale suggested a 
particular system which was to become the unofficial basis 
(140) 
of the NACAB model tender. They took on board the 
ideas that the policy should be a national co-ordinated 
approach, and that the money should go towards specialist 
rather than generalist advice. Additionally they suggested 
that the money should be for a maximum number of clients 
(reflecting the number who would have received green form 
advice) with extra funding over and above that number; they 
noted the importance of preserving the established indepen-
dence of the CABx network and therefore rejected means 
testing as having a detrimental affect on their image; 
and they recognised the need to placate the legal pro-
fession so as to sustain relations with them. 
The Blake and Beale scheme would provide no extra 
money for individual bureaux, infact all the money would 
be used to set up regional support units for both social 
security and housing work. These units would provide 
specialist advice and casework for difficult or test 
cases, as well as a training role for bureaux in their 
area. 
The response to the proposals has been mixed and 
NACAB itself has been split even at the most senior levels 
as to the viability of the proposals. Local feeling among 
140} Blake 1 A. 1 and Beale 1 D., "Dear Bureau Manager" 1 :!December 1987) 1 
Legal Action 6. 
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CABx in the North East of England has basically been behind 
that expressed by the Chair of NACAB, Sir Kenneth Clucas. 
He has stressed on separate occasions that the general 
advice service which CABx see as their basic function is 
seriously underfunded and is facing a continually increasing 
level of demand, (l 4 l) and certainly in the short term 
NACAB could give no commitment to becoming involved in 
(142) 
such a scheme. In the longer term he has stated that 
he is pessimistic about the ability of NACAB to become 
involved in a specialist service, describing the likli-
hood of such a scheme as "remote". (143 ) This can be 
contrasted to what Elizabeth Filkin NACAB Chief Executive 
Office has said. Expressing particular interest in wel-
fare rights advice on the basis of the Blake and Beale 
proposals she has said that even on current funding levels 
she feels that a better service to clients is possible. 
While paying lip service to general CABx fears she has 
said that there was no evidence to support them, and with 
an eye to the future did not rule out the possibility of 
tendering for green form work. ( 14 4) 
Commentators have taken up the points made by Clucas. 
In particular Cape has claimed that CABx workers would 
be unlikely to have the time or level of expertise necessary, 
while the CABx themselves would not have the worker resources 
141) Clucas, K., Open Letter to the Lord Chancellor, (23 December 1987) . 
142) Ibid. 
143) Clucas, K., Untitled Report, 22 January 1988}, The House Magazine 10. 
144) Filkin, E., Speaking to the LAG Conference on the Legal Aid Board, 
(26 March 1988}; and also see Grosskurth, A., "LAG Conference", 
(May 1988), Legal Action 7. 
175 
to take over even currently operating schemes. This would 
all be combined in the case of housing problems with the 
difficulty in creating a necessary strategy in the 
approach. (145 1 Therefore conditional tendering while not 
proving to be universally unpopular is still regarded, 
even by those most closely associated with it as having 
inherent problems, which some regard as likely to pro-
duce a worse rather than better system than the present 
one because of the failure to overcome the basic problem 
of a lack of adequate resources. (146 ) 
(iii) Franchising or Bulk Funding:- Although 
cowmonly called "franchising" it has been pointed out that 
such a definition does not emphasise the non-exclusivity 
of the contracts involved, and therefore bulk or block 
f d . ld b . t bl d . t. (1 4 7 ) N un lng wou e more sul a e escrlp lOns. on-
exclusivity of the contracts in this model are its most 
important feature, although the degree of non-exclusivity 
is regarded differently by different commentators, with 
LAG suggesting that no firm should be excluded from the 
scheme, (l 4S) but Bridges suggesting that to be entitled to 
a contract a firm or agency would have to prove its corn-
mitment to that work by undertaking a minimum amount of 
( 14 9) that type of work. The idea behind this model is that 
any firm or agency could enter into a contract with the 
145) Cape, E., "Legal Aid Proposals : A Practitioner's Opinion", 
(May 1988) Legal Action 6. 
146) Ibid. 
147) Bridges, L., "Legal Aid : A Plea for Realism", (February 1988), 
Legal Action 8. 
148) Anon, "Franchising Legal Aid", (January 1988) Legal Action 5. 
149) Op.cit., note (_147). 
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Board to provide particular services with conditions 
attached as to the quality of the service. LAG have said 
that the emphasis should be moved away from the idea of 
( 150) the lowest tender getting a contract, but Cape has 
quite correctly noted that there is no evidence from other 
social service areas which have had contracting of any 
sort that this would be the case. (l 5l) 
This system is perhaps the most flexible since it 
covers any type of work, not just green form, and it is 
tied up with such ideas as payments on account and fixed 
fees( 152 ) which the Lord Chancellor has shown himself in 
favour of. The possible problems with it are that although 
leading to some administrative simplification it is not 
directly in line with the Lord Chancellor's proposed 
scheme and therefore it might not be seen to be achieving 
what the Lord Chancellor sees as his priorities. Particu-
larly the liklihood of any resultant savings in expen-
diture are remote given the needs for quality control of 
services, a factor which could be cruciaL( 153 ) 
(iv) Improving Green Form:- Although in reality 
this is rather an anti-contract model and therefore perhaps 
least likely to have any effect it has received some 
support. Bridges(154 ) particularly has suggested that 
savings in green form could be made by reducing the cost 
150) o.e. cit., note (148) . 
151} Op.cit. 1 note (145) . 
152) See text to notes (100) - (lOll . 
153) Op.cit. 1 note (l45l 
154) Op.cit., note (147} . 
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to the legal aid fund of the first half-hours advice. In 
some cases this half-hour could be used as a cut off point 
for advice such as benefit determination. Savings will 
be made by solicitors either working at this intially 
reduced rate, or working at the full rate from the 
beginnins of a case if the client had had an initial diag-
nostic interview with a CAB. The full rate charged would 
include a fixed fee to be paid direct to the relevant CAB. 
LAG have also shown some interest in this area, suggesting 
that perhaps there could be stricter rules relating to the 
l l t f d . . (155) ega componen o a v1ce g1ven. 
(b) Contracting's Inherent Problems:- Contracting 
has been seen not only in terms of the form it rright take 
but also in the problems it might bring. These points 
have not been used in a coherent attempt to change the 
Lord Chancellor's view on contracting, rather they have 
emerged as examples of the possible injustices of such a 
scheme. 
There has been some discussion about the number of 
outlets for advice under a contracting system. (156 ) 
Solicitors point to the legal aid figure and say that they 
provide 9000 outlets for legal aid and that a contract 
system would severely diminish client access to justice. 
In reality considerably fewer firms provide advice on 
155) Anon, Editorial, "Open to Tender", (November 1987) ,Legal Action 3. 
156) Meredith, E. , "Two Advisers Give a Personal View", (September 
19861, Legal Action 5; and Blake and Beale, op.cit., note (140). 
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social security matters, and even fewer could profess 
expertise in that area. The problem is that no one knows 
how client access will really be affected, taking account 
of limited lawyer expertise, yet one would expect this 
question to become central when the Lord Chancellor 
looks to see whether contracting would provide adequate 
coverage of an area as he said he would in the White 
Paper. (157 ) 
The wultiple problem case has also raised concern, 
in that commentators fear that a client will not be able 
to receive advice and assistance on more than one problem 
if one of these relates to an area for which a contract 
exists. The client may not be able to ask the solicitor 
or agency to give advice on for example a social security 
problem if their solicitor does not hold the contract for 
that work. ( 158 ) The validity of the points made has had 
some effect in this case with s8(5) of the Act stating 
that where a client is already receiving legal aid for 
representation they can obtain advice and assistance "in 
connection with" those proceedings without reference to 
changes imposed by the Board under the Act. The Lord 
Chancellor has explained the purpose of this specific 
. ( 15 9) . th ,. d . . . d t l t . . polnt, saylng at ·a Vlce lDCl en a o or arlslng 
out of"a major matter being dealt with by a solicitor 
should also be given by that solicitor. The question of 
157) Op,cit., note (137}. 
158} See Anon, Editorial, op.cit., note (155); Cape, op.cit., note (145) 
Grosskurth, op.cit., note (1441; and Smith, op.cit., note (139). 
159} Op.cit., note (1381. 
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the fee for this work has not been looked at but legal 
profession would presumably not accept less than the green 
form rate, which could cause administrative difficulties 
for a system working on the basis of standard fees and 
payments on account since this additional work could not 
be foreseen when any case started. 
A contracting system which transferred work to 
advice agencies was initially seen as likely to disperse 
monies intended for legal advice into general advice pro-
vision, (l 60) and this could still be the case should advice 
agencies tender on a purely regional basis. In that case 
money would go directly to one agency who would simply 
expand their service of general advice to cope with the 
increased demand. It was in response to this possible 
problem that the idea of specialist local legal units was 
mooted, (l 6l) and on which Blake and Beale's Regional 
Support Units (RSUs) idea was based. (162 ) Blake and 
Beale noted that to divide the likely contract monies 
between all CABx would be to spread it too thinly, 
resulting in a failure to tackle the basic problems of 
increasing demand for services. They also feared that it 
might result in an equivalent decrease in funding from 
the local authorities. The RSUs change the emphasis of 
the funding increase to new support services and inevitably 
this is largely in the form of specialist assistance to the 
160) Op.cit., note (139}. 
161} Op.cit. 1 note (155}. 
162) OJ?ocit. 1 note (140} • 
180 
generalist front-line agencies. We can assume then that 
if NACAB were to tender on the Blake and Beale con-
ditions then specialist advice would still be available, 
but should advice agencies individually tender and gain 
contracts then it seerrs likely that the specialist advice 
currently provided by solicitors would no longer be 
available to the consumer. 
Therefore although there is some reassurance with 
regard to the fears for the multiple problem client, the 
crucial questions of the access to advice outlets and the 
continuing availability of specialist legal advice are 
left largely unanswered, despite their fundamental 
bearing on the provision of advice in whatever form. 
(c) The Response to the Contracting Proposals:- The 
response in the North East of England was put into motion 
by a conference organised jointly by the Advice Services 
Alliance (ASA), and NACAB. The attendance at this meeting 
was broadranging with independent advice centres, CABx and 
local authority welfare rights representatives making up 
the bulk of the numbers but many other more varied agen-
cies were also represented. There were representatives 
from legally orientated groups such as North Eastern Legal 
Ser vices Committee (NELSC), and North Eastern Legal Action 
Group (NELAG) , but also representatives of organisations 
such as the probation service, the community relations 
council, as well as academics. No private practitioners 
attended in their own right, although the representatives 
from NELAG may have been solicitors in that field. 
Perhaps because of the make up of the attendance 
there was a considerable amount of agreement about the 
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approach to the Act, which resulted in the formulation of 
a strongly worded resolution which was agreed upon by a 
sizeable majority of the body. (163 1 This resolution 
rejected totally the concept of competitive tendering 
for advice and legal services. Action was recognised as 
being necessary and a standing committee of all groups 
representing providers and consumers of legal and advice 
services was called for. The resolution gave the standing 
committee specific aims. The first was to formulate and 
promote opposition to the Bill, and the second was to 
initiate the production of a development plan for advice 
and legal services in the North East. (164 ) 
The standing committee did not meet until the formu-
lation and implementation of a policy of opposition to the 
Bill was not a feasible aim, (l 6S) and the focus of the 
committee was therefore changed to the production of a 
development plan for the region, and to an attempt to 
create a suitable umbrella agency, such as a North 
Eastern ASA, to give the standing committee a more 
permanent basis. These projects are both in progress. 
It is worth noting that the regional development plan is 
viewed by the independent advice sector as the alternative 
to a method of development dictated by contracting. It 
has been noted that a united advice sector could "forget 
163) Minutes of Legal Aid Conference (23 March 1988). 
164) The idea of regional development plans is not new, their pur-
pose and form are described in the Law Centres Federation, 
"Response to the Legal Aid Scrutiny Report", (19861 7; and 
London Advice Services Alliance, "Response to the Report of 
the Legal Aid Efficiency Scrutiny", (Undated, presumed 1986}, 
Section 3. 
1651 7 July 1988. 
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tendering" and continue to do the work that is being 
done at present, with the regional development plans being 
offered as an alternative to legal aid. (166 } This approach 
would seem to fall into the block funding model of con-
tracts, an attempt to use the Board's contracting powers 
for non-competative development. As such the problems 
outlined with the block funding approach will apply to 
such plans, and in the North East these will be exacer-
bated. Despite the unity of the independent advice net-
work, and the disapproval of the local Law Society there 
is one firm of solicitors who are kno~n to be ready to 
tender for advice on welfare benefits. Should that firm 
obtain a contract then it would seem most unlikely that 
more money would be made available to the area for the 
development of advice services. Nevertheless the reg-
ional development plan is the most positive stance that 
could be taken by agencies which are strongly opposed to 
the principle of competative tendering, and in the long 
term these plans could at least be valuable tools in 
negotiating with local funders for improved advice and 
legal services. 
166) Kate Markus, Law Centres Federation Secretary, speaking at the 
North East Legal Aid Conference (23 March 1988) . 
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(4} Conclusion. The response of agencies to the Legal 
Aid Act 1988 shows signs of a recognition that the 
possibility of influencing the Lord Chancellor and 
Government's view of the requirements of legal aid is 
minimal and that the response must therefore be in the 
form of positive proposals to the Legal Aid Board itself. 
Whatever the powers of the Lord Chancellor the 
possibility that the Board will have an independent stand-
point is very real, and this must bode well for legal 
services provision. The intended form of the Board may 
not be that which agencies may have hoped for, and its 
agenda has been recognised as possibly involving cost 
cutting and decreasing eligibility for legal aid. The 
decision, particularly by LAG, to attempt to take the 
initiative in setting the Board's agenda, and hopefully-
pre-empting the Lord Chancellor must be seen as impor-
tant. This move shows the recognition that the Board 
could give a valuable mouthpiece to consumers and 
producers of legal services, and that from now on they 
will probably have to work through it. 
The response to the proposals on contracting out 
advice and assistance from the green form scheme has been 
a diverse one. There has been a mixture of confusion as 
to what the proposals could entail, and objection to the 
perceived principles on which the proposals are based. 
While some commentators have felt that contracting is 
inevitable and therefore the best deal must be struck, 
others including the advice sector in the North East have 
refused to become involved even in the discussion of 
competitive tendering. Again the response has ended 
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reasonably positively with agencies in the North East 
attempting to formulate their own ideas as to how advice 
and legal services should be provided in the area. As 
with the LAG proposals these too mark a recognition that 
the Legal Aid Board will in future be the single most 
important agency administering and providing advice, 
assistance and representation, and as such it must be 
approached positively, not simply rejected. 
It is recognised that the Legal Aid Act has made 
changes to the technical operation of the Legal Aid 
scheme. However the main thrust of the changes were 
not directed towards solving the technical problems 
noted in Part l. The bureaucracy of the scheme will not 
be reformed. The scheme will continue to emphasise the 
individual problems of each poor client and ignore their 
collective poverty, which is often the cause of those 
problems. The Legal Aid scheme itself may cover less 
areas of work and fewer people, while it has been shown 
that many of the most relevant areas of law for the poor 
clients already fall outside the scope of the pre-Act 
scheme. Means-testing will remain, and therefore con-
tinue to conflict with the clients' interests. An 
essentially financial frame of reference has been imposed 
on the reform of the scheme, and as a result the Act has 
created new and possibly worse technical problems, while 
failing to deal with those already noted. 
However, the problems of what the Legal Aid Act 
could do to the existing scheme should not divert atten-
tion from the still pressing structural problems from 
which the Legal Aid scheme suffers, and which the Act 
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failed to deal with. The Act failed to address the 
issue of the fundamentally social rather than legal 
nature of the problems of the poor clientele which the 
scheme is meant to assist. No proposals have been made 
which aim to improve the often negative attitudes of both 
lawyers and clients to legal aid work. The failure of 
private practice to provide the appropriate services, in 
the proper locations, for those to whom the legal aid 
scheme is targetted i.e., the poor, as witnessed by the 
role played by law centres, citizens advice bureaux, local 
government welfare rights departments, and (as we have 
particularly seen) independent advice agencies, has only 
been recognised to a limited extent. The proposals to 
contract out advice provision to these agencies could 
result in forced changes in the nature of those agencies 
who do tender for the work, rather than making use of 
the proven popularity of the current form of those 
services. Also contracting could result in competition 
for funding, with adverse results for the level of 
funding for advice services as a whole. By failing to 
solve the structural problems of the Legal Aid scheme, 
while imposing financial solutions to technical problems, 
the Legal Aid Act may result in a far greater waste of 
resources in terms of the true purpose of legal aid, to 
provide legal services for poor people. 
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APPENDIX A 
Methodological issues relating to the number of solicitors 
and offices in the North East of England. 
The methodology used was basically that used by 
Foster. (l) The Law List is now contained in the Solici-
tors' and Barristers' Directory and Diary Volume 2, 
1987 (being the most up to date copy available at that 
time) . Section 4 of the Directory includes a geogra-
phical list of solicitors, a geographical breakdown of 
all solicitors principal and branch offices by town. 
Each entry included the names of partners, assistant 
solicitors and consultants, noted at the office at 
which they were present. All solicitors not in private 
practice e.g., those in other advice services, public 
authorities or industry, were listed separately, as were 
those who had retired. They were therefore easily dis-
tinguishable from private practitioners. Those solic-
itors noted as attending at an office but who did not have 
a practising certificate were included in the figures. 
This was because the Directory made it clear that this 
was simply the situation at 31.12.86, and those solici-
tors may well have applied or had a certificate granted 
since that date. Also, since the number was exceptionally 
small, it seemed sensible to err on the side of generosity. 
l) Foster 1 K. 1 "The Location of Solicitors" 1 (1973) 36 N\.L.R. 153. 
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Consultants were not counted as solicitors present since 
by their nature they do not tend to be full-time members 
of staff. 
Certain problems and possible mistakes arose in 
relation to the information in the Directory. No pro-
vision was made for distinguishing between full and part-
time members of the staff at any particular office. This 
IT.eant that, particularly at branch offices, if solicitors 
were only present for part of the working week, then they 
would be marked as being there full-time, and double 
counted at the principal office. Alternatively they 
would not be counted at the branch office but only at the 
principal office, thereby reducing the ratio of solici-
tors to head of population in the branch office areas. 
These errors would be impossible to correct without 
personal contact with all firms, which was impossible 
within the bounds of this work. Therefore all entries 
were counted as stated in the Directory in the hope that 
the opposite approaches might cancel each other out. 
Double counting could also have been possible where 
firms failed to provide up-to-date information of the 
number of solicitors and their status within the practice. 
For example when partners had moved into their own prac-
tices, but their previous practice still listed them as 
current partners. Again without re-researching the 
Directory, perfect information could not be obtained. 
Corrections were made in the limited cases when personal 
knowledge of the situation was available. Similarly some 
towns were incorrectly noted in a particular county or 
district council area. Corrections were again made 
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wherever possible. 
Undercounting of offices was also possible. This 
was because of the failure in the Directory to properly 
cross reference every branch office which should have been 
noted under the principal office of a firm. This meant 
that no information on that branch office was available 
since it was only feasible to count those offices noted 
distinctly. 
Foster also noted the difficulty in editing the 
law list (Directory). He suggested that this could 
account for further omissions andinaccuracies.( 2 ) 
All information relating to legal aid solicitors 
and offices is from the Solicitors' Regional Directory 
1987. (J) Possible problems with counting could arise 
here because of solicitors have to make their o~~ 
returns of information. This may account for the small 
disparity between numbers of offices noted here, and in 
the Directory. Some solicitors provided no information 
about the work of the members of their practice. Although 
they may have stated that their firm would undertake 
legal aid work it is impossible to tell how many of their 
solicitors would actually be involved in that work. This 
may have lead to some undercounting of the number of 
solicitors offering to do legal aid work. 
County and district population figures are from the 
Municipal Yearbook Vol.2, 1988. (4 ) For to~m and parish 
populations the Census 1981, Index of Place Names, England 
and Wales, (Sl was used. Urban areas, urban area sub-
2) See (1971) 115 Solie. J. 547. 
3) Published by the Law Society. 
4) Edited by W.A.C.Roope. 
Sl By the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (published 1985). 
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divisions, and parish populations, were all noted but 
some towns were noted only as localities. These have no 
legally defined boundary and so it was impossible to 
produce any population figures for them. (6 ) 
6) Ibid., Explanatory Notes p.V. 
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APPENDIX B 
The compilation of data on advice agencies in the North 
East of England. 
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A. Introduction 
l. Research Objectives. 
When a member of the public needs advice to solve a 
problem there are only a limited number of ways of ob-
taining it. Their choice will be further limited by their 
knowledge or preconceptions about the agencies offering 
advice. Some advice providers have a very definite image 
in the public eye. Solicitors are seen as dealing with 
very specific legal problems, (l) and many people would 
not use them without having first exhausted every other 
possible way of solving their problem. (2 ) Law centres 
have attempted to respond to the local needs of the com-
munity which involves some projection of an image, defined 
by the type of work they will undertake. (3 ) Citizens 
Advice Bureaux (CABx) project their generalist first port 
of call advice role which results in a broad cross-
section of general advice being given, (4 ) their position 
is well publicised. However it was recognised that there 
were a substantial number of other independent agencies 
offering advice in one form or other on many topics of whom 
little was known. (S) 
The purpose of this research was to compile a data-
base of these advice agencies so that the services they 
provided, where and to whom could begin to be assessed. 
l) See usage figures for legal aid, Lord Chancellor's Department, 
(37th Annual Reports of the Law Society and Lord Chancellor's 
Advisory Committee, 1986-87", (1987) p.47 onwards. 
2) Curran, B.A., "The Legal Needs of the Public," (1977) p.228. 
3) Law Centres Working Group, "Towards Equal Justice," (1974). 
para. 3.12. 
4) N.A.C.A.B. "Annual Report 1986-87", (1987), p.32. 
5-6) When the author attempted to obtain information from the (FIAC) 
Federation of Independent Advice Centres database, he was told 
that he could only do so at a cost of £15, nor was the information 
available in local libraries. 
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It was recognised that the level of lack of information 
was large, basic information such as a list of addresses 
of agencies did not exist, and therefore within the time 
limits inherent in this work only the most basic informa-
tion could be collected. Certain factors obviously pro-
jected themselves as being of importance, a list of 
addresses of relevant agencies, their opening hours, the 
type of advice offered and their ability to give that 
advice. Collection and analysis of this information 
would be of importance in establishing the role played by 
these advice agencies in providing advice and legal ser-
vices to the public, and in comparison to the role of 
lawyers. 
2. The legacy of Prior Research. 
It has been one of the stated aims of the Legal 
Services Committees to identify legal needs( 7 ) and this 
has necessarily involved research into advice agencies. 
The wost fruitful work has been undertaken by the North 
Western Legal Services Committee (N.W.L.S.C.) in the 
production of its directories of local advice agencies. (S) 
These were also to have been used as a database for analy-
sis of the quality of services and then as the basis of 
suggestions for supplementation and improvement of ser-
vices, but to date have remained only in the form of the 
directories. 
7} North Eastern Legal Services Committee Steering Committee Adminis-
trative Group, "Legal Services in the North : Report of the Adminis-
trative Group", Cl982},Unpublished Paper. 
8) Smith,R., "From Manchester to the Lakes : the N.V.l.L.S.C., " 
(October,l987} Legal Action 6. 
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The North Eastern Legal Services Coromittee (N.E.L.S.C.) 
in its attempt to clarify a useful purpose for itself 
undertook a broad ranging survey of "those people involved 
either directly or indirectly in the provision of legal 
services or who by their contact with the public could 
or might be expected to be aware of any claim by any 
member of the public of some deficiency or unavailability 
of any particular legal service". (lO) This was obviously 
a considerably broader survey than was intended for the 
purpose of this work, but the N.E.L.S.C. work provided 
separate analysis of responses from voluntary groups in 
the North East which covered a very similar cross-section 
of groups and organisations to the one which was to be dealt 
with. (ll} The questionnaire which the N. E. L. S.C. used 
contained a considerable number of questions which attempted 
to clarify regional knowledge of unmet legal needs, improve-
ments which the agencies thought could be made, and inno-
vations which they had been unable to implement because 
of lack of funding. The results from these questions 
were perhaps predictably disparate making conclusions 
hard to draw and resulting in some cases in simple listing 
of responses. Although the Administrative group did not 
hesitate to recommend the formation of a legal services 
committee the basis for this must be somewhat suspect 
as their conclusions were, as they said, "inevitable"(l 2 ) 
10) Op.cit., note (7}. 
ll) Although there was a heavy emphasis on Community Associations in 
the Stockton area which I felt would not produce useful returns 
since trial questionnaires were returned as inapproproate to such 
organisations. There were also some anomalies which I attempted 
to avoid, e.g., the Cleveland Playing Fields Association. 
12) Op,cit., note (7) Report pages were not numbered, this informa-
tion on the third page. 
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and reflect rather an acknowledgement of there being a 
variety of problems, rather than a aecision that the 
establishment of such a committee would be the best means 
to deal with them. 
Despite the fact that the questionnaire was, as 
described by one member of the Administrative Group, 
"extremely unstructured"(lJ} and the lack of any clear 
roethod in definition of groups to whom the question-
naire should be sent, (l 4 } it did produce some results of 
interest, although the report, rather like the question-
naire lacked any cohesive structure or method. These 
results related to catchment areas, work undertaken, size 
and age of the groups, and will be used later in compara-
tive form. The greatest failing was the lack of any 
significant analysis of the data particularly in rela-
tion to the differences of the nature of the agencies, it 
is not satisfactory simply to categorise all agencies as 
advice agencies when their range is considerable, for 
example, surely the Child Poverty Action Group and 
Community Information and Computing Service can not simply 
be lumped together? Consequently no picture could be 
built up of what services were available and their 
quantity, quality, applicability or distribution. 
3. Coverage of Research. 
It was learned from the failure of the N.E.L.S.C. 
work to define its aims clearly that to fail to do so 
could result in the generation of data that although 
13) Interview with Anne Galbraith at Newcastle Polytechnic, 24th Nov.l987. 
14) Described by Anne Galbraith as"anyone", ibid. 
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interesting could serve little purpose other than as a 
highlight of one aspect of the whole structure, and if 
that broader whole is to be brought into perspective it 
is essential to begin with a clear scheme or plan. This 
research had six broad objectives. 
(i} Nature of Agencies from the data generated 
to attempt to formulate the salient features of each 
agency into general categories of broad applicability. 
Cii} Distribution of Agencies to break down the 
responses by County to see whether there was any pattern 
of distribution in relation to the size of the county. 
Also to breakdown the responses within the counties to 
assess the distribution of the different types of 
agencies, and then to compare the breakdown to the 
other counties to see whether there was any pattern 
to the distribution. Finally to examine the geographical 
area covered by each agency, to assess its size and to ask 
whether this leads to any particular conclusions about 
the nature of the agency. 
(iii) Background of Agencies in order to obtain an 
idea of the relative age of the agencies and to see whether 
new agencies were being created. Also to question the 
stability of the agency with regard to the future, asking 
how long they could be certain that they would be a 
functioning establishment. 
(iv} Staffing of agencies here looking at the 
quantity and quality of staff, the size of the agencies 
staff resources, and the reliance on unpaid staff. Also 
again to compare the breakdo~m of staff between types of 
agency to see whether comparison revealed any pattern. 
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(v) Access to agencies the practicalities of 
how the public corre to receive advice, the how and when, 
and how those with special difficulties are assisted. 
(vi) Services provided by agencies the actual 
areas of advice and representation provided to the con-
sumer and the form which they can expect that to take. 
B. Methodology. 
l. Survey design and content. 
The design of the questionnaire was obviously an 
important factor since a badly designed questionnaire 
could result in the production of data which would be of 
little or no value. The emphasis in this case was on 
pure factual responses and the questionnaire therefore 
had to reflect this requirement, there was no room for 
the more open ended questions. This rr.eant that all the 
questions had to provide the relevant information to allow 
the respondent to answer by simply ticking an appro-
priate box. Although the broad plan of what information 
was to be collected was not explicitly stated it was 
obvious from the form of the questions. There was no 
scope for questions aimed at producing responses explicitly 
reflecting the attitudes of the agency, but it was hoped 
that this would be implicit in the responses to the 
questions establishing the sort of advice they wished to 
provide. In the light of Finman's work(lS) this may have 
15} Finrnan, T., "OEO Legal Service Programs and the Pursuit of Social 
Change : The Relationship Between Program Ideology and Program 
Performance", (1971} Wisconsin Law Review 1001. 
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been a mistake since an explicit statement might have 
shown more precisely the ideology behind the agency, 
which in turn might have made classification of 
agencies into general categories simpler. 
The format of the questionnaire was created with 
the assistance of former questionnaires of a similar 
nature. As stated above both N.W.L.S.C., and N.E.L.S.C., 
had undertaken research more or less similar to this work, 
and also the Law Centres Federation (L.C.F.} had recent 
work attempting to generate similar factual information. (l 6 ) 
Although these were useful in the question formation, 
their format was very different to that which was felt 
to be likely to produce the maximum response. 'I'he L.C.F. 
questionnaire totalled twenty-seven A4 pages while the 
N.W.L.S.C. covered eight A4 pages. The layout of the 
questionnaire used here was designed with the appearance 
of brevity in mind, and the four pages of typed A4 
questions were reduced to one double sided sheet of A4. 
The questionnaire was printed on an eye catchingly 
coloured paper to attempt to create more interest in 
it and to distinguish it from other documents. 
An iF.portant lesson was also learnt from the con-
trast in response rate to the N.E.L.S.C., and L.C.F. 
questionnaires. The former required the respondent to 
provide their own envelope and postage to return the 
161 L.C,F. Evaluation Framework Research Project, "Profile of 
Law Centres", Distributed to Law Centres in March/April 1987, 
see "Questions of Value" (_19881 Prt.2. 
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. . t h bt . d 3 4 ° (l 7 ) questlonnalre, ey o alne a u response. The 
L.C.F. provided a stamped addressed envelope and 
( 18\ 
obtained an 86% response. l Although it would be mis-
guided to attribute the whole of the difference to the 
provision of the prepaid envelope (since this would 
ignore such factors as the homogeneity of the agencies 
contacted, the certainty of their physical position, and 
the applicability of the questionnaire to them) , it does 
not seem unreasonable to attribute some of the difference 
to this factor. Because of this each questionnaire was 
accompanied by a prepaid envelope in the hope that this 
would increase the number of responses. 
2. Sample Design. 
In deciding to whom to send the questionnaires there 
were very few guidelines, and much was the result of 
personal educated judgement. There was no comprehensive 
source of information, and it soon became obvious that 
even before the questionnaires were sent that the sample 
could in no way be hoped to be fully comprehensive, nor 
would there be any way by which to judge just how 
comprehensive responses would be. Therefore like pre-
vious research results this sample could only be regarded 
as a starting point from which further more detailed 
information would have to be built up. Inevitably this 
would involve considerable further effort based on a 
large amount of speculative work, contacting agencies who 
17} Op.cit.,note (7) "Supplementary Report", undated. 
l8I Op.cit., note (16) p.l. 
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were not conspicuous by their name or any information 
that existed on them, as advice agencies of some form. 
The sample which was used was built up from a number 
of sources some more reliable than others. The informa-
tion collected by the N.E.L.S.C. work was regarded by 
members of the Administrative Group who compiled it to be 
"out of date in significant respects". (l 9 ) This threw 
doubt on both the addresses and the continuing existence 
of some of the agencies. Bearing this in ~ind and the 
reethodological differences mentioned above( 20) it was 
decided that direct information should only be used as a 
general guide to the type of groups who could be con-
tacted, rather than a definitive list of those who 
should be contacted. The listing was inaccurate in 
another respect in that it represented the first list of 
agencies contacted which only produced a 22% respons~( 2 l) 
and this compared to the supplementary responses from 
agencies who were in turn suggested by original agencies 
which produced a response of twenty-seven from forty-three 
additional questionnaires (63%). (22 ) There was no indica-
tion of who these agencies were or their whereabouts. 
The second source of information was a listing of 
voluntary agencies produced by North East Area N.A.C.A.B. 
with representatives of local advice agencies in February 
1988. This obviously had the considerable advantage of 
being up to date, but again was by no means perfect. 
19) Interview with John Swann, Sunderland Borough Council, 9,12.87. 
20} Op. cit., note (lll 
21} o.e.cit., note (71. 
22) Op.cit., note (171 . 
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Perhaps because of the geographical situation of those 
involved in compiling the list it was heavily biased 
towards Tyne & Wear alone with virtually no information 
at all relating to the other three north eastern counties. 
Also the terms of reference for the listing were 
slightly different from that intended to be used here, 
involving any organisation providing advice and/or repre-
sentation. This resulted in a high emphasis on CABx and 
even involved one firm of solicitors. Also the advice 
agencies appeared to fall into the bracket of those pro-
viding generalist advice in the more traditionally recog-
nised legal services areas, and thereby neither taking 
into account those providing advice and information to 
specific groups, or those counselling agencies who under-
take advice work as a secondary role, or even those 
agencies who act as a resource for other agencies. With 
some changes to take account of these problems this 
listing provided a basis, in Tyne and Wear at least, of 
the sample organisations. 
The final source of information involved the use of 
the most personal judgement and is therefore perhaps the 
most suspect as a means of generating a representative 
listing of agencies. Despite this, the Yellow Pages did 
prove a very fruitful source of information. There were 
several sections which produced relevant information, 
Information Services, Social Service and Welfare Organisa-
tions, Charitable and Benevolent Organisations (Clubs and 
Associations were also troubled but to less fruitful effect). 
The criteria used to choose agencies were varied, 
obviously agencies i.e. those emphasising advice, rights 
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or information in their title were the first choice, 
followed by those more well known agencies such as low 
pay units and centres against unemployment. After these 
the selection process became more subjective and although 
it was attempted to include as many agencies which were 
not perhaps so obvious in their role, it is impossible 
to judge the success in absolute terms. The choice varied 
between those organisations forming part of a considerable 
national network who it was suspected, because of this back-
up, might well provide advice in some form to their 
clientele e.g. MIND and MENCAP, to those organisations 
who by their name suggested a speciality which was 
thought likely to involve advice work in some form, e.g. 
' the Womens' Centre'. (23 ) 
It was from the combination of these sources that 
the sample was drawn up and to them that the question-
naire was sent. This work was undertaken during April 
1988 and in the questionnaire emphasis was placed on a 
swift response in the hope that it would avoid the corr~on 
problem of information sitting in an "in-tray" waiting to 
be dealt with at the last minute, or often simply not at 
all. 
C. Response 
The results obtained from this research were all based 
on the responses returned. This included all the agencies 
23} The problems inherent in this approach were recognised, but it 
seemed better in research such as this to try to generate and 
clarify information on as many organisations as possible, 
rather than making too many pre-judgements and then finding that 
the data generated was only on one very specific type of organisa-
tion. 
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providing relevant information but did not include those 
who were contacted on a trial basis and returned their 
questionnaires as fundamentally inappropriate to their 
role. (24 ) For example the rr.eaning of "welfare" in the 
title of an organisation could be deceptive and no clear 
cut way of judging in which cases these organisations 
were basically social clubs and in which they were pro-
viders of advice on welfare rights and social services 
was found. Similarly with residents associations, it 
was difficult to judge which were biased towards social 
activity and which were based more on the ideas of a 
tenants group. 
TABLE 1 Response to Questionnaires. 
County Number sent Number Returned Percentage 
Returned. 
Tyne and Wear 94 59 63% 
Northumberland 5 1 20% 
Durham 22 17 77% 
Cleveland 25 15 60% 
GRAND TOTAL 146 92 63% 
The response was satisfactory and with just under 
two-thirds of questionnaires being returned it seems to 
provide a reasonable database from which to draw con-
elusions about provision in the North East as a whole. 
The most disappointing response was from Northumberland, 
it was noted from the N.E.L.S.C. information that that 
county had very few advice agencies and it could be 
suggested that response reflects this rather than a 
24} ep.cit., note (lll. 
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failure to make contact with the sources of advice 
provision in the area. With regard to non-response-in 
general, by their nature it is impossible to say that 
agencies did not respond. Very few questionnaires were 
returned through the 'dead-letter' post, only five in 
total, so one must assume that all other agencies received 
their questionnaire. Also, it was explicitly stated in 
the letter accompanying the questionnaire that even if 
the questionnaire was inappropriate it would be useful 
to have it returned since this would clarify the situa-
tion for the future. Another six questionnaires were 
returned with this explanation but all were from among 
the trial questionnaires. Therefore the non-response 
category must be regarded as a mixture of inappropriate 
agencies who simply failed to confirm this fact, and appro-
priate agencies who were either unable, perhaps due to the 
constraints of time, or unwilling to respond to the 
questionnaire. 
Dear Madam/Sir , 
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Department of Law, 
University of Durham , 
50 North Bailey, 
Durham . DHl 3ET 
Advice Agencies in the North East 
I am a researcher at Durham University Law Department , looking 
into the provision of advice and legal services in the Nor th East . 
The enclosed questionnaire is the basis of an attempt to compile a 
database on the advice and information services in this area . Such 
a database would be of considerable value in establishing areas 
where there is a lack of information and advice, and also in 
assisting co-ordination among existing agencies . 
I have attempted to keep the questionnaire short as I realise 
your time is valuable, it should not take you more than about fifteen 
minutes to complete. I would ask you to complete and return it in 
the pre- paid envelope enclosed as soon as possible . If you cannot 
return it immediately, it will still be of value if returned at all, 
and preferably before 30th April, 1988. 
Do please feel free to make constructive comments on any part 
of the questionnaire or any other related issue which you consider 
important . If you do not feel the questionnaire is particularly 
suited to your organisation, would you please still return it since 
this is valuable in clarifying the situation for the future. 
I thank you for your co-operation and hope to hear from you 
soon . 
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APPENDIX C. Interviews conducted in the course of the 
research. 
My thanks must go to the following people who 
generously gave their time to be interviewed. They 
provided valuable information and insight into the 
provision of legal services in the North East of 
England. 
David Keating 
Robin Widdison 
Jill Welch 
Ben Hoare 
Shaun Kirby 
Anne Galbraith 
Roger Smith 
Richard Jenner 
John Swann 
Anne White 
Andy Cope 
Marian Robinson 
Jim King 
Pat Armstrong 
Jeremy Fish 
Mary McSorley 
Ellen Phethean 
Lyn Evans 
private practice solicitor and Chair 
of North Eastern Legal Services 
Committee. 
law and advice centre worker and 
barrister. 
former law centre worker, now a 
solicitor in private practice. 
former law centre worker, now a 
solicitor in private practice. 
Legal Aid Area Director for Area 8. 
lecturer in law at Newcastle Poly-
technic, and former chair of New-
castle Citizens Advice Bureau. 
Legal Action Group Director. 
researcher at National Association 
of Citizens Advice Bureaux central 
office. 
solicitor with Sunderland MDC. 
Durham Citizens Advice Bureau Manager. 
solicitor in private practice, and 
convenor of North East Legal Action 
Group. 
N.A.C.A.Bx Area Director. 
Ford and Pennywell Advice Centre 
Manager. 
Stockton Law Centre Management Com-
mittee Treasurer. 
Stockton Law Centre Solicitor. 
Middlesbrough Law Center Administrator. 
Gateshead Law Centre Worker. 
Law Centre Federation Administrator. 
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